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The abortion doctrine laid out in Roe v. Wade permits a procedure necessary to
preserve the life or the health of the pregnant woman, setting out what has come to be
called the “life exception” and the “health exception.” This Article investigates the
background and antecedents of the health exception, identifying three periods of
formation and change up to the drafting of the Model Penal Code in 1959. It
argues that theories of health lie at the heart of legal doctrine, shaping
common-law treatment of abortion and persisting in nineteenth- and twentieth-
century statutes. This account reveals origins of a health exception more robust
and formative than previously understood and illuminates some of the otherwise
puzzling formulations, distinctions, and legal categories that still shape abortion
doctrine today.
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INTRODUCTION: THE SEARCH FOR THE HEALTH EXCEPTION
In Roe v. Wade, the U.S. Supreme Court identified two “separate and distinct”
interests that a State may invoke in regulating abortion1: the wellbeing of the
pregnant person and the potential human life of the fetus.2 Throughout the
Court’s holding, something called “maternal health” structures a regime of rules,
each rule applying to a particular stage of pregnancy and triggered by a specified
1. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973).
2. Id. (“[T]he State does have an important and legitimate interest in preserving and protecting the
health of the pregnant woman . . . and that it has still another important and legitimate interest in
protecting the potentiality of human life.”).
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condition which makes the State’s interest “compelling.”3 First, the “now-
established medical fact” (circa 1973) that maternal mortality during the first
three months of pregnancy was lower from abortion than from childbirth meant
that before the end of the first trimester,4 the Court left an attending physician
“free to determine, without regulation by the State, that, in his medical judgment,
the patient’s pregnancy should be terminated.”5 Second, after the first trimester
but before fetal “viability,” the Court held the State could regulate abortion but
only to the extent that such a regulation “reasonably relates to the preservation
and protection of maternal health.”6 Third, after a fetus became “viable,”
presumably capable of “meaningful life outside the mother’s womb,”7 a State
interested in protecting fetal life could “go so far as to proscribe abortion”8 except
where “necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the
life or health of the mother.”9 Thus, at its most restrictive, Roe set forth two
exceptions, the “life exception” and the “health exception,” in which the State’s
interest in the pregnant person was to prevail against any interest it might have in
fetal life.
With this language, “maternal health” weighed as a state interest counterpoised
with potential fetal life and the “health exception” became a linchpin of
constitutional jurisprudence on abortion.10 Accordingly, since Roe, the health
exception has become a lightning rod for subsequent challenges,11 a perceived
Achilles’ heel for those trying to test the limits of Roe via statutory innovation,12
3. Id. at 162–63 (holding that the State’s interests in the potential life of the fetus and the health of the
pregnant person grow “in substantiality as the woman approaches term and, at a point during pregnancy,
each becomes ‘compelling’”). While Casey disrupted Roe’s trimester framework, the figure of maternal
health still weighs prominently in it and subsequent abortion jurisprudence. See Planned Parenthood of
S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
4. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 163–64.
8. Id.
9. Roe, 410 U.S. at 165.
10. Id.; see also Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) (invalidating provisions of restrictive Georgia law
and giving woman’s attending physician authority to decide a procedure’s necessity for health).
11. See, e.g., question presented in Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844–45
(1992) (testing whether Pennsylvania Act’s “medical emergency” exemption in three abortion-restrictive
provisions sufficiently ensures the Act does not significantly threaten a woman’s life or health); Stenberg
v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 929–30 (2000) (contesting the constitutionality of a statute criminalizing a
particular abortion procedure without exception for health of the pregnant person); Ayotte v. Planned
Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 328 (2006) (contesting the constitutionality of a parental
notification statute generally lacking a health exception but allowing emergency abortion without
parental notice when necessary to protect minor’s health); Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 161 (2007)
(contesting the constitutionality of a statute barring a procedure without regard to medical judgment of its
necessity for preserving pregnant woman’s health).
12. See, e.g., Partial Birth Abortion Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (fining or imprisoning any
physician who knowingly performs a “partial-birth abortion,” excepting only a procedure “necessary to
save the life of a mother” from “a physical condition caused by or arising from the pregnancy
itself . . . .”), contested in Carhart, 550 U.S. 124; see also, e.g., Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act § 5,
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and a matter of high anxiety both for supporters of women’s autonomy13 and
opponents of abortion.14 Surprisingly, though, despite its centrality to abortion
doctrine15 and significance in legal challenges since Roe,16 the history of the
health exception remains obscure.17 A flurry of scholarship over the fifteen years
before Roe scrutinized the doctrine regarding so-called “therapeutic abortion,”
abortion performed for health-curative purposes, but none tackled its origins.18
1974 Pa. Laws No. 209 § 5 (codified as PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6605(a) (1977)) (exposing physician to
criminal liability for failure to employ specified abortion technique, so long as alternative is not necessary
to preserve pregnant person’s life or health), contested in Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979);
Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982 § 3210(b), 1982 Pa. Laws No. 138 § 3210(b) (codified as 18
PA. CONS. STAT. § 3210(b) (1982)), contested in Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (requiring physician to use procedure offering highest likelihood of
aborting live fetus unless it presents “significantly greater” medical risk to patient’s life or health); NEB.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 28–328(1) (Supp. 1999) contested in Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
13. See, e.g., NARAL PRO-CHOICE AMERICA, ABORTION BANS WITHOUT EXCEPTIONS ENDANGER
WOMEN’S HEALTH 2–3 (Jan. 1, 2015), http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/media/fact-sheets/abortion-bans-
no-exceptions-endanger-women.pdf (press release noting that in Carhart, the Supreme Court “omi-
nously . . . turned its back on Roe’s core holding safeguarding women’s health”); cf. Judith Resnik &
Reva Siegel, Health Excepted, Health Accepted: Abortion, Health, and Law, BALKINIZATION (Sept. 22,
2008, 6:40 AM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2008/09/health-excepted-health-accepted.html (observing
that under the Roe framework and around the world, “‘health’ offers reasons for regulation as well as for
exemption from regulation” so that “every claim of health is itself a potential site of struggle”). For
consideration of part of the post-Roe jurisprudence and its effect on women’s autonomy, see, e.g., Jane
Maslow Cohen, A Jurisprudence of Doubt: Deliberative Autonomy and Abortion, 3 COLUM. J. GENDER &
L. 175 (1992) [hereinafter Cohen, A Jurisprudence of Doubt] (examining the effects of Casey on the
analytic structure in Roe and on women’s deliberative autonomy in regard to abortion).
14. See, e.g., Current Abortion Law: General Principles, MISSOURI RIGHT TO LIFE, (Dec. 10, 2000),
http://www.missourilife.org/law/genablaw.htm (the “health exception” is the “exception that swallows
the rule” and permits “infanticide”); see also, e.g., Americans United For Life, Trojan Horse “Health”
Exception Used To Strike Down Partial Birth Abortion Ban (Sept. 8, 2004), on file with NARAL
Pro-Choice America.
15. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 165; see also supra text accompanying notes 1–11; Mary Ziegler, The
Framing of a Right to Choose: Roe v. Wade and the Changing Debate on Abortion Law, 27 L. & HIST.
REV. 281, 282 (2007) (arguing the importance of public health, rather than rights-based, arguments in
pre-Roe advocacy of abortion legalization); Yvonne Lindgren, The Rhetoric of Choice: Restoring
Healthcare to the Abortion Right, 64 HASTINGS L. J. 385, 385 (2012–13) [hereinafter Lindgren, Restoring
Healthcare] (arguing that the Roe holding “viewed abortion as a right inextricably linked to healthcare”).
16. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. 833; Stenberg, 530 U.S. 914; Ayotte, 546 U.S. 320 (upholding precedent
that a State ban must except procedures to safeguard a woman’s health); Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (holding
that Congress might omit a health exception after finding that a given abortion procedure is “never”
medically necessary but leaving open the possibility of a facial challenge if an instance of medical
necessity were to arise); see also Lindgren, Restoring Healthcare, supra note 15, at 391–403 (describing
post-Roe abortion cases focused on health doctrine); Susan Frelich Appleton, Doctors, Patients and the
Constitution: A Theoretical Analysis of the Physician‘s Role in ‘Private’ Reproductive Decisions, 63
WASH. U. L.Q. 183, 187 (1985) (concluding “at least in the abortion context, the Court’s vision of privacy
makes the doctor, not his patient, the centerpiece”).
17. The historical recitation in Roe does not cover it. Roe, 410 U.S. at 129–147.
18. See, e.g., Herbert L. Packer and Ralph J. Gampell, Abortion: A Problem in Law and Medicine, 11
STAN. L. REV. 417 (1958–1959) (reporting results of an empirical study of doctors regarding perceptions
of medical indication for abortion); Monroe Trout, Therapeutic Abortion Laws Need Therapy, 37 TEMP.
L.Q. 172 (Winter 1964); James S. Bukes and William C. Hewson, The Legal Status of Therapeutic
Abortion, 27 U. PITT. L. REV. 669 (1965–1966) (arguing that proposed Model Penal Code language, circa
1962, that lacked legal justification for therapeutic abortion, would improperly restrict the law compared
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Historian Cyril Means, whose work19 convinced the Roe majority20 that women
traditionally enjoyed a common-law liberty to abort,21 did not provide an account
either. Other works of legal history since Roe, including exceptionally thorough
social histories of physicians’ movements in the nineteenth century and the
micropolitics of abortion-liberalization movements during the twentieth century,
have also not focused specifically on the health exception itself nor provided an
account of its origins.22 This Article addresses that gap.
Deciphering an Unfamiliar Past
In this Article, I trace the health exception and its antecedents through three
periods: early-modern common-law, during which theories of health based on an
with the status quo); Zad Leavy and Jerome M. Kummer, Abortion and the Population Crisis;
Therapeutic Abortion and the Law; Some New Approaches, 27 OHIO ST. L.J. 647 (1966) (contending
abortion laws need to be reformed to bring them into line with widespread medical practice and to permit
pregnancy termination by a physician for medical or humanitarian reasons). NB: The “health exception”
has also been referred to as the “therapeutic exception,” referring to abortion performed for
health-curative purposes.
19. Cyril Means, The Law of New York Concerning Abortion and the Status of the Foetus, 1664–1968:
A Case of Cessation of Constitutionality (pt. 1), 14 N.Y.L.F. 411 (1968) [hereinafter Means, Cessation of
Constitutionality]; Cyril Means, The Phoenix of Abortional Freedom: Is a Penumbral or Ninth-
Amendment Right About to Arise from the Nineteenth Century Legislative Ashes of a Fourteenth Century
Common Law Liberty?, 17 N.Y.L.F. 335 (1971) [hereinafter Means, The Phoenix of Abortional
Freedom].
20. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 132–152 (citing Means, Cessation of Constitutionality, supra note 19;
Means, The Phoenix of Abortional Freedom, supra note 19).
21. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 132 (citing Means, Cessation of Constitutionality, supra note 19, in
concluding that “[i]t is undisputed that, at common law, abortion performed before ‘quickening’—the
first recognizable movement of the fetus in utero, appearing usually from the 16th to the 18th week of
pregnancy—was not an indictable offense.”).
22. Scholars have produced some excellent works of social history and historical sociology on
abortion in the U.S., but none have made explaining the health exception and its origins a principal aim.
See, e.g., DONALD T. CRITCHLOW, INTENDED CONSEQUENCES: BIRTH CONTROL, ABORTION, AND THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IN MODERN AMERICA (1999) (arguing that the abortion rationale in federal health
programs between World War II and Roe—concern for population control more than for women’s
rights—affected abortion politics, coalitions, and policies after Roe); DAVID J. GARROW, LIBERTY AND
SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE MAKING OF ROE V. WADE (1994) [hereinafter GARROW,
LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY] (detailing how abortion was provided and how abortion-law liberalization was
debated from 1917–1972, with a focus on liberty and sexuality, privacy and birth control rather than ideas
of health or origins of the health exception); KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF
MOTHERHOOD especially 30–31 (1984) [hereinafter LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHER-
HOOD] (tracing current polarized feelings on abortion to trajectories set in a nineteenth-century
physicians’ campaign that used opposition to abortion to establish perceptions of physicians’ moral
stature and technical expertise); JAMES C. MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA: THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF
NATIONAL POLICY, 1800–1900 (1978) [hereinafter MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA] (describing practice and
regulation of abortion, but not the ideas of health under which it was performed nor the earlier origins of
the health exception); LESLIE J. REAGAN, WHEN ABORTION WAS A CRIME: WOMEN, MEDICINE, AND THE LAW
1867–1973 (1997) [hereinafter REAGAN, WHEN ABORTION WAS A CRIME] (describing the practice of
abortion after its statutory prohibition, including therapeutic abortion conducted legally under the health
exception, but not focused on the origins of the health exception); see also infra text accompanying notes
33–35, 38–42 (distinguishing the approach, subject matter, and conclusions of this Article from prior
works).
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idea of the humors predominated;23 the first half of the nineteenth century, a
pivotal period of innovation;24 and a period of reconsolidation in health theory
and practice from 1857 until the drafting of the Model Penal Code (M.P.C.) in
195925 (which shaped debate over the last decade before Roe).26 Delving into the
completely unfamiliar regime of health that informed earlier periods during
which legal doctrine was formed, this Article illuminates antecedents of the
health exception and gives grounds to reassess our understanding of contempo-
rary abortion doctrine more generally.27
This past is a foreign country. Prenatal imaging and pregnancy tests did not
exist before the 1930s.28 Scientists still debated the exact duration of human
gestation itself into the 1820s, and laypersons, even later.29 Knowledge of sepsis
23. See infra Part I.
24. See infra Part II.
25. MODEL PENAL CODE §230.3 (1959, full draft of M.P.C. finalized 1962), reprinted in MELODY ROSE,
ABORTION: A DOCUMENTARY AND REFERENCE GUIDE 38 (2008) [hereinafter ROSE, ABORTION DOCUMEN-
TARY GUIDE].
26. See infra Part III.
27. See infra Part I. A–C.
28. In regard to prenatal imaging, see Ian Donald, J. MacVicar, & T.G. Brown, Investigation of
Abdominal Masses by Pulsed Ultrasound, 1 LANCET 1188, 1188–95 (1958); Douglass H. Howry, The
Ultrasonic Visualization of Soft Tissue Structures and Disease Processes, 40 J. LABORATORY & CLINICAL
MED. 812, 812–13 (1952) (reporting Howry’s discovery of the first means to produce tomographic
images of human anatomy); see generally S. Campbell, A Short History of Sonography in Obstetrics and
Gynaecology, FACTS, VIEWS & VISION IN OBGYN 213 (2013). In regard to pregnancy tests, see Harry E.
Kaplan, M.D., The Aschheim-Zondek Hormone Test for Pregnancy, 3 CAL, & W. MED. 412,
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1657279/?page!1 (reporting Selmar Aschheim and Bern-
hard Zondek’s isolation of the hormone human chorionic gonadotropin, hCG, and development of the
“A-Z Test,” a test of injecting human urine in a mouse that could detect the presence of hCG); see also
Marian D. Damewood, M.D. & John A. Rock, M.D., In Memoriam: Georgeanna Seegar Jones, M.D.:
Her Legacy Lives On, 84 FERTILITYAND STERILITY 541 (Aug. 2005), https://www.deepdyve.com/lp/elsevier/
in-memoriam-georgeanna-seegar-jones-m-d-her-legacy-lives-on-JvDw1P3MuE (reporting Jones’discov-
ery around 1936 that hCG was produced by the placenta, rather than the pituitary as previously thought);
Judith L. Vaitukaitis, Glenn Braunstein, & Griff Ross, A Radioimmunoassay Which Specifically Measures
Human Chorionic Gonadotropin in the Presence of Human Luteinizing Hormone, 113 AM. J. OBSTETRICS
GYNECOLOGY 751 (1972) (reporting their discovery of a test sensitive enough to detect a subunit of hCG
only days after a missed period); Andrea Tone, A Thin Blue Line: A History of the Pregnancy Test Kit, 81
BULL. HIST. MED. 439 (2007) (in review of NIH exhibit, explaining the first FDA approval, in 1976, of a
home pregnancy test); Office of NIH History, A Thin Blue Line: The History of the Pregnancy Test Kit
(Sarah Leavitt curator, Dec. 3, 2003–present) https://history.nih.gov/exhibits/thinblueline/.
29. Karl Ernst von Baer discovered the mammalian ovum only in 1826. KARL ERNST VON BAER, ON
THE GENESIS OF THE OVUM OF MAMMALS AND OF MAN 137 (Charles Donald O’Malley trans., 1956) (1827)
(establishing that mammals develop from eggs). The human ovum was not given detailed description
until Edgar Allen’s work in 1928. Edgar Allen et al., Recovery of Human Ova from the Uterine Tubes:
Time of Ovulation in Menstrual Cycle, 91 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1018 (1928). In regard to the persistence of
imprecise understandings of human gestation among laypeople, see for example Joseph Hall, Judge
of Probate etc. v. Hancock, 32 Mass. (15 Pick.) 255, 257 (1834) (defense counsel opposing eligibility of
after-born heir on grounds that gestation defies precise specification and for a given fetus can vary by up
to several weeks).
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in childbirth30 and how to prevent it in gynecological procedures31 became
widespread in the U.S. only by the last quarter of the nineteenth century, and
antibiotics, by the 1930s.32 The sense of uncertainty—even unknowability—
regarding what takes place inside a woman’s body and the dread risks of
abnormal childbirth or surgical interventions to terminate pregnancy are hard for
us to grasp, but they played a significant role in the experience of interrupted
menstruation, pregnancy, and its alternatives in the past. Perhaps equally hard for
us to grasp is that, in addition to what it lacked, the past had its own
understandings and logics. Incorporating prior conceptions of health, including
humoral doctrine, into the reading of legal history is where this Article departs
from other histories of U.S. abortion law.33 Reading legal doctrine across time
demands that we engage a historical sensibility and suspend presentist assump-
tions about what, for people of a given time, even constituted the basic
parameters of an experience or problem.34
Regarding abortion, I categorize practices upon which women and their
caregivers have relied as potional (meaning, primarily, ingested substances);35
30. IGNAZ SEMMELWEIS, ETIOLOGY, CONCEPT, AND PROPHYLAXIS OF CHILDBED FEVER (K. Codell trans.,
1983) (1861) (reporting Semmelweis’ 1847 discovery of sepsis as a cause of maternal mortality in
childbirth, and doctor hand washing and other doctor disinfection measures as the key to its prevention).
31. Joseph Lister, On the Antiseptic Principle in the Practice of Surgery, 90 THE LANCET 353 (1867);
Joseph Lister, Of the Effects of the Antiseptic System of Treatment on the Salubrity of a Surgical Hospital,
95 THE LANCET 4 (1870) (reporting the findings of Joseph and Agnes Lister’s experiments with
antiseptics and their application to preventing infection from surgery).
32. Alexander K. Fleming, On The Bacterial Action of the Cultures of a Penicillium, with Special
Reference to their use in the Isolation of B. Influenza, 10 BRIT. J. EXPERIMENTAL PATHOLOGY 226 (1929)
(reporting Fleming’s 1927 discovery of antibiotics, in the form of penicillin).
33. See, e.g., MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA, supra note 22 (giving a detailed history of abortion law,
but missing the theory of health under which abortion was performed); see also JOHN RIDDLE,
CONTRACEPTION AND ABORTION FROM THE ANCIENT WORLD TO THE RENAISSANCE (1992) [hereinafter
RIDDLE, ANCIENT ABORTION] (giving a thorough history of abortion practice, but deemphasizing
contemporaneous theories of health).
34. This Article follows Monica H. Green’s endeavor “to explore medical systems of the past on their
own terms. These societies saw a different body than we do, not necessarily because the physical body
itself differed significantly, but because their intellectual structures of explanation and their social
objectives in controlling the body differed. The task . . . is to reconstruct an image of the world that they
saw, a sensation of the body as they experienced.” Monica H. Green, Introduction to THE TROTULA: AN
ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF THE MEDIEVAL COMPENDIUM OF WOMEN’S MEDICINE 1, 20–21 (Monica H. Green
ed. and trans., 2001) [hereinafter Green, Introduction to THE TROTULA]. For discussion of presentism
more generally, see Michal Jan Rozbicki, Intercultural Studies: The Methodological Contours of an
Emerging Discipline, in PERSPECTIVES ON INTERCULTURALITY: THE CONSTRUCTION OF MEANING IN
RELATIONSHIPS OF DIFFERENCE 1, 14 (Michal Jan Rozbicki ed., 2015) (analogizing presentism to
ethnocentricity, both cases of the “enormous power of taken-for-granted prejudgments over our attempts
to reconstruct other people’s reality,” and in regard to presentism, warning against censuring people of
past times for “not conforming to the values or ideology” of the present). For discussion of presentism
functioning in a practice context, see for example Monica Eppinger, Karen Knopp & Annelise Riles,
Diplomacy and its Others, 6 EWHA J. GENDER & L. 1, 11 (June 2014) (describing presentism in the
practice of diplomacy).
35. See infra Part I.C.
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external manipulation;36 and internal intrusion.37 Within each category, I identify
different techniques specific to particular periods to understand precisely what
practices were at issue in particular cases, legislative debates, and doctrines.
More fundamentally, the milieu of knowledge and care within which techniques
were developed, taught, and applied itself changes. The sociological context of
care has been the recurring focus of histories of abortion in the United States.38
One contribution of this Article is to look at shifts in ideas that drive, abet, or
undermine changes in the sociological context of abortion practice. I am
concerned with what is considered at stake for people of different times, the
meanings they attach to health, health care, and abortion.39
Many historical investigations into the conceptual background of abortion
doctrine focus on “life” and its timing.40 Particular details might be new, but the
moves are familiar to us: changing senses of when human life begins mask a
deeper set of ontological questions—what it means to be human, what is at stake
at different points in development. We get that a secularization of understanding
“the human” and its inception has taken place, and that theological debate has
given way to scientific investigation. In other words, our time has equipped us to
accept that understandings of “life” have changed or multiplied. In new questions
about human life, we can see new grounds that have emerged for raising those
questions and new apparatuses for providing answers.
This Article shifts the focus from life to health and foregrounds epistemology.
The person seeking care faces her own set of questions, a multiplicity of ways of
understanding what is happening in the present and what that means for the
future. What is health; when is it vulnerable or what imperils it: behind these
questions stand the fundamentally epistemic matters of how one understands,
intuits, inquires, conceptualizes, decides. Understanding the grounds from which
such questions arise and the apparatuses from which acceptable answers may be
generated requires an anthropology of knowledge, an inquiry into the “epistemic
36. See infra Part I.C.
37. See infra Part I.C.
38. For history of abortion in sociological context, see generally MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA, supra
note 22; MARVIN OLASKY, ABORTION RITES: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF ABORTION IN AMERICA (1992); REAGAN,
WHEN ABORTION WAS A CRIME, supra note 22. For parallel history in England, see for example JOHN
KEOWN, ABORTION, DOCTORS, AND THE LAW: SOME ASPECTS OF LEGAL REGULATION OF ABORTION IN
ENGLAND FROM 1803 TO 1982 (Charles Webster and Charles Rosenberg eds., 1988) [hereinafter KEOWN,
ABORTION, DOCTORS, AND THE LAW].
39. Even recent scholarship undertaking a close reading of the health exception in Supreme Court
jurisprudence since Roe, without inquiring into fundamental concepts of health, in my view puts the cart
before the horse. See, e.g., Stephen G. Gilles, Roe’s Life-or-Health Exception: Self-Defense or
Relative-Safety, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 525 (2009-2010).
40. See, e.g., John T. Noonan, An Almost Absolute Value in History, in THE MORALITY OF ABORTION:
LEGAL AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 51 (John T. Noonan, Jr. ed., 1970) (asserting “the most fundamental
question involved in the long history of thought on abortion is: How do you determine the humanity of a
being?”).
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engagement of human beings with their environments.”41 That is the aim of the
Article.
Throughout the periods under study, different kinds of knowledge—medicine,
biological science, and human self-understanding—developed along their own
trajectories. In each Part of this Article, I identify intersections of those
trajectories that, I argue, prove dispositive to the emergence of a “health
exception” doctrine. A few specific points prove significant in the development of
the doctrine: shifts in accepted health theory and medical practice; emergent
understandings of human ontology; and changing modes of knowledge produc-
tion and patterns of diffusion.42 The interplay between these shifts has profound
effects for what women do in relation to their bodies, what is considered at stake
when they do, and when and why the law takes a stand in the name of health.
Earlier ideas about health and life differ significantly from present-day ideas but
are indispensable to understanding legal doctrine of our own time. Medical
practices informed by past ideas might wane and the underlying health theory
pass away, but legal doctrines formed in response to earlier practices and beliefs
continue to sound in contemporary legal debate. Common law doctrines on
abortion still referenced today are not properly legible to twenty-first century
minds unless we understand underlying ideas of health and life and the practices
they inspired.
Roadmap
Part I looks to medieval and early modern common law for evidence of a
“health exception” doctrine, or its absence, and to uncover its antecedent logics.43
To understand a “health exception,” we must first understand what earlier peoples
meant by “health.” Part I describes prior health ideas44 and then health
practices,45 arguing that under a humoral theory of health accepted in the United
States through the nineteenth century, administering what would now be
understood as an abortifacient could itself have been recognized as only, or
primarily, therapeutic. Fundamental theories of health guided medical practitio-
41. Dominic Boyer, Visiting an Anthropology of Knowledge: An Introduction, 70 ETHNOS: J.
ANTHROPOLOGY 141, 148 (2005), http://anthropology.rice.edu/uploadedFiles/People/Faculty_and_Staff_
Profiles/Boyer_Documents/visiting%20knowledge.pdf; cf. LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF
MOTHERHOOD, supra note 22 (taking a sociology of knowledge approach—looking at knowledge in
social context—rather than investigating the production and evolution of concepts and their co-
constitutive interactions with social formations and power, which would be an aim of an anthropology of
knowledge).
42. In other words, in understanding the history of the health exception, I argue that an important
subtext is that modes of veridiction have shifted over time. On modes of veridiction, see Michel Foucault,
Les Quatres Modes de Ve´ridiction Antiques [The Four Modes of Ancient Veridiction], Lecture at the
College de France, (Feb. 1, 1984), at YOUTUBE https://www.youtube.com/watch?v!b2ZFPNRXwPk;
see also Paul Rabinow, Dewey and Foucault: What’s the Problem?, 11 FOUCAULT STUD. 11 (Feb. 2011),
http://rauli.cbs.dk/index.php/foucault-studies/article/viewFile/3202/3415.
43. See infra Part I.
44. See infra Part I.A.
45. See infra Part I.C.
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ners and patients to uterine purgatives; while a desire to avoid unwanted births
might have been co-present (or not), any potion or manipulation to induce
menstruation was underwritten by a health rationale.
Part I explains theories and practices prevalent in Europe and North America at
least through the third quarter of the nineteenth century. This material supports
the conclusion that, in performing what we would now consider abortion, health
was not the exception, it was the rule. Part I explains that abortion to save the life
of the mother was, by contrast, the exception46: “saving life” entailed interven-
tion later in pregnancy, increasing risk to the pregnant woman and rationally
undertaken only if inaction posed a greater danger to her than intervention.
Common-law abortion doctrine incorporated these background understandings.
In it, the end of Part I reports, a “health exception” existed in two versions, one
that I characterize as “the constructive health exception” and the other, as a
“life-health exception” at a time when, in medical practice, life and health were
inseparable.
The story changes after enactment of the first abortion statute (in Great Britain
in 1803, in the U.S. in 1821).47 Legislatures got involved in formulating abortion
doctrine, producing three waves of statutes in the U.S. The first two occurred
during a period of intense change that I refer to as “the short nineteenth century”
running from 1820 to 1857, the subject of Part II.48 Part II describes how the
“health exception” entered statute, influenced by three parallel developments of
this time. First, the increasing profile of science and the rise of professional men
of medicine altered patterns of production and circulation of medical knowledge.
Second, as midwifery waned and surgeons and commercial providers increas-
ingly took over gynecological practice, “abortion” in the public mind became
increasingly associated with intrusive measures. Third, underlying conceptions
of health fundamentally began to shift away from humoral health.
Part III outlines a period of consolidation: of legislatures’ hold on regulating
abortion, of formally trained physicians’ monopolization of women’s health care
practice, and of adherence to new theories of health and disease. I refer to this
period as “the long twentieth century,” pegging its inception at 1857 with the
founding of the American Medical Association Committee on Criminal Abortion.
Part III traces developments in biological science and breakthroughs in medical
knowledge, as well as fundamental shifts regarding which traditions could speak
truth about medicine; who practices medicine and how; and the parallel loss of a
rich body of knowledge and practice of potional abortion. Finally, this Part
46. See infra Part I. C.
47. See, in the U.K., The Malicious Shooting Bill or Stabbing Act 1803, 43 Geo. 3 ch. 58 §§ 1, 2
(initiating modern statutory regulation of abortion) [hereinafter Lord Ellenborough’s Act], reprinted at
https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Lord_Ellenborough’s_Act_1803; in the U.S., An Act Concerning Crimes
and Punishments § 14, 1821 Conn. Rev. Pub. Laws tit. 22, §§ 14, 16 (codified at CONN. REV. STAT. tit. 22,
§§ 14 at 152 (1821) (Connecticut legislative provision initiating statutory regulation of abortion in the
U.S.).
48. See infra Part II.
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follows the implications for the “health exception”—during a time in which the
grounds for the exception precipitously contracted and then unexpectedly
expanded—until 1959 when the Model Penal Code proposed a standardized
codification.49
The debate over abortion writ large is often cast as a fetal right to life versus a
woman’s right to choose.50 This Article raises what it means to be healthy as an
overlooked but dispositive background feature of the debate. The Conclusion
synthesizes the overarching argument, that fundamental change in conceptions of
health has remade the content and range of the “health exception,” even as law
has preserved some of its earliest formulations.51
I. HEALTH AT COMMON LAW
Health, life, abortion: these are the three starting terms for our investigation.
This Part takes on three tasks: to review conceptions of health dominant in early
modern England52; to use them to understand the backdrop of medicine and
gynecological practice53 against which formation and promulgation of common
law doctrine took place; and then to revisit early modern legal doctrine
concerning abortion and the health exception, bearing in mind the conceptual
background of this time.54 As this Part will show, ideas and practices from
Mediterranean antiquity figure prominently in this history55 for reasons specifi-
cally related to women’s health and with direct consequences for the practice and
conceptualization of abortion. In particular, ideas from the Hippocratic tradition
(fifth-second century B.C.)56 and the physician Claudius Galen (129-199 A.D.)57
49. See infra Part III.
50. See, e.g., P.G. Coffey, Therapeutic Abortion, 31 THE ADVOCATE (VANCOUVER BAR ASS’N ), 99, 99
(1973) (“The argument about whether abortion is right or wrong is over the question of the foetus’ or
unborn child’s claim to ‘life’”).
51. See infra Conclusion.
52. See infra Part I.A.
53. See infra Part I.B. and Part I.C.
54. See infra Part I.D.
55. On the influence of Hippocratic and Galenic thought in England even before the medieval or early
modern periods, see for example RICHARD MARSDEN, THE CAMBRIDGE OLD ENGLISH READER 17 (2004)
(explaining that much of the content of the four surviving major Old English medical treatises (from
before 1100 A.D.) is translation of Latin works retransmitting the traditions of Hippocrates and Galen).
56. The Hippocratic tradition was established in a body of anonymous Greek writings from the fifth
and fourth centuries B.C., eventually circulated together under the name of the physician Hippocrates of
Cos (b. 460 B.C.). W.H.S. Jones, General Introduction, in HIPPOCRATES, HIPPOCRATES ix, xliii (W.H.S.
Jones trans., 1979 (1923)). Hippocratic ideas about women’s health are conveyed to early modern Europe
in two principal texts, Diseases of Women I and Diseases of Women II. Green, Introduction to THE
TROTULA, supra note 34, at 15. For English translation of the Hippocratic treatise on women’s
physiology, see HIPPOCRATES, Nature of Women, in 10 HIPPOCRATES 189 (Paul Potter ed. & trans., Loeb
Classical Library 2012) (fifth century B.C.).
57. For biographical details and discussion of Galen’s ideas, see Peter Brain, Galen and His System:
An Introduction, in PETER BRAIN, GALEN ON BLOODLETTING: A STUDY OF THE ORIGINS, DEVELOPMENT, AND
VALIDITY OF HIS OPINIONS, WITH A TRANSLATION OF THE THREE WORKS 1 (Peter Brain ed. & trans., 1986)
[hereinafter Brain, Introduction to Galen]. On Galen’s influence on medieval medicine and the
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are key. Through a formative period of the common law—encompassing the time
of Bracton’s treatise On the Laws and Customs of England (1210–1268)58
through the time of Sir Edward Coke (1628-1644),59 Sir Matthew Hale (d.
1676),60 and beyond61—Hippocratic-Galenic theories served as the taken-for-
granted background of health practice.62 It is to them that we turn first.
A. MEDIEVAL AND EARLY MODERN HEALTH
1. Humors and Humoral Balance
In the Hippocratic-Galenic theories that came to dominate in Europe, good
health depends on maintaining a correct balance of certain “humors” (manifest in
development of early modern gynecology, see Green, Introduction to THE TROTULA, supra note 34, at
18–25. For three of Galen’s works in English translation, see PETER BRAIN, GALEN ON BLOODLETTING: A
STUDY OF THE ORIGINS, DEVELOPMENT, AND VALIDITY OF HIS OPINIONS, WITH A TRANSLATION OF THE THREE
WORKS 15 (Peter Brain ed. & trans., 1986) (second century A.D.) [hereinafter GALEN, ON BLOODLET-
TING].
58. HENRI DE BRACTON, 2 ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND (George Woodbine Latin text,
Samuel E. Thorne trans., 1968–1977) (1210–1268), http://bracton.law.harvard.edu/Unframed/English/
v2/340.htm [hereinafter BRACTON, LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND]; See also infra Part I.D.2 (describing
Bracton’s liability and rescue doctrines).
59. SIR EDWARD COKE, A FOURTH PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (W. Clarke & Sons
ed. 1817) (1628–1644), https://books.google.com/books?id!S2w0AQAAMAAJ&pg!PA251&lpg!PA
251&dq!3"E."3"Coron."163&source!bl&ots!LTVhC9Lv0w&sig!o9JxlE9G25vntYsGXg7wB3
kg1fg&hl!en&sa!X&ei!91zhVMAVhKmDBMKwhIAP&ved!0CBQQ6AEwAA#v!onepage&q!
3%20E.%203%20Coron.%20163&f!false [hereinafter COKE, LAWS OF ENGLAND FOURTH].
60. 1 SIR MATTHEW HALE, HISTORY OF PLEAS OF THE CROWN: OR A METHODICAL SUMMARY OF THE
PRINCIPAL MATTERS RELATING TO THAT SUBJECT (1736) (1682), [hereinafter HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN],
reprinted at https://archive.org/details/historiaplacitor01hale; see also infra Part I.D.3 (describing Hale’s
intent doctrine).
61. See infra Part II (discussing the persistence of these ideas and practices into the nineteenth century
and challenges to them that arise over the century).
62. For evidence of gynecological practice and its background in medieval treatises that circulated
through early modern times, see for example THE TROTULA: AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF THE MEDIEVAL
COMPENDIUM OF WOMEN’S MEDICINE (Monica H. Green ed. and trans., 2002) (twelfth century)
[hereinafter THE TROTULA]; see also HILDEGARD OF BINGEN, HOLISTIC HEALING (Manfred Pawlik trans.
Latin-German, 1989; Patrick Madigan, S.J. trans. German-English; Mary Palmquist & John Kulas,
O.S.B. eds. of English text, 1994) (1151–1158) [hereinafter HILDEGARD OF BINGEN, HEALING]. On the
particular prominence of the Trotula and Hildegard’s work in medieval and early modern health practice,
see HILDEGARD OF BINGEN, HEALING, id., at 72 (with the Trotula, Hildegard’s work is the most consulted
handbook on women’s health in medieval Europe); Green, Introduction to THE TROTULA, supra note 34,
at 2; id., at 60 (explaining the Trotula informs medieval practice from “Italy to Ireland, from Spain to
Poland”); Monica H. Green, Obstetrical and Gynecological Texts in Middle English, 14 STUD. AGE
CHAUCER 53–88 (1992) (explaining five of the ten gynecological texts in Middle English are renditions of
the Trotula). For a sixteenth-century example of Galenism in thinking about health, see for example JEAN
FERNEL, THE “PHYSIOLOGIA” OF JEAN FERNEL (John M. Forrester & John Henry eds. and trans., Am. Phil.
Soc’y 2003) (1567) [hereinafter “PHYSIOLOGIA” OF JEAN FERNEL]; see also John Henry & John M.
Forrester, Introduction, in THE “PHYSIOLOGIA” OF JEAN FERNEL, 1, 1, 4–5, 8 (John M. Forrester & John
Henry eds. and trans., Am. Phil. Soc’y 2003) [hereinafter Henry & Forrester, Introduction to FERNEL]
(describing Fernel’s “Physiologia” as the fullest exposition of Renaissance Galenism, representing the
“high-water mark of European Galenism”).
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the bodily fluids of blood, phlegm, yellow bile, and black bile)63 and elements
(hot, cold, wet, and dry).64 Poor interworking of the elements or disruption in the
balance of humors causes illness65 and calls for intervention to restore balance.66
When it comes to humors, excess was considered as dangerous as deficiency,67
and many treatments were meant to absorb or rid the body of excess.68 One
famous method of restoring humoral balance, if an excess build-up of the
sanguine humor was diagnosed, was blood-letting.69 “Venesection,” an incision
into a vein to release blood, became a practiced art.70 One famous example shows
the persistence of a view of health as “balance,” with Galenic treatments for
re-balancing, in the United States: the blood-letting treatment demanded by
George Washington, subsequently re-prescribed by his doctors, resulting in his
being bled four times in the last forty-eight hours of life of roughly eighty ounces
of blood.71 A century later, an eminent Boston physician confirmed that the
bleeding given Washington would have been acceptable treatment for the same
condition in 1860.72
63. Manfred Pawlik, Foreword to HILDEGARD OF BINGEN, HOLISTIC HEALING, xvi (Manfred Pawlik
trans. Latin-German; John Kulas, O.S.B. trans. German-English; Mary Palmquist & John Kulas, O.S.B.
eds. of English text, 1994 (1989)) [hereinafter Pawlik, Foreword to HILDEGARD].
64. See, e.g., HILDEGARD OF BINGEN, HEALING, supra note 62, at 45 (“Fire, air, water, and earth are in
every human being . . . If the elements work properly in a human being, they sustain him and keep him
healthy. However, if they do not live harmoniously in him they disturb him and make him sick.”); see also
“PHYSIOLOGIA” OF JEAN FERNEL, supra note 62, ch. 5, at 198–200 (“The body of man, like everything
else, is united and held together by the coalescence of the four elements.”).
65. See, e.g., HILDEGARD OF BINGEN, HEALING, supra note 62, at 51 (“a condition of peace and health”
depends on maintaining the humors in “correct balance and proper proportion” but “when they conflict
with each other, the humors make him weak and sick . . .”).
66. Pawlik, Foreword to HILDEGARD, supra note 63, at xvi–xvii (Galen’s theory of humors explains
physical health and temperament); Henry & Forrester, Introduction to FERNEL, supra note 62, at 10.
67. HILDEGARD OF BINGEN, HEALING, supra note 62, at 46 (“[W]henever any humor increases beyond
its proper amount, the person is in danger.”).
68. See, e.g., JAMES HAMILTON, OBSERVATIONS ON UTILITY AND ADMINISTRATION OF PURGATIVE
MEDICINE IN SEVERAL DISEASES (1805). The work of Hamilton (1749–1835), one of the physicians to the
Royal Infirmary, enjoyed such popularity that it is reprinted through seven editions. 2 JOHN COMRIE,
HISTORY OF SCOTTISH MEDI.CINE 489 (1932), https://archive.org/stream/b20457273M002/b20457273
M002_djvu.txt [hereinafter COMRIE, HISTORY OF SCOTTISH MEDICINE].
69. See, e.g., Galen, On Venesection [surgery to cut a vein] against Erasistratus, in GALEN, ON
BLOODLETTING supra note 57, at 15, 21, 25; Galen, On Venesection against the Erasistrateans in Rome, in
GALEN, supra at 38, 38–41, 53; Galen, On Treatment by Venesection, in GALEN, supra at 67, 67–99.
70. See, e.g., On Treatment by Venesection, supra note 69. For an example of the accepted use of
bloodletting to treat a variety of diagnoses interpreted as an excess of sanguine humor, see ARCHBALD
PITCAIRNE, THE METHOD OF CURING THE SMALL-POX; WRITTEN IN THE YEAR 1704 OF THE USE OF THE
NOBLE AND HONOURABLE FAMILY MARCH (printed ed. 1715) (advising, before the introduction of
inoculation knowledge from Turkey to England, bloodletting from the arm and then a purgative to treat
smallpox), cited in COMRIE, HISTORY OF SCOTTISH MEDICINE, supra note 68, at 428–29.
71. See, e.g., The Death of George Washington, Digital Encyclopedia of George Washington,
http://www.mountvernon.org/research-collections/digital-encyclopedia/article/the-death-of-george-
washington/.
72. See J.H. Mason Knox, Jr., The Medical History of George Washington, His Physicians, Friends,
and Advisers, 1 BULL. INST. HIST. MED. 174, at 180 (1933) (reporting Washington’s treatment and the
opinion, a century later, of Boston physician Dr. James Jackson). Despite skepticism, “heroic treatment”
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2. Warmth, Retained Matter, and Natural Purgation
The idea of humoral balance provided an overarching heuristic within which
other details of Galen’s theories of health fit. Men, in Galen’s schema, are
constitutionally “warmer”73 than women,74 a fact of physiology with basic
effects on digestion and consequences for women’s humoral balance. The deficit
of “heat” in women,75 Galen thought, leaves women unable to concoct (“literally,
‘cook’”)76 their nutrients during digestion as thoroughly as men.77 Retained
matter, like the residue from digestion, leads to humoral imbalance and illness.78
Women, because of their insufficient heat, produce a greater proportion of
leftover or waste matter during digestion, but they cannot get rid of it through
other processes like sweating or hair growth that occur naturally in men.79 Due to
their innate coldness and its consequences, women need an additional method of
purging themselves of waste matter. Menstruation, in Galenic theories of health,
serves that indispensable function.80
3. Menstruation: First, a Means of Purgation
Menstruation, a regular process of emission directly involving one of the
humors (blood), thus bore particular significance in Galenic theories of health.
Whereas in modern Western thought, menstruation is considered “a mere
by-product of the female reproductive cycle,” a monthly shedding of uterine
lining when no fertilized ovum is implanted, “in Hippocratic and Galenic
as a response to the inflammation in Washington’s throat is still legible to medical commentators as late as
the 1930s. Id. at 182.
73. In “hot” and “cold,” Galen and Galenic physicians are not referring to measurable differences in
thermal heat (and, moreover, no instruments then existed to measure thermal heat) but rather are referring
to general principles of warmth or its absence. Green, Introduction to THE TROTULA, supra note 34, at
174 n.81.
74. GALEN, De usu partium, bk. 14, ch. 7, at 630 (Margaret Tallmadge May trans., 1968), cited in
“PHYSIOLOGIA” OF JEAN FERNEL, supra note 62, at 625 n.8.
75. GREEN, Introduction to THE TROTULA, supra note 34, at 19–20 (“[D]efect it was, for heat was the
very principle of life, its absence or deficiency a sign of a less than perfect life form.”).
76. Id. at 20.
77. Id. at 19–20.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 20; see also, e.g., HILDEGARD OF BINGEN, HEALING, supra note 62, at 108 (“A woman has a
greater number of damaging fluids and a more damaging corruption in her body than a man.”
Menstruation rids women of excess, “their noxious fluids and poisonous corruptions,” and if not for its
cleansing, “their whole body would . . . become bloated and not be able to remain alive.”); “PHYSIOLO-
GIA” OF JEAN FERNEL, supra note 62, at ch. 7, bk. 7, 561, 563 (Since the male “overflows with a great deal
of heat, he completely modifies and digests all the food he has taken in” and “powerfully dispels anything
further overflowing,” but the female “secured a heat too weak to be capable of dispelling an excess. She
has accordingly been granted the benefit of menstrual blood, out of . . . an imperfect nature.” What flows
out at the appointed cycles is a “sick kind of blood.”).
80. THE TROTULA, supra note 62, at sect. 3, 66 (“Because there is not enough heat in women to dry up
the bad and superfluous humors which are in them, nor is their weakness able to tolerate sufficient labor
so that Nature might expel [the excess] to the outside through sweat as [it does] in men, Nature
established a certain purgation especially for women, that is, the menses, to temper their poverty of
heat.”).
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gynecology menstruation was a necessary purgation, needed to keep the whole
female organism healthy.”81 If not expelled through menstruation, excess
materials would “accumulate and sooner or later lead to a humoral imbalance—in other
words, to disease.”82 Through menstruation, a woman’s body achieved its necessary
purging.
In early modern thought, therefore, menstruation was a significant way for a
woman’s body to maintain humoral balance and health. Amenorrhea, i.e., the
absence of menstruation in a woman of menstruating age, posed danger. This is
not to say that early moderns did not understand a connection between pregnancy
and cessation of menstruation. It is more complicated than that. The first function
of menstruation, they thought, was to preserve health: when menstruation
happened “in normal amounts, at the normal times,” a woman was likely to be
healthy.83 If menstruation failed to occur, pregnancy itself might absorb potential
accumulations of excess materials and humoral imbalance.84 “Retained menses”
and “pregnancy” were not synonyms; these two conditions might exist in
parallel. In fact, for some medical thinkers, retaining menstruation was one more
condition of heightened danger attendant upon being pregnant, and the effect of
retained menses during pregnancy was the subject of much concern.85
Within the core schema of humors, balance, excess, and health, the absence of
menstruation was taken not merely as a symptom of some underlying cause. It
was seen as a cause, in itself, of disease. Any irregularity of menstruation was “a
serious threat to overall health.”86 From menarche to menopause, “a woman
should be menstruating regularly if she is to remain healthy.”87 The horrors
wrought by “suppressed menstruation” included “blockages of viscera, wasting,
cancer, epilepsy, and very many [sorts] of this destruction.”88 The upshot is that
cessation of menstruation could be associated with the humoral-balancing
condition of pregnancy, or cessation of menstruation might, itself, be a cause of
humoral imbalance and disease. In Hippocratic and Galenic thought, “absence of
menstruation—or rather, retention of the menses, for the waste material was
almost always thought to be collecting whether it issued from the body or
81. GREEN, Introduction to THE TROTULA, supra note 34, at 19.
82. Id. at 20; see also, e.g., HILDEGARD OF BINGEN, HEALING, supra note 62, at 91 (“[T]he woman is
weak and cold, and the humors in her are weak. As a consequence, she would be continually sick if her
blood were not periodically cleansed through menstruation. In the same way, food cooking in the pot is
cleansed when it throws off its foam from itself.”).
83. GREEN, Introduction to THE TROTULA, supra note 34, at 20.
84. Id. (explaining that when a woman did not menstruate because of pregnancy or lactation, “the
excess matter—now no longer deemed ‘waste’—either went to nourish the child in utero or was
converted into milk”).
85. See, e.g., “PHYSIOLOGIA” OF JEAN FERNEL, supra note 62, at ch. 7, bk. 7, 563, 565 (arguing that,
since menstrual blood, unlike “more useful blood” is inherently “noxious,” it is implausible that “a fetus
carried in the womb possibly snatches nutriment from it.”).
86. GREEN, Introduction to THE TROTULA, supra note 34, at 20.
87. Id. at 19–20.
88. “PHYSIOLOGIA” OF JEAN FERNEL, supra note 62, at ch. 7, bk. 7, 563.
2016] 679HEALTH EXCEPTION
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3390926
not—was cause for grave concern, for it meant that one of the major purgative
systems of the female body was inoperative.”89
Amenorrhea thus demanded a therapeutic response from any responsible
medical practitioner and “the necessary therapeutic response was simple: induce
menstruation.”90 Knowing this, it should come as no surprise that “the largest
percentage of prescriptions for women’s diseases in most early medieval medical
texts . . . were aids for provoking the menses.”91 They worked. These medieval
prescriptions, twentieth-century medical research reveals, commonly contain
ingredients we now know to be emmenagogues (i.e., agents that induce
menstruation) or abortifacients (i.e., agents that effectuate abortion).92
B. DIAGNOSING PREGNANCY, DETECTING LIFE
Three factors made detecting fetal life an important diagnostic step in
preserving women’s health for early moderns: (1) the importance of menstruation
in humoral health and the alarm that amenorrhea thus raised;93 (2) understanding
pregnancy as a condition that could absorb excess materials and stave off
humoral imbalance;94 and (3) the absence of pregnancy tests, imaging, or
alternative means of ascertaining pregnancy.95 Conception and what happens
afterwards thus became a matter of importance in the domain of women’s health
beyond concerns about reproduction, and the subject of much speculation.
The Latin in which most medieval and early modern medical texts were
written makes a distinction between the conceptus, the product of human
conception, and its later developed state, the fetus.96 This distinction supports the
Aristotelian idea, widely accepted in medieval and early modern Europe, of in
utero development97: a conceptus takes on human form and is instilled with its
own vital heat, or “animated,” over time.98 For early moderns concerned with
89. GREEN, Introduction to THE TROTULA, supra note 34, at 20.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See generally RIDDLE, ANCIENT ABORTION, supra note 33 (reviewing modern scientific findings of
a predominance of abortifacient ingredients in medieval prescriptions for gynecological purgatives).
93. See supra Part I.A.1. and Part I.A.3.
94. See supra Part I.A.3.
95. See supra Introduction, text accompanying notes 28–29.
96. Henry and Forrester, Introduction to FERNEL, supra note 62, at 10. This distinction is hard to render
into English, which lacks an equivalent for conceptus. Id.
97. See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, 7.16.15.1335b19-26 (H. Rackham trans., G.P. Putnam’s Sons ed.
1932) (distinguishing the “unformed,” a state “before sense and life have begun in the embryo,” and “the
formed” in utero). For later adherents to an Aristotelian conception of in utero development, see for
example HILDEGARD OF BINGEN, HEALING, supra note 62, at 54–55 (describing how during the first month
a seed in utero, although already with the four humors and four elements, becomes a still unformed “thick
mass that is not yet alive” and develops from there).
98. Aristotle’s conceptualization of formation and animation discussed in MARIE-THE´RE`SE FONTA-
NILLE, ABORTION ET CONTRACEPTION DANS LA ME´DECINE GRE`CO-ROMAIˆNE 194 (1977) [hereinafter
FONTANILLE, ABORTION DANS LA ME´DECINE GRE`CO-ROMAIˆNE], cited in RIDDLE, ANCIENT ABORTION, supra
note 33, at 22–23; see also, e.g., HILDEGARD OF BINGEN, HEALING, supra note 62, at 55–56 (correlating an
680 [Vol. XVII:665THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF GENDER AND THE LAW
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3390926
detecting pregnancy in order to diagnose pathological amenorrhea, animation
became a key diagnostic.
As a corollary, in medieval and early modern thought the soul is not
necessarily a feature of the conceptus99 but rather enters the body later, a
development referred to as “ensoulment.”100 Even when a woman had reason to
suspect conception, the soul was not always considered present in a conceptus.101
Some procedures meant to provoke menstruation, undertaken to restore humoral
balance for a woman, might never have been thought to implicate an ensouled
creature, even after conception. However, other times treatment might have been
understood as interrupting the continuing development of an ensouled, and thus
animated or enlivened, being.102 Deciphering what was going on came to rely on
“quickening,” an English idea about in utero development cued by the perception
of fetal movement by the pregnant woman, into which Hellenic concepts of
animation and ensoulment were assimilated.103 “Quickening” became a pivotal
concept and element of proof in common-law legal doctrine on abortion. It stood
as a proxy for ascertaining pregnancy, only after which something called
immature stage of in utero development, at the second month, with the inability of “the form” to “move
itself”).
99. For Augustine, e.g., the body of one “not yet formed,” though “some sort of living, shapeless thing
[informiter]” is “not yet endowed with its senses” and does yet not contain a “living soul.” 33 AUGUSTINE,
Quaestiones Exodi, 80.1439-45 in SANCTI AURELII AUGUSTINI QUAESTIONUM IN HEPTATEUCHUM, LIBRI 7,
pt. 5 (J. Fraipont & Donatien de Bruyne eds., Corpus Christianorum: Series Latina Brepols 1958),
translated and discussed in G.R. Dunstan, The Human Embryo in the Western Moral Tradition, in THE
STATUS OF THE HUMAN EMBRYO: PERSPECTIVES FROM MORAL TRADITION 39, 44 (G.R. Dunstan & Mary J.
Seller eds., 1988); see also RIDDLE, ANCIENT ABORTION, supra note 33, at 20 (discussing Aristotle’s ideas
of in utero formation and the soul).
100. See Augustine, Quaestiones in Heptateuchem 2.80 [on Exodus 21:22], in 28 CORPUS
SCRIPTORUM ECCLESIASTICORUM LATINORUM pt. 2, at 146–147 (Joseph Zyche ed., Tempsky 1887), cited in
RIDDLE, ANCIENT ABORTION, supra note 33, at 21 (discussing various possible combinations, according to
the works of Augustine and other church fathers, of stages of formation and ensoulment in an embryo);
see also, e.g., HILDEGARD OF BINGEN, HEALING, supra note 62, at 55–56 (describing ensoulment as the
entering of the “breath of life” and the “inflowing of the soul”). For treatment of ensoulment in
Renaissance science, see, e.g., “PHYSIOLOGIA” OF JEAN FERNEL, supra note 62, at 576 (explaining that the
physical form and the soul develop in utero until the being can be considered “vital,” alive as a human in
both body and soul); see also id. at 626 n.23 (discussing Fernel’s idea of the parallel development of
biological growth and ensoulment as part of his Aristotelian convictions).
101. The timing of “ensoulment” was never settled in Greco-Roman thought, Judaism, or Christianity.
See generally RIDDLE, ANCIENT ABORTION, supra note 33, at 20–21; see also, e.g., 1 ARISTOTLE,
Generation of Animals 736a-b in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE at 1111, 1142–43 (Jonathan
Barnes ed. & A. Platt trans., Bollingen Series, Princeton Univ. Press, 1995 (1984)) (avoiding stating a
definite point at which a being in utero is endowed with a rational soul).
102. The prevailing thought at this time was that the interval between “conception” and “animation” is
perceived as a zone in which action can be taken without raising questions of moral or legal wrongdoing
by patient or health practitioner in regard to the fetus. FONTANILLE, ABORTION DANS LA ME´DECINE
GRE`CO-ROMAIˆNE, supra note 98, at 194; also discussed in RIDDLE, ANCIENT ABORTION, supra note 33, at
22–23.
103. See infra Part I.D.4 (for further discussion of common law doctrine, including that implicating
ideas about quickening).
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“abortion” would even have been at issue.104
C. ABORTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE
The distinctions laid out above give us tools to re-examine our thinking about
practices we would now think of as abortion. First, the contemporary reader must
continually bear in mind that in the early modern period, cessation of
menstruation in a woman of childbearing years was not exclusively associated
with pregnancy. Under humoral conceptions of health, cessation of menstruation
could also have been considered a serious cause, not symptom, of ill-health.105 If
it accompanied pregnancy, the problem was less acute: excess matter could be
absorbed in the processes of developing a conceptus into a fetus.106 However,
absent pregnancy, amenorrhea caused a dangerous build-up of waste materials
in a woman that any responsible medical practitioner would find it incumbent to
address.107 “Abortion” typically meant intervention after quickening and risked
side effects (like uncontrolled hemorrhaging) that become increasingly danger-
ous to the patient over the duration of pregnancy. Pre-quickening intervention
and its risks were understood in a completely different light.
Thus diagnosis. What about treatment? Practitioners in early-modern England,
benefitting from centuries of accumulated experimentation,108 deployed a
remarkable range of uterine-purging measures when faced with amenorrhea in a
woman of menstruating age.109 Some were classed as “emmenagogue,” a
treatment intended to induce menstruation110 without any necessary reference to
terminating pregnancy.111 Others were classed as “abortifacient,” intended to
expel a conceptus or fetus.112 Medical texts admitted the potential for ambiguity,
104. “Quickening” is understood as a proxy heuristic, not to be confused with an equivalent of
certainty regarding pregnancy. Practitioners as late as the early twentieth century guarded against
over-relying on “quickening” to diagnose pregnancy, alert, inter alia, to so-called “false quickening.”
See, e.g., ALEXANDER MILNE, THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF MIDWIFERY WITH SOME OF THE DISEASES
OF WOMEN 67–79 (1884) (describing, in physician-authored medical textbook, “false quickening” and
other problems with diagnosing pregnancy).
105. See, e.g., “PHYSIOLOGIA” OF JEAN FERNEL, supra note 62, at 563.
106. See supra Part I.A.3.
107. See supra Part I.A.3.
108. See generally RIDDLE, ANCIENT ABORTION, supra note 33 (cataloguing thousands of emmenag-
ogic and abortifacient prescriptions from antiquity through early modern times, with modern laboratory
verifications of their abortifacient properties, to argue that since antiquity, abortions were always
available in the West); see also id. at 7 (summarizing his conclusion that a widespread culture of abortion
obtained during the periods under study).
109. For example, in the medieval health manual Conditions of Women, a portion of The Trotula
meant to cover all aspects of women’s health, more than one-third of the entire catalogue is devoted to
treating conditions related to menstruation. Green, Introduction to THE TROTULA, supra note 34, at 21.
110. See supra Parts I.A.2 and I.A.3.
111. See GREEN, Introduction to THE TROTULA, supra note 34, at 20 (pointing out the difficulty that the
Trotula manuscripts’ distinction between pregnant and pathological amenorrhea posed to some later
manuscript copyists).
112. Some are also understood as, and administered as, contraceptives, but that usage is beyond the
scope of the present inquiry and will not be discussed here.
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noting some measures both provoke menstruation and cease generation,113
making it impossible to assume intent ex poste.114 Surveying contemporaneous
gynecology, I identify three kinds of treatments: (1) potion, meaning intentional
administration of a chemical or biochemical substance, usually a plant prepara-
tion; (2) external manipulation, which can range from poultice to massage to
abdominal blows; and (3) internal intrusion, mechanical rather than biochemical
intervention, by vaginal insertion (or, more rarely, incision through the abdomi-
nal wall) to interrupt uterine function. To give an idea of the range of treatment
options available to early modern gynecology, the two therapeutic classifications
(emmenagogue and abortifacient) with the three kinds of treatments (potional,
external, and intrusive) are outlined briefly below.
1. Emmenagogues
Potional emmenagogue was the most common response to amennorhea either
before or after quickening.115 Early modern gynecology gives scores of recipes to
be administered orally to “extract the menses,”116 “move the menstrua,”117 or
“put in motion the menstrua.”118 The most common alternative to orally
administering an emmenagogic potion was to soak a ball of cotton or other
113. A preparation made from the Chaste Tree is an example of one such dual-use treatment. See, e.g.,
DIOSCORIDES, DE MATERIA MEDICA [MATERIALS OF MEDICINE] 1.103 (Max Wellman ed., Weidmann 1958)
[hereinafter DIOSCORIDES, DE MATERIA MEDICA] (“The Chaste Tree destroys generation as well as
provokes menstruation.”), cited in RIDDLE supra at 31; id. at 3.7 (prescribing birthwort, drunk with
pepper and myrrh, to expel menstrua and to expel a conceptus or fetus), cited in RIDDLE supra at 32.
114. John Riddle proposes that “provoking menses” is merely a coded way of talking about
widespread practices of contraception and abortion. See generally RIDDLE, ANCIENT ABORTION, supra
note 33 (arguing that “provoking menstruation” was, in medieval health texts, code for procuring
abortion). However, historian Monica H. Green, disagrees and argues for taking earlier medical texts at
their word: they really do consider some substances uterine purgatives to induce menstruation, a
legitimately separate domain of Hippocratic-Galenic medical practice from purposefully inducing
miscarriage. Green, Introduction to THE TROTULA, supra note 34, at 21, 215 n.83.
115. See supra Part I.A.3. (explaining how “retained menses,” as a medical condition, could exist
separately though simultaneously with pregnancy).
116. See DIOSCORIDES, DE MATERIA MEDICA, supra note 113, at 2.109 (cultivated lupine to extract the
menses or expel a fetus), cited in RIDDLE, ANCIENT ABORTION, supra note 33, at 32) (listing cultivated
lupine as a remedy to extract the menses or expel a fetus).
117. Id. at 3.80 (listing silphium drunk with pepper and myrrh to move the menstrua).
118. Id. at 4.146 (listing a treatment of Mediterranean mezereon); see also, e.g., GALEN, De
compositione medicamentorum secundum locus [“On Compound Medicines according to Site”], 9.4,
13:283-284 in CLAUDII GALENI OPERA OMNIA (Karl Gottlieb Ku¨hn ed., Olms 1964-65 (1821-33))
(prescribing willow and rue; and willow, rue, ginger, and date palm), cited in RIDDLE, ANCIENT ABORTION,
supra note 33, at 85; THE TROTULA, supra note 62, at 89–90 (prescribing red willow cleaned, pulverized,
and stewed with wine or water; or wafers of ground madder and marsh mallow, mixed with barley flour
and eggwhites; or a fumigant made from these herbs); id. at 67 (prescribing diathessaron: mint or
myrtleberry, felwort, birthwort, and laurel berry, cooked with honey); id. at 68 (describing a powder of
yellow flag, hemlock, castoreum, mugwort, sea wormwood, myrrh, common centaury, and sage mixed
with a stew of myrrh and savin and drunk); id. at 106 (prescribing vervain and rue, pounded and cooked
with bacon, followed by a beverage of ground delicate willow root juice and madder mixed with wine);
HILDEGARD OF BINGEN, HEALING, supra note 62, at 165–66 (prescribing inter alia a beverage made from
stewed and ground heidelberries, yarrow, rue, Easter lilies, cloves, and white pepper with wine).
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tampon-like object in the substance and insert it vaginally.119 These vaginal
suppositories, known as pessaries,120 are also widely attested in practice
manuals.121
Aside from potional means, practice manuals prescribe emmenagogic treat-
ment by external manipulations ranging from poultice122 and massage123 to
bleeding by venesection under the arch of the foot.124 The most invasive delivery
method for an emmenagogic agent I found, given in the influential medical
handbook The Trotula, is a fumigant piped through a reed to a sitting woman’s
womb.125 Even this treatment, although using a more intimately positioned
delivery mechanism, works through chemical or biochemical agent rather than
physical interference. One category is missing: None of the materials I surveyed
provided evidence of emmenagogic treatment by internal intrusion.
2. Abortifacients
As with emmenagogues, ingested potion was the most common abortifacient
intervention. Hippocratic texts prescribe them,126 other widely consulted medical
authorities advise them,127 and private sources attest to widespread practical
119. See, e.g., THE TROTULA, supra note 62, at 68 (calling for carded wool to be soaked in a mixture
including gall from a bull and then “pressed so it is hard and rigid and long so that it can be put into the
vagina”). Another recipe directs, “let there be made another pessary in the shape of the male member, and
let it be hollow, and inside there let the medicine be placed and let it be inserted.” Id.
120. Pessaries mentioned in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 131 n.14 (1973).
121. See, e.g., 8 HIPPOCRATES, De mulierum affectibus, in OEUVRES COMPLE`TES D’HIPPOCRATE:
TRADUCTION NOUVELLE AVEC LE TEXTE GREC EN REGARD bk. 1, § 78, 1–12, at 173 (Emile Littre´ ed., chez
J.B. Baillie`re 1839–1861), (reproduced in Hakkert, 1973) [hereinafter HIPPOCRATES, De mulierum
affectibus] (“an efficacious pessary” consists of inserting into the vagina a mixture of cantharine beetle
parts, leaves and roots of small caltrop, a small amount of crushed plant of the chrysanthemum family,
celery seed, and fifteen cuttlefish eggs); DIOSCORIDES, DE MATERIA MEDICA, supra note 113, at 2.152
(advising a garlic pessary to “bring down the menses”), cited in RIDDLE, ANCIENT ABORTION, supra note
33, at 37. See generally RIDDLE, ANCIENT ABORTION, supra note 33, at 36–38 (reviewing twentieth-
century biomedical research verifying the efficacy of various vaginal suppositories prescribed in antique,
medieval, and early modern texts).
122. See, e.g., HILDEGARD OF BINGEN, HEALING, supra note 62, at 165 (prescribing a poultice of
aniseed and feverfew poultice applied externally to the genitalia to “relax the monthly flow”).
123. See, e.g., THE TROTULA, supra note 62, at 106 (advising a cushion of carded wool, soaked in
mugwort stewed with savin, pennyroyal, or other herbs, laid as a poultice on the belly); see also id. at 68
(calling for laying cooked chickweed on the belly).
124. For retention of the menses, the Trotula advises the practitioner bleed the woman from the vein
under the arch of the inside of the foot, alternating feet day by day. Id. at 67; see also id. at 106.
125. Id. at 68 (prescribing “fomentation” by catmint smoke, i.e. advising that a care-giver cook
catmint in a pot and “let the woman set a perforated chair over it and let her sit there covered all over and
let the smoke come out through a reed, so that the smoke is received inside penetrating through the reed
up to the womb”).
126. HIPPOCRATES, De mulierum affectibus, supra note 121, bk. 1, §§ 80–82 (listing six early-stage
abortifacients to be taken with wine or water), bk. 1, §§ 82–84 (giving eight ingestibles to induce
miscarriage), discussed in RIDDLE, ANCIENT ABORTION, supra note 33, at 78–80.
127. See, e.g., DIOSCORIDES, DE MATERIA MEDICA supra note 113, at bk. 2, ch. 159–166, cited in
RIDDLE, ANCIENT ABORTION, supra note 33, at 44–45 (discussing “sharp herbs” among which
abortifacients figure prominently, including soapwort to dry out menses and kill embryo; edderwort to
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knowledge of potions that can, as one says, “cause miscarriage” and “force away
the birth dead or alive as allso [sic] the afterbirth.”128
Potional abortion by pessary was also widely known.129 Hippocrates labeled
some pessaries as “ecbolic suppository” (an ecbolic being a substance that causes
contraction of the uterus),130 but he labeled others, straightforwardly, as
abortifacient,131 meant to “draw down the crippled embryo/fetus” or to “release a
half-completed embryo/fetus.”132 (The Hippocratic abortifacients133 are particu-
larly notable given the symbolic weight that the Hippocratic oath came to hold in
the nineteenth-century United States physicians’ movement to prohibit abortion
by law.134) Such prescriptions for potional abortion—ingested or pessary—were
common knowledge among early-modern health practitioners.
Among external manipulations meant to induce abortion, early modern texts
give evidence of poultice135 and bloodletting.136 However, simple activity
appears to be the external manipulation most commonly advised (or undertaken
abort a developing, or perhaps early stage, fetus; and lords and ladies to expel a conceptus); see also
DIOSCORIDES, THE GREEK HERBAL OF DIOSCORIDES: ILLUSTRATED BY A BYZANTINE A.D. 512. ENGLISHED
BY JOHN GOODYER A.D. 1655 (Robert T. Gunther ed., Hafner 1959 (1933)) at ch. 48 (no pagination)
(“Dioscorides sayth that Peper, Rue, Tuttsayne, Calamint, Castoreum, wast the sede of generacyon (by
dryuynge it up) of their propertie and strong heate . . .”), cited in RIDDLE, ANCIENT ABORTION, supra note
33, at 149.
128. Jerningham family medicinal receipt book, Jerningham MS 3/H/1, fol. 65 (late seventeenth
century) (Stafford, Eng. Record Office), cited in Linda A. Pollock, Embarking on a Rough Passage: The
Experience of Pregnancy in Early-Modern Society, in WOMEN AS MOTHERS IN PRE-INDUSTRIAL ENGLAND:
ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF DOROTHY MCLAREN 39, 56 (Valerie Fildes ed., 2013 (1990)); see generally id. at
53–58 (discussing miscarriage in early modern England); see also ANGUS MCLAREN, REPRODUCTIVE
RITUALS: PERCEPTIONS OF FERTILITY IN ENGLAND FROM THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY TO THE NINETEENTH
CENTURY 73–75 (1984) (finding in a survey of early modern England women using many of the same
abortifacient plant preparations as their medieval predecessors).
129. See, e.g., DIOSCORIDES, DE MATERIA MEDICA, supra note 113, at 4.172 (giving Mediterranean
mezereon “on a pad” to expel a fetus), cited in RIDDLE, ANCIENT ABORTION, supra note 33, at 36; see also
DIOSCORIDES, supra at 1.1 (describing lily root, applied as a pessary with honey, to “draw down the
embryo”); RIDDLE, ANCIENT ABORTION, supra at 35 (citing a pepper pessary to “dry out” a fetus/embryo).
130. HIPPOCRATES, De mulierum affectibus, supra note 121, bk. 1, § 78, 1–12, at 173; id. at 12–14
(suggesting the squirting cucumber plant).
131. Id. at bk. 1, § 78–80, at 173-200 (grouping respectively ecbolic suppositories and nine
abortifacient vaginal suppositories), summarized in RIDDLE, ANCIENT ABORTION, supra note 33, at 77.
132. Id. at bk. 1, § 78, at 177; see also, e.g., DIOSCORIDES, DE MATERIA MEDICA, supra note 113, at
2.152 (advising a garlic pessary to “bring down the menses”), cited in RIDDLE, ANCIENT ABORTION, supra
note 33, at 37.
133. See, e.g., HIPPOCRATES, De mulierum affectibus, at bk. 1, § 78–80, at 173-200; see also, e.g.,
supra notes 126, 131 (Hippocratic texts openly describing substances as abortifacient, explaining them,
and prescribing them).
134. See infra Part III.A.2. (discussing the nineteenth-century anti-abortion movement led by U.S.
physicians and the role of the Hippocratic oath therein).
135. See, e.g., DIOSCORIDES, DE MATERIA MEDICA, supra note 113, at 3.3 (describing a poultice of
gentian among treatments explicitly labelled “abortifacient”), cited in RIDDLE, ANCIENT ABORTION, supra
note 33, at 39; see also DIOSCORIDES id. at 1.1.
136. See, e.g., John Christopoulos, Abortion and the Confessional in Counter-Reformation Italy, 65
RENAISSANCE Q. 443, 463 (2012) [hereinafter Christopoulos, Abortion and the Confessional] (citing
MARTIN AZPILCUETA, CONSILIORUM SIVE RESPONSORUM cons. 47, 455 (1595) (priest admitting to the
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by) a woman wishing to induce miscarriage. One treatise advocated jumping137
and another prescribed walking energetically138 or, if pregnancy persisted,
pairing treatments like softening vaginal suppositories, bleeding, or fasting with
getting “shaken” by riding draft animals.139 Beating the stomach of a pregnant
woman with a hawthorn root could cause abortion, in Dioscorides’ rather genteel
version140 of “abortion by blows,” a practice evidenced more roughly in a variety
of historical and legal texts.141
Widely consulted medical texts commonly prescribed abortifacient treatments
by potion and external manipulation. By contrast, causing abortion by internal
intrusion via the vagina to pierce a placenta, cause expulsion, or extract a fetus or
by incision through the abdominal wall—though an option also well-known to
caregivers—was generally disfavored. Medical texts typically warn against
“separating the embryo by means of something sharp-edged” because adjacent
parts can be injured,142 and, as poets lamented,143 the woman doing so risked her
own death. Very few accounts of abortion by instrument exist from early modern
England,144 and historian Cornelia Hughes Dayton finds only one description of
Apostolic Penitentiary in the late 1500s that, before taking orders, he had impregnated a woman and after
“forty days” (meaning a conceptus is presumed) counseled her to abort by letting blood)).
137. 7 HIPPOCRATES, De natura pueri [“On the Nature of the Child”] bk 4, § 90 (Emile Littre´ ed., chez
J.B. Baillie`re 1839–1861) (reproduced Hakkert, 1973) (advising the so-called “Lacedaemonian leap, that
is, ‘leaping with the heels to the buttocks for the sake of expulsion’”), cited in RIDDLE, ANCIENT
ABORTION, supra note 33, at 9. This instruction of Hippocrates for expelling an unwanted fetus repeated
in SORANUS, GYNAECOLOGY 63 (Oswei Temkin ed. & trans., 1956) [hereinafter SORANUS, GYNAECOL-
OGY], cited in RIDDLE, ANCIENT ABORTION, supra, at 9.
138. SORANUS, GYNAECOLOGY supra note 137, 1.64 at 66 (prescribing walking energetically, riding
horseback, jumping, or carrying heavy loads), cited in RIDDLE, ANCIENT ABORTION, supra note 33, at 46.
139. Id. at 67, cited in RIDDLE, ANCIENT ABORTION, supra note 33, at 47.
140. DIOSCORIDES, DE MATERIA MEDICA, supra note 113, at 1.93, cited in RIDDLE, ANCIENT ABORTION,
supra note 33, at 51.
141. See, e.g., the papal bull of 1588 which includes among measures “to kill . . . immature fetuses in
the maternal viscera” external manipulations—violence, burdens, and work—imposed on a pregnant
woman. Sixtus V, Contra Procurantes, consulentes, & consentientes, quocumque modo Abortum, preface
to CONSTITUTIO, n.1, n.5) (1588), cited in Christopoulos, Abortion and the Confessional, supra note 136,
at 466–467, 468.
142. SORANUS, GYNAECOLOGY, supra note 137, 1.65 at 68, cited in RIDDLE, ANCIENT ABORTION, supra
note 33, at 48.
143. OVID, AMORES, II., xiv 27–28, 35–40 (Grant Showerman trans., Loeb Classical Library, 1921)
https://www.loebclassics.com/view/ovid-amores/1914 (“Ah, women! Why will you thrust and pierce
with the instrument [literally: why do you dig with shafts at your vitals from below] . . . oft she who slays
her own in her bosom dies herself”).
144. One of the rare accounts from England comes from the trial of Eleanor Beare, accused of
abortion by instrument in 1732. Witness Grace Belfort testifies that her employer Beare, having heard that
Grace feared herself pregnant, collected 30 shillings for the procedure and then “my Mistress brought a
kind of an Instrument, I took it to be like an Iron Skewer, and she put it up into my Body a great Way, and
hurt me,” thereby inducing miscarriage. Upon conviction in this and on a poison procurement charge in a
separate incident, Beare is sentenced to stand pillory two market days and suffer “close Imprisonment”
for three years. Though the press account does not report the legal rule invoked, clues indicate that
because the procedure involved a quickened fetus and thus posed exceptional danger to Grace Belfort, it
arouses the attention of the law. See The Tryal of Eleanor Beare of Derby, 2 GENTLEMAN’S MAGAZINE,
Tuesday, August 15, 1732, at 931–32 (1732); see also Cornelia Hughes Dayton, Taking the Trade:
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it in her review of colonial American court records.145 Though surgical
instruments used in intrusive practices date back to antiquity,146 the overall
impression left by early modern medical texts and legal records is that abortion
by vaginal intrusion or surgical intervention was seen as dangerous and
irresponsible, and thus rare, in sharp contrast with commonplace potional uterine
purging.147
By the end of the seventeenth century, the abortion doctrine accepted as the
common-law standard was formulated.148 By some historians’ reckoning, this
same period stands as the high-water mark of knowledge of emmenagogic and
abortifacient remedies in gynecological practice.149 Humoral methods were so
effective, Riddle argues, that overall, humoral health practice suppressed
population growth in Europe measurably below the natural rate of increase.150
For early moderns, abortion by potion was routine; by intrusion or surgery,
dangerous and rare. And the most common procedure terminating pregnancy,
emmenagogue, might not have been thought of as “abortion” at all.
D. LAW
1. The Background of Medical Practice
Health, life, abortion: these are the terms we have been investigating in early
modern understandings and practice, in order to reconsider common-law doctrine
on abortion and the antecedents of the “health exception” in the terms of their
time. Under Galenic theory, health requires humoral balance; in women, that
depends on regular menstruation;151 its interruption demands purgative treat-
ment. Untreated, retained menses can cause dire effects, from cancer to
epilepsy.152 Early modern medicine developed purgative compounds153 (many
principal ingredients of which, twentieth-century science finds, are abortifa-
Abortion and Gender Relations in an Eighteenth Century New England Village [hereinafter Dayton,
Taking the Trade], in WOMAN AND HEALTH IN AMERICA 12, 12, 29 n.2 (Judith Walzer Leavitt ed., 2nd ed.
1999) [hereinafter Leavitt, WOMAN AND HEALTH].
145. Dayton, Taking the Trade, supra note 144, at 20.
146. See, e.g., RIDDLE, ANCIENT ABORTION, supra note 33, at 172 n.27 (citing M. Moı¨sside´s,
Contribution a` l’e´tude de l’abortement dans l’antiquite´ grecque, 26 JANUS 1, 59–85 (1922); RALPH
JACKSON, DOCTORS AND DISEASES IN THE ROMAN EMPIRE 105–109 (1988); J.S. MILNE, SURGICAL
INSTRUMENTS IN GREEK AND ROMAN TIMES 81–82 (1907)).
147. RIDDLE, ANCIENT ABORTION, supra note 33, at 10, 166. In contrast to potional interventions,
“[s]urgical or manipulated abortions were recognized as dangerous” and therefore rarely attempted. Id. at
10.
148. See infra Part I.D.
149. RIDDLE, ANCIENT ABORTION, supra note 33, at 135–166.
150. Id. at 7.
151. See supra Part I.A.2.
152. See supra Part I.A.2. and Part I.A.3.
153. See supra Part I.C.
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cient).154 A responsible practitioner routinely induced menstruation during what
might have turned out to have been the early months of pregnancy for reasons
often unrelated to birth control.155
Despite this rich practical gynecology, through the early modern period,
medicine confessed finding the female abdomen and its inner workings
inscrutable.156 This admittedly incomplete understanding in medicine defied
precision and abetted flexibility in law. With pregnancy tough to diagnose for
crucial months,157 “quickening,”158 the subjective experience of fetal movement
by the pregnant woman,159 came to serve as a heuristic for pregnancy and thus,
for “abortion.” Before quickening, no “pregnancy”; no pregnancy, no abortion.
The difference between provoking menstruation and causing a miscarriage “was
seen as so minimal as not to warrant discussion.”160 After quickening, interven-
tion (particularly by internal intrusion) was considered increasingly dangerous to
the woman161 and a responsible, well-versed practitioner or patient would
undertake it reluctantly, weighing it against the consequences for the woman of
inaction.162
Understanding these prevailing conceptions of health and practices for
maintaining it allows us to re-read familiar legal sources with new insight. Two
sources that bookend the early-modern period, Bracton and Hale,163 provide
elements that crystalize into antecedents of the “health exception” at common
law.164
154. See generally John M. Riddle, Oral Contraceptives and Early-Term Abortifacients During
Classical Antiquity and the Middle Ages, 132 PAST & PRESENT 3 (1991) (identifying compounds from
antiquity tested as abortifacient and/or contraceptive by modern laboratory science); contra, e.g.,
PHILIPPE ARIE`S, HISTOIRE DE POPULATIONS FRANC¸AISES ET DE LEURS ATTITUDES DEVANT LA VIE DEPUIS LE
XVIII SIE`CLE 494–521 (1948) (presuming the virtual absence of contraception in Europe before the
seventeenth century on the basis of its “unthinkability”); Keith Hopkins, Contraception in the Roman
Empire, VIII COMP. STUD. SOC’Y & HIST. 124, 131 n. (1965–66) (describing ancient oral contraceptions as
“ineffectual potions”); see also generally RIDDLE, ANCIENT ABORTION, supra note 33.
155. See supra Part I.A.3. and Part I.C.
156. See generally Cathy McClive, The Hidden Truths of the Belly: The Uncertainties of Pregnancy in
Early Modern Europe, 15 SOC. HIST. OF MED. 209 (2002) [hereinafter McClive, Uncertainties of
Pregnancy] (concluding that for women and their medical attendants, the experience and understanding
of pregnancy was primarily uncertain, including in regard to quickening, false conceptions, and the threat
of miscarriage).
157. See supra Part I.B.
158. See McClive, Uncertainties of Pregnancy, supra note 156 (describing history of quickening and
other contemporaneous understandings).
159. See supra Part I.B.
160. Carla Spivack, To ‘Bring Down the Flowers’: the Cultural Context of Abortion Law in Early
Modern England, 14 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L., 107, 123 (2007) [hereinafter Spivack, Context of
Abortion Law in Early Modern England].
161. See supra Part I.C.
162. See supra Part I.C.
163. See infra Part I.D.2. and Part I.D.3.
164. See infra Part I.D.4.
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2. Bracton: The Legality Distinction and the Precautionary Principle
The work of collective authorship that bears Bracton’s name, On the Laws and
Customs of England (1220-1230),165 is regarded as the standard statement of the
common law from the Middle Ages.166 It mentions abortion twice.
The first abortion passage, in Bracton’s section on homicide, comes between
recitation of doctrine with direct relevance for women’s healthcare providers.
Before discussing abortion, Bracton first explains two kinds of homicide. He
describes one kind, “homicide by word” (a legal category borrowed from canon
law167), as when “one dissuades another . . . from rescu[ing] someone from
death; thus in an indirect way he commits homicide.”168 For therapeutic intent,
this is strong stuff, stronger than an affirmative defense, stronger than a category
exempted from charge (as afforded by a “life exception”), even stronger than a
duty to provide care. It would expose to liability in homicide a bystander who
merely dissuaded a rescuer from saving someone in mortal peril—at a time when
pregnancy or childbirth regularly imperiled women169 and in some cases the only
possible rescue was induced miscarriage.
165. BRACTON, LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND, supra note 58. Its continued influence is felt in ways
large and small. An 1843 Iowa criminal statute, for example, uses (without citation) the canon law
hypothetical that Bracton’s retransmission entrenches of homicide by chance, as when a master flogs a
pupil in discipline and the pupil dies as a result. Id. at 341; cf. IOWA (TERR.) REV. STAT., ch. 49 §19 (1843)
(giving an example of “excusable homicide by misadventure”).
166. See, e.g., PAUL VINOGRADOFF, LETTER TO THE ATHENAEUM (July 19, 1884) (Bracton’s treatise is “a
statement so detailed and accurate that that there is nothing to match it in the whole legal literature of the
Middle Ages”) reprinted in 1 F.W. MAITLAND, BRACTON’S NOTEBOOK: A COLLECTION OF CASES DECIDED
IN THE KING’S COURTS DURING THE REIGN OF HENRY III, at xvii (1887), https://archive.org/stream/
bractonsnoteboo00maitgoog#page/n8/mode/2up. For insight into a powerful influence on Bracton,
namely, the systematic restatement of papal authorities published at the time that Bracton was compiling
his work (the Decretals of Pope Gregory IX (1234)), see generally Edward Peters, Master Page on Ius
Decretalium (1234–1918), CANON LAW INFO (last accessed July 11, 2015) http://www.canonlaw.info/
masterpageIusDecret.htm (giving general background information on the Decretals and links to
electronic versions). On Bracton’s debt to Roman law in general, and the Decretals in specific, see CARL
G¨UTERBOCK, BRACTON AND HIS RELATION TO THE ROMAN LAW: A CONTRIBUTION TO THE HISTORY OF THE
ROMAN LAW IN THE MIDDLE AGES 169 (Brinton Coxe trans., 1866) [hereinafter G¨UTERBOCK, BRACTON
AND ROMAN LAW], http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id!hvd.32044010502342;view!1up;seq!177.
167. BRACTON, LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND, supra note 58, at 340 (naming two types of
homicide, corporeal and spiritual, and specifying the former can be accomplished by word or by deed).
Cf. CORPUS IURIS CANONICI EDITIO LIPSIENSIS SECUNDA POST AEMILII LUDOUCI RICHTERI, PARS SECUNDA,
DECRETALIUM COLLECTIONES, DECRETALES D. GREGORII P. IX COMPILATIO (A. Friedberg ed., 2000) (1234)
[hereinfafter DECRETALS OF POPE GREGORY IX] at tit. 14, cap. 2, http://www.thelatinlibrary.com/
gregdecretals5.html (proposing that homicide might be perpetrated by word or by deed: “Homicidium
autem tam facto quam praecepto, sive consilio aut defensione non est dubium perpetrari”); see also
G¨UTERBOCK, BRACTON AND ROMAN LAW, supra note 166, at 169 (identifying a passage in the Decretals
that specifies homicide by word and by deed that Bracton repeats here).
168. BRACTON, LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND, supra note 58, at 341.
169. See supra text accompanying notes 29–33 (on technologies for understanding the mechanics of
pregnancy and treating common complications unavailable before the nineteenth century); infra notes
216–18 (discussing the risks of pregnancy and childbirth for early modern women).
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Bracton goes on to explain a second kind, “homicide by deed.” Of the four
circumstances that Bracton imagines might result in homicide by deed,170 only
one, “homicide by chance,”171 would apply in a bona fide healthcare context.
Chance homicide172 gave rise to liability unless the accused was (1) engaged in a
lawful act and (2) “employed all the care he could.”173 Applied to health practice,
the doctrine would shield from liability the caregiver whose patient died despite
best efforts.
Bracton then specifically discusses abortion in an example of homicide by
deed. “If one strikes a pregnant woman or gives her poison in order to procure an
abortion, if the fetus is already formed or quickened, especially if it is quickened,
he commits homicide.”174 Read within the terms of its day, the specifics of this
text leap out. First, before an animated fetus was at issue (i.e., pre-quickening),
pregnancy was not assumed and a procedure would often not have been
considered “abortion” in the first place.175 This excludes most emmenagogues
and many early-term fetal expulsives. (Bracton’s wording references Aristotelian
concepts that do not equate “fetal formation” with “quickening.”).176 Second, this
was not a blanket sanction against abortion. The passage specifically prohibits
only two acts: striking a pregnant woman or giving her “poison,”177 a substance
meant to harm or kill and not a normal synonym for a “potion” used for uterine
170. BRACTON, LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND, supra note 58, at 340–41 (they are: homicide in the
administration of justice; by chance; by necessity; or by intention, “as where one in anger or hatred or for
the sake of gain, deliberately and in premeditated assault, has killed another wickedly and feloniously and
in breach of the king‘s peace”). Necessity doctrine has been invoked to analyze the modern life
exception. See, e.g., D. Seaborne Davies, The Law of Abortion and Necessity, 2 MOD. L. REV. 126 (1938)
[hereinafter Davies, Necessity]; B. James George, Jr., Current Abortion Laws: Proposals and Movements
for Reform, 17 W. RES. L. REV. 371, 377–78 (1965) [hereinafter George, Current Abortion Law]
(discussing necessity doctrine as reflected in state abortion statutes, circa 1965).
171. BRACTON, LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND, supra note 58, at 341.
172. See id. (giving as example the result when one fells a tree and another is accidentally crushed
beneath it).
173. Id. Gu¨terbock points out that the Decretals also made the distinction in homicide by chance
between licit and illicit activity. G¨UTERBOCK, BRACTON AND ROMAN LAW, supra note 166, at 169–170. The
canon law of the Decretals specifies the same elements for excusing homicide by chance, namely
engaging in licit activity and employing diligent care. DECRETALS OF POPE GREGORY IX, supra note 167,
at tit. 12, cap. 7 (“Homicidium casuale imputatur ei, qui dabat operam rei licitae, si non adhibuit
diligetntiam, quam debuit.”).
174. BRACTON, LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND, supra note 58, at 341. What Samuel E. Thorne
translates here into English as “quickened” reads in Latin animatum fuerit, “has been animated.” A
parallel passage in canon law reads, “He that giveth something to cause abortion is a murderer, if the
conceptus was a rational animal endowed with life” (“Qui dat causam abortioni, homicida est, si
conceptum erat vivificatum animal rationale”). DECRETALS OF POPE GREGORY IX, supra note 167, at tit.
12, cap. 20.
175. See supra Part I.B.
176. See supra Part I.B.
177. BRACTON, LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND, supra note 58, at 341. Bracton differs in the means
of abortion from the parallel cannon law passage, which does not specify only “poison” (but does not
include blows). See DECRETALS OF POPE GREGORY IX, supra note 167, at tit. 12, De Homicidio Voluntario
et Casuali, cap. 20.
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purgation or abortion.178 It leaves out the most common means of accomplishing
abortion known to Bracton’s time, purgative potion.179 Third, the two enumer-
ated acts speak of assault, undermining easy inference of due care or patient
consent and implying a post-quickening procedure posing heightened patient
risk.180 For women’s healthcare providers or others who might have wished a
woman not pregnant, this doctrine stood as a warning against uncertain,
particularly patient-risky practices. Taking all of these specifics into consideration, the
text supports the inference that it is the woman’s death or endangerment—not the
fetus’—that evokes liability. The bottom line: read with standard healthcare
practices in mind, the passage would expose a practitioner to liability in homicide
for poisoning and for abortion by blows, but not otherwise for inducing
miscarriage in the course of healthcare.
This first abortion passage is followed by reiteration of the duty to rescue. A
person “who, though he could rescue a man from death, failed to do so,”181 ought
not be free from punishment. Thus, two passages circumscribe the prohibition on
using poison or blows to cause post-quickening miscarriage. Both before and
after, Bracton repeats a statement of liability for one who could rescue a person
from death but does not. Warned against dangerous practices, the text reiterates
care providers’ duty to save a woman, including from pregnancy, if her life were
imperiled.
Bracton treats abortion by intrusion separately (in his second abortion passage)
in a section on “wounding.” In general, a charge of “wounding” only arose from
injury by blade, not from assault by weapons like clubs or stones.182 A
“wounding” charge required as proof visual evidence of a “fresh and open
wound”183 and mere “bruises and contusions” were insufficient,184 with only one
exception: “If anyone forcibly interferes with a woman’s internal organs in order
to produce abortion,” he is liable for wounding in breach of the king’s peace.185
Lawful medical practice excluded it.
In Bracton, we find several elements that will recur in later abortion regulation:
a concern with poison; a precautionary principle, evidenced through imposing
liability for patient death if a procedure occurred at a time or in a manner that
raised risk to the patient, hedged by a duty to save; and pronounced wariness in
178. What Samuel E. Thorne translates here into English as “poison” reads in Bracton’s original
Latinate text as venenum. Venenum is not the same as “potion.” Although “potion” is given as a subsidiary
translation for venenum, Latin offers other words—potio, “potion,” or medicamentum, medicina,
remedium—more typically used to indicate emmenagogues and substances employed in potional
abortions. Bracton could have used those other words here but does not.
179. See also, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 182–85 (describing Bracton’s second abortion
passage, on abortion by intrusive measures, which is not treated in homicide).
180. See supra Part I.C.
181. BRACTON, LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND, supra note 58, at 342.
182. Id. at 408.
183. Id. at 406.
184. Id. at 408.
185. Id.
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regard to intrusive measures. What we do not find is also significant: prohibition
of abortion per se. Regarding all pre-quickening emmenagogues and regarding
the most common abortion practice of the time, potional abortion, the law is
silent.
3. Hale: The Curative Intent Distinction
Hale’s formulation of a life or health defense comes in his discussion of
homicide in his restatement treatise, History of Pleas of the Crown.186 The set-up
in Hale’s discussion is familiar. The person whom a defendant would be accused
of harming is the woman upon whom the procedure is performed, not the fetus.187
In his discussion, Hale first rephrases a rule to which Coke had drawn attention,
wherein curative intent excuses lethal consequences of medical practice.188 In
Hale’s restatement, “If a physician gives a person a potion without any intent of
doing him any bodily harm, but with an intent to cure or prevent a disease, and
contrary to the expectation of the physician it kills him, this is no homicide, and
the like of a chiurgeon.”189 Thus far, his treatment reads like a narrow
reapplication of Bracton’s “homicide by chance” doctrine.190 For anyone who
administered a potion after which a woman died, Hale’s holding offered blanket
protection. The charge would not lie if the person administered the potion with
intent to “cure her of a disease.”191
Hale distinguishes this situation from the death of a woman from a procedure
intended to “destroy the child within her.”192 Hale’s distinction between
administering a potion to cure a woman versus to destroy a fetus mirrors the
distinction between everyday medical practice under humoral health theory
versus a dangerous repurposing of purgative knowledge. “Feticide” is not the
legal issue for Hale: he does not invoke necessity doctrine that excuses the taking
of one life (the fetus’) if necessary to save another (the woman’s) because a fetus
was “not yet in rerum naturae” (translated literally as “in the nature of things,”
meaning “in existence,” a status entered into at live birth).193 Abortion that a
186. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN, supra note 60, at 429–34; see also Rex v. Anonymous (1670) (the
only recorded case of “abortion” over which Hale presided as judge), summarized in HALE, id. at 429–30.
187. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN, supra note 60, at 432–33.
188. Within his section on the college of physicians in London, Coke specifies a therapeutic intent
exception: “If one that is of the mysterie of a physician take a man in cure and giveth him such physick as
within three days he dye thereof, without any felonious intent, and against his will, it is no homicide.”
COKE, LAWS OF ENGLAND FOURTH, supra note 59, at 251 (citing 3 E.3 Coron. 163). Placing this discussion
as he does, within ch. 50 (“Of the Courts and their Jurisdictions within the City of London . . .”),
§16 (“The Jurisdiction etc. of the Colledge [sic] of Physicians in London etc.”), Coke specifies this as the
rule pertaining to “this noble city [i.e., London].” Id. at 251.
189. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN, supra note 60, at 429.
190. See supra Part I.D.2.
191. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN, supra note 60, at 429.
192. Id.
193. “If a woman be quick or great with child, if she take, or another give her any potion to make an
abortion, or if a man strike her, whereby the child within her is kild, it is not murder nor manslaughter by
the law of England, because it is not yet in rerum naturae, tho it be a great crime, and by the judicial law
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woman survived, says Hale, was thus “not murder or manslaughter by the law of
England.”194 Hale’s doctrine is reminiscent of Bracton’s in its emphasis on
patient protection. Hale states clearly that if a potion administered with intent to
destroy a fetus,195 even before quickening,196 is so strong that it kills the patient,
the medical practitioner bears the risk197 of a murder charge even if the patient
consented to it. Practitioners of his day routinely administered compounds to
induce menstruation knowing they might expel a conceptus or fetus,198 and
“curative intent” encompassed this abortion practice and excluded it from the
category of punishable offenses.199 As Hale’s Pleas of the Crowne200 became a
widely accepted working reference for lawyers and judges, his therapeutic intent
doctrine became the standard statement of the common law on abortion.201 In the
rare event of an abortion prosecution202 (when it occurred, typically for the
danger post-quickening abortion posed to a woman203), a therapeutic defense
shielded the good-faith care provider.
Accepted medical practice continued to permit fetal expulsion in the interest of
the health of the pregnant person; this we can deduce from evidence of the
prevalence of “medically indicated” abortion from a variety of sources. To take
just one example, a review of virtually all major obstetrical texts published in
England between 1734 and 1937 shows that, of sixty-two texts, only two did not
condone inducing labor either before, or after, viability of the fetus for reasons
of Moses was punishable with death, nor can it legally be made known whether it were kild or not, 22 E.3
Coron. 263. So it is, if after such child were born alive, and baptized, and after die of the stroke given to
the mother this is not homicide. 1 E.3. 23 b. Coron. 146.” Id. at 433.
194. Id.
195. “But if a woman be with child, and any gives her a potion to destroy the child within her, and she
take it, and it works so strongly, that it kills her, this is murder, for it was not given to cure her of a disease,
but unlawfully to destroy the child within her, and therefore he, that gives a potion to this end, must take
the hazard, and if it kill the mother, it is murder, and so ruled before me at the assizes of Bury in the year
1670 . . . .” Id. at 429–30.
196. Id. The phrase “with child” rather than “quick with child” distinguishes a pre-quickened from a
quickened fetus.
197. In Hale’s phrase, the physician then “must take the hazard.” Id. at 430.
198. See supra Part I.C. supra.
199. Curative abortion in his day is not limited to emergency cases of, say, saving a woman from
life-threatening labor. See supra Part I.A.
200. The earliest publication of Hale’s summary of case law doctrine appeared in 1682. HALE, PLEAS
OF THE CROWN, supra note 60.
201. As evidence of the prominence of Hale’s treatise, the Boston Public Library’s copy is inscribed
“John Adams 1760. John Quincy Adams 1800. George Washington Adams 1825.” Frontspiece of HALE,
PLEAS OF THE CROWN, https://archive.org/details/historiaplacitor01hale; see also, e.g., JOSEPH W.
DELLAPENNA, DISPELLING THE MYTHS OF ABORTION HISTORY 207–08 (2006) [hereinafter DELLAPENNA,
DISPELLING MYTHS] at 185 n.7, 207, 208 n.190 (citing Hale).
202. The medical profession concurred with this position. For example, in 1756, a London medical
convocation decided it was justifiable to sacrifice an “unborn child” to save the life of a pregnant woman
even during delivery. See L. A. PARRY, CRIMINAL ABORTION 9 (1932); see also MOHR, ABORTION IN
AMERICA, supra note 22, at 30, 270 n.18.
203. Means, Cessation of Constitutionality, supra note 19, at 437.
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related to the health of the pregnant woman.204
4. Health on the Verge of Modernity
To ask, “Was there a ‘health exception’ at common law?” is to raise an
admittedly anachronistic question, transposing terms from our time onto another.
The term “exception” wrongly assumes an abortion prohibition to which
exception might be raised.205 The question also problematically presumes shared
understandings of “abortion” across time. “Abortion,” in turn, presumes common
grounds for understanding “pregnancy,” which entails its own complications.
Thinking historically demands we suspend modern confidence about ascertaining
pregnancy, a certitude not available to those of earlier times. More subtly, asking,
“Was there a health exception at common law?” presumes a shared understanding
of “health.” The importance of the “health exception” in current doctrine justifies
investigation into its antecedents,206 but we entertain it knowing that, epistemi-
cally, we start on thin ice.
That said, considering conceptions of health, practices of medicine, and
precepts of law, we can discern several domains of possible action for early
modern patients and practitioners, subject to different legal doctrines.
a. Pre-Quickening: The Constructive Health Exception
Pre-quickening treatment to induce menses consituted one domain of possible
action. As discussed above, not all instances of amenorrhea indicated pregnancy
to early modern women.207 Treatment for amenorrhea, pre-quickening, might
have been undertaken either with no suspicion of pregnancy or lack of clarity
whether the amenorrhea correlated with pregnancy. Under dominant theories of
health, it was incumbent on a responsible practitioner to induce menstruation if
he or she diagnosed “retained menses” (or “obstructed menses,” as the condition
came to be called in the United States).208
Legal historians have debated whether the common law permitted pre-
quickening medical intervention. Proponing the “liberty” argument, Cyril Means
asserts that women enjoyed a common-law liberty to abort at any point in
pregnancy209 and the U.S. Supreme Court, persuaded, has sided with those who
204. KEOWN, ABORTION, DOCTORS, AND THE LAW, supra note 38, at 80–83.
205. To be clear: women themselves, not liable under the doctrine, are not prohibited recourse to
abortion; practitioners are not liable except regarding those procedures posing greatest patient risk. See
supra Part I.D.2. and Part I.D.3.
206. See supra text accompanying notes 11–16 (explaining the importance of the health exception in
challenges to Roe).
207. See supra Part I.C.
208. See, e.g., MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA, supra note 22, at 14, 268 n.27 (1978) (citing Walter
Channing’s lectures in midwifery and diseases of women at Harvard Medical School (1821, 1822, and
1825–26)); see also id. at 6.
209. Means, The Phoenix of Abortional Freedom, supra note 19, at 336–37; Means, Cessation of
Constitutionality, supra note 19, at 515. For the liberty argument, see also, for example, George, Current
Abortion Law, supra note 170.
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argue that abortion was not a crime at common law.210
My research leads to framing this conclusion in a different way. Although I
concur that at common law, a woman could terminate a pregnancy without facing
legal consequence, I do not argue that the law “permitted” abortion in the
administration of emmenagogues we now know cause fetal expulsion. Rather, in
them, early modern common law did not even see abortion. It saw, instead, health
practice. “Permission” is the wrong word. Either the law was blind to the
commission of abortion in the administration of an emmenagogue to treat
suppressed menses; or the law recognized the possible side effect of fetal
expulsion but, considering amenorrhea a source of life-threatening humoral
imbalance, the law actively supported so treating it. To apply this framing to our
anachronistic question, I characterize this situation, wherein patients and health
practitioners routinely conducted uterine purgations in the name of health and
without interference from law, as a “constructive health exception.”
Although provoking menstruation was the most common pre-quickening
intervention, sometimes women and their care providers, even before quicken-
ing, suspected pregnancy and intervened to terminate it. They might have done so
for health reasons, for example if a woman was in fragile health or sufferred from
certain pre-existing conditions thought to be incompatible with pregnancy. This,
too, would fall under a “constructive health exception.”
Alternatively, they might have done so for birth control purposes. Indictment
for pre-quickening pregnancy termination was virtually unheard of, compared
with its routine frequency. As a practical matter the law ignored it. Here, we can
concur with Means’ conclusion that an “abortion liberty” doctrine controlled.
b. Post-Quickening: The Life-Health Defense
Even post-quickening, it was not always clear whether pregnancy, illness, or
both were at issue.211 What was clear was increasing risk over time: experts of the
day warned that medical intervention—regardless of means or intent—posed
210. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 136 (1973) (“doubtful that abortion was ever firmly established as a
common-law crime even with respect to destruction of a quick fetus.”). For historians’ accounts cited by
the Supreme Court, see Means, The Phoenix of Abortional Freedom, supra note 19, at 336–37; Means,
Cessation of Constitutionality, supra note 19, at 515. For later objections that Means erred and missed
evidence from ecclesiastical courts, see DELLAPENNA, DISPELLING MYTHS, supra note 201 (arguing that
prosecutions for abortion, because of evidentiary difficulties over protections against self-incrimination
in the king’s courts, were brought in ecclesiastical courts); Joseph W. Dellapenna, The History of
Abortion: Technology, Morality, and the Law, 40 U. PITT. L. REV. 359 (1979). For rebuttal of Dellapenna
and defense of the common-law abortion liberty position, see Spivack, Context of Abortion Law in Early
Modern England, supra note 160 (arguing that Dellapenna misreads the medieval record by
misunderstanding abortion case law and terminology); see generally KEOWN, ABORTION, DOCTORS, AND
THE LAW, supra note 38 (arguing, based on review and evaluation of extant early modern sources, that
abortion was subject to but limited prosecution in ecclesiastical courts); R.H. Helmholz, Infanticide in the
Province of Canterbury during the Fifteenth Century, 2 HIST. CHILDHOOD Q. 379 (1975) (arguing that one
group of early commentators was writing of canon law and another, of secular law, and thus did not
directly contradict each other as some historians allege).
211. See supra Part I.A. and Part I.B.
2016] 695HEALTH EXCEPTION
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3390926
greater danger to the woman the longer it had been since her last menstrual
period.212 In an era before preventive asepsis, fail-proof anti-hemorrhagics, or
antibiotics, later interventions risked her life. A responsible practitioner would
have initiated a procedure only if the risk of inaction outweighed the risk of
action; if the patient were to die, only the irresponsible practitioner would have
been legally liable in homicide.213 Post-quickening treatments, then, fell into
several domains of possible action.
Post-quickening emmenagogue constituted one domain. Even after clear
indications of pregnancy, which the law accepted as the perception of fetal
movement by the pregnant woman (“quickening”),214 some conditions called for
emmenagogue. Even after quickening, administration of a substance thought of
as an emmenagogue, or for an emmenagogic purpose (as with pre-quickening
intervention), would fall under the “constructive health exception.”215
Post-quickening treatment to terminate possible pregnancy constituted another
possible domain of action. Contemporaneous legal authorities suggest a prevail-
ing duty to intervene in post-quickening situations where the pregnant woman’s
life was imperiled, with the protection of curative intent doctrine if her life was
lost in the attempt.216 In the case, say, of a peculiarly positioned or malformed
fetus promising difficult delivery or dangerous pregnancy, legal doctrine favored
therapeutic intervention.217
Under practice conditions of the time, “saving life” was often inseparable from
“saving health,” making the common-law “life exception” in practicality
inextricably entangled with, and conceptually indistinguishable from, a “health
exception.”218 Here, “health” was subsumed under “life.” Absent a background
abortion prohibition, it would be a mischaracterization to call the doctrine a
life-health “exception.” Rather, the doctrine offered a defense from a charge of
homicide in the case of patient death. Although acting to preserve health is
eclipsed by life-and-death circumstances, we discern in legal doctrine a respect
for those acting in the name of health—as a matter of practical legal reasoning,
health operating in the penumbra of life—resulting in what I characterize as a
“life-health defense.”
212. See, e.g., JOHN AITKEN, PRINCIPLES OF MIDWIFERY, OR PUERPERAL MEDICINE 72 (1784) (“The more
advanced the pregnancy, the more dangerous the abortion, as great haemorrage [sic] arises from the
dilated state of the vessels”), available at GALE CENGAGE LEARNING Eighteenth Century Collection
Online.
213. See supra Part I.D.
214. See supra Part I.B.
215. See supra Part I.D.4.a.
216. See supra Part I.D.2. and Part I.D.3.
217. See supra Part I.D.2.
218. Means reaches a similar conclusion, though he considers a more limited set of cases and
evidence. He does not take into account abortion induced by potion or by external manipulation; but
analyzing the law as applied to surgical abortion in the 1800s, he finds that quickening doctrine together
with the absence of antiseptic surgery meant virtual equivalence of life and health exception. Means,
Cessation of Constitutionality, supra note 19, at 435–37.
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By the turn of the nineteenth century, then, a “constructive health exception” is
the rule under which most medical interventions that we now know terminate
pregnancy—the emmenagogues—took place. The “constructive health excep-
tion” applied to emmenagogic treatment regardless of whether it was undertaken
before or after quickening. After quickening, in the event of patient death, the
life-health defense protected the practitioner charged with patient homicide.
Legal liability thus would only have attached to a small subset of procedures that
we now understand as “abortion”: those undertaken to interrupt pregnancy,
without curative intent, resulting in the death of the woman.
II. THE SHORT NINETEENTH CENTURY
Health, life, abortion: these terms continued in relative stability from the early
decades of North American colonization into the 1800s until a period of intense
change from 1820–1857 that I call “the short nineteenth century.” Before this
period, early modern doctrines in health219 and law220 imported to North
America221 persisted. During this period, however, in medicine the balance of
power between discursive traditions fundamentally shifted. Empirical science
rose; theories of humoral health began to fall.222 This period also saw the first
regulation of abortion by legislatures and thus the first statutory formulation of a
health exception doctrine. Before 1820, no U.S. state had abortion legislation; by
1959, every state did.223 The flood of state abortion legislation hit in three
waves—two in the “short nineteenth century”224 and the third, at its close.225 The
first and second waves, the subjects of this Part, began out of a patient-protection
motivation. The first set of state abortion laws mirrored changes in elite discourse
(both scientific and legal) in the United Kingdom, but incorporate American
caution towards developments in medicine and mercy towards well-intended
practitioners. The second wave, although still largely emanating from a
patient-protection impetus, was inspired by popular scandal rather than elite
219. See supra Part I.A. (describing a women’s health regime combining common knowledge of
abortifacients with an ideology of health that promotes their employment).
220. See supra Part I.D.4. (describing legal doctrine tolerant of uterine purgatives and other abortion
techniques).
221. See infra Part II.A.
222. As historian of medicine Charles E. Rosenberg summarizes, “Medical therapeutics changed
remarkably little in the two millenia preceding 1800; by the end of the century, traditional therapeutics
had altered fundamentally.” Charles E. Rosenberg, The Therapeutic Revolution: Medicine, Meaning, and
Social Change [hereinafter Rosenberg, Therapeutic Revolution], in SICKNESS AND HEALTH IN AMERICA:
READINGS IN THE HISTORY OF MEDICINE AND PUBLIC HEALTH 39, 39 (Judith Walzer Leavitt and Ronald
Numbers eds., 2nd ed. 1985) [hereinafter Leavitt and Numbers, SICKNESS AND HEALTH].
223. See Eugene Quay, Justifiable Abortion—Medical and Legal Foundations (pt. 2), 49 GEO. L.J.
395, 447–520 (1961) [hereinafter Quay, Justifiable Abortion] (Appendix I listing, by state, abortion
legislation passed by U.S. state legislatures between 1821 and 1960, with relevant statutory text).
224. See infra Part II.B. and Part II.C.
225. See infra Part III.
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discourse. This Part summarizes some of the changes in thinking about health
that define this period and redirected the course of the health exception.
Part II.A. describes the status quo in the United States at the beginning of the
century.226 Part II.B., discussing the first wave of legislation, describes the
implicit preservation of the life-health defense in U.K. abortion legislation and
the health rationale behind the first U.S. legislation.227 Meanwhile, starting
roughly in the second quarter of the nineteenth century, dramatic changes in
providing medical care overshadowed a behind-the-scenes revolution in concep-
tions of health. Part II.C. describes how abortion became a vehicle for public
discussion of these more general background changes, a discussion which itself
produced the second wave of U.S. abortion regulation.228 This account of the
short nineteenth century is admittedly not a progress narrative telling of a steady
march towards efficacious care229 and wise law. It is, instead, a record of
unsystematic and uncoordinated starts, stops, reversals, and shifts. In this messy
record, some features of our contemporary options and dilemmas regarding
abortion emerge. Through changes that gained momentum between 1820 and
1857, the “health exception” survived, but in different formulations, vulnerable
to different interpretations.230
A. STATUS QUO ANTE: HEALTH, LIFE, ABORTION
In the United States, under the received theory of health,231 amenorrhea posed
particular danger,232 and for American women through the colonial period and
into the mid-nineteenth century, as in England, it was fraught with indeterminacy.
If it coincided with pregnancy, fetal growth could absorb harmful residues that, if
left alone to accumulate, caused humoral imbalance and disease.233 Otherwise,
amenorrhea was understood to cause a number of pathologies,234 and “obstructed
menses” demanded remedies to “restore menstrual flow.”235
226. See infra Part II.A.
227. See infra Part II.B.
228. See infra Part II.C.
229. In this, I found historian Charles Rosenberg had come to a similar view. See, e.g., Rosenberg,
Therapeutic Revolution, supra note 222, at 39 (arguing against a presumption of studying the history of
medicine in the nineteenth century).
230. See infra Part II.C.
231. Under the going theory, every part of the body relates with every other in a holistic system of
“intake and outgo” that must remain in balance for a person to enjoy health. Rosenberg, Therapeutic
Revolution, supra note 222, at 40. “A distracted mind could curdle the stomach; a dyspeptic stomach
could agitate the mind.” Id.
232. See supra Part I.A.2.
233. See supra Part I.A.3.
234. See supra Part I.A.3.
235. See, e.g., MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA, supra note 22, at 14 (citing Walter Channing’s lectures
on women’s health and gynecology at Harvard Med. School in the early 1820s); see also id. at 6. My main
departure from Mohr is that he apparently reads the “obstructed menses” diagnosis of the first half of the
nineteenth century primarily in a mechanical, not humoral, sense and thus seems to misinterpret medical
response to the diagnosis as attempts literally to “unblock,” rather than induce, menstruation. Id. Contra
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Into these Old World conceptions of health, the New World introduced some
differences in practice. A new mix of populations and bodies of knowledge added
Native American236 and African237 pharmacopeia and procedures to the array of
European treatments to provoke menses or terminate pregnancy.238 Dispersed
patterns of settlement and absence of formal medical education in the U.S. more
often put the practice of medicine in the hands of local herbalists or the patient
herself. The home medical manual239 became a common source for self-
diagnosis and treatment.240 Those in more settled areas also had access to
midwives, “Indian doctors,” and other experienced practitioners, but caregivers
Mohr, see REAGAN, WHEN ABORTION WAS A CRIME, supra note 22, at 8–9 (briefly describing humoral
health practice to restore menstruation and urging current-day readers to take seriously nineteenth-
century beliefs in “blocked menses”); LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD, supra note
22, at 16–17 (in discussion of gynecological practice and abortion, alluding to “a model of illness” in the
first third of the nineteenth century “that called upon the use of drastic medical treatments such as
bleeding or the administration of hash laxatives and emetics.”).
236. See, e.g., Peter Smith, The Indian Doctor’s Dispensary, Being Father Peter Smith’s Advice
Respecting Diseases and Their Cure (1813), reproduced in 2 BULL. LLOYD LIBR. OF BOTANY, PHARMACY,
AND MATERIA MEDICA, 46–47 (J.U. Lloyd ed., Reproduction series #2, 1901) [hereinafter Smith, Indian
Doctor’s Dispensary] (prescribing snake root, also known as seneca); see also BENJAMIN RUSH,
OBSERVATIONS ON THE DUTIES OF A PHYSICIAN, AND THE METHODS OF IMPROVING MEDICINE 11 (pamphlet of
speech to Philadelphia medical graduates, 1789) [hereinafter RUSH, IMPROVING MEDICINE] (recommend-
ing to medical students in Philadelphia the American pharmacopeia unknown in the Old World including
ipecacuana and seneca) available at GALE CENGAGE LEARNING Eighteenth Century Collection Online;
Joseph Jouvency, “Concerning the Country and Manners of the Canadians, or the Savages of New
France” (Acadia 1610-1613), in 1 JESUIT RELATIONS AND ALLIED DOCUMENTS 277 (Reuben Gold
Thwaites ed., 1896-1901), cited in Ann Marie Plane, Childbirth Practices Among Native American
Women of New England and Canada, 1600-1800, in Leavitt, WOMAN AND HEALTH, supra note 144, at 42.
237. See, e.g., RUSH, IMPROVING MEDICINE, supra note 236, at 10 (advising graduating American
medical students in pursuit of medical knowledge to converse with “nurses and old women” and to
inquire of “Negros and Indians” regarding discoveries in medicine.); MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA, supra
note 22, at 6 (describing cotton root and other abortifacient knowledge commanded by Africans brought
to the Americas). Although treatment of abortion in Native American and African law awaits further
research, the prevalence of abortifacient knowledge among indigenous Native American and resettled
Africans leads us to infer its acceptance in legal traditions of non-European populations significant in
colonial America.
238. Some of the New World prescriptions and procedures differed from the balance-restoring or
dual-use humoral treatments in that they had a distinctly contraceptive aim. See, e.g., Thomas Jefferson,
Response to Query VI, A Notice of the mines and other subterraneous riches, its trees, plants, fruits, &c.,
in NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA (1787) (1781), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/
jeffvir.asp (reporting Native Americans raise fewer children than descendants of Europeans not because
of “a difference of nature, but of circumstance,” as “child-bearing becomes extremely inconvenient to
them . . . it is said that they have learnt the practice of procuring abortion by the use of some vegetable.”).
239. See, e.g., S.K. JENNINGS, THE MARRIED LADY’S COMPANION, OR POOR MAN’S FRIEND (1808)
[hereinafter JENNINGS, LADY’S COMPANION], excerpted in ROSE, ABORTION DOCUMENTARY GUIDE, supra
note 25, at 1–2; see also, e.g., Letter to Ladies (1817), cited in MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA, supra note
22, at 6.
240. See MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA, supra note 22, at 6 (arguing the importance of home medical
manuals in early nineteenth century U.S. health care). For examples of such manuals addressing
gynecological health, see id. (citing DOMESTIC MEDICINE (1782)) (the most commonly consulted home
manual); JENNINGS, LADY’S COMPANION, supra note 239, at 1 (giving straightforward recommendations
for dealing with “a common cold,” a nineteenth-century euphemism for missing a period). The American
home manuals, continuing the classificatory schemata of predecessor humoral manuals, commonly
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with formal medical education or those using commercial preparations were
rare.241 Contemporaneous writers remarked on how common herbal remedies for
amenorrhea were in the U.S., some straightforwardly acknowledged to “destroy
the fetus in utero.”242 Humoral purgatives were effective; without expert
guidance, self-treatment was far from risk-free,243 and misused purgatives could
be lethal.244 Pregnancy itself was an uncertain business.245
In the ambiguity inhering in diagnosis of “obstructed menses” versus
“pregnancy,” the law tolerated medical intervention before quickening.246 After
quickening, as in early modern England, the law ignored measures intended to
provoke menstruation under a “constructive health exception.”247 Indictment for
abortion was practically restricted to after-quickening procedures to destroy a
fetus that resulted in the death of the woman carrying it.248 With the “life-health
doctrine” providing an affirmative defense, convictions on such charges were
separate abortifacient compounds into one section for treating “obstructed menses” and another, for
abortion. MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA, supra note 22, at 6.
241. Benjamin Rush offers a prominent example of that rarity, a formally trained physician in the early
history of the United States: native of Pennsylvania, educated at the College of New Jersey (now
Princeton) and at medical college in Edinburgh, Scotland, practitioner in Philadelphia as well as political
activist and signer of the Declaration of Independence. BENJAMIN RUSH, A MEMORIAL CONTAINING
TRAVELS THROUGH LIFE OR SUNDRY INCIDENTS IN THE LIFE OF DR. BENJAMIN RUSH (Louis Alexander
Biddle ed., 1905) (1813), https://archive.org/details/memorialcontaini00rush.
242. See, e.g., Smith, Indian Doctor’s Dispensary, supra note 236. For further discussion of the
prevalence of emmenagogues and abortifacients in U.S. health practice at this time, see, for example,
LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD, supra note 22, at 18–19.
243. See, e.g., Center for Disease Control, Fatality and Illness Associated with Consumption of
Pennyroyal Oil—Colorado, 27 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 511 (Dec. 22, 1978), http://stacks.
cdc.gov/view/cdc/1654 (reporting, in 1978, three unrelated deaths of women in Colorado from
unsupervised self-dosing with humoral recipes containing pennyroyal).
244. See, e.g., Carter v. State, 2 Ind. 617 (May 1851) (after death of Marilla Reed, convicting her
boarder of her accidental death by overdose, without medical advice, with the purgative arsenic and the
abortifacient ergot.); see also, e.g., Comm. ex rel. Chauncey & Nixon v. Keeper of Prison, 2 Ashm. 227,
231 (Philadelphia County, 1838) 227, 230 (describing a woman’s death from abortifacient purgatives in a
Pennsylvania case).
245. Recent reassessment of nineteenth-century records shows maternal mortality averages for those
assisted by midwives is significantly lower than for those attended by a formally trained physician. See
Laurel Thatcher Ulrich, ‘The Living Mother of a Living Child’: Midwifery and Mortality in
Postrevolutionary New England [hereinafter Ulrich, Midwifery and Mortality] in Leavitt, WOMAN AND
HEALTH, supra note 144.
246. For discussion of common-law doctrine that tolerates the practice, see supra Part I.D.4, and for
an instance of its application in the United States, see, for example, Commonwealth v. Bangs, 9 Mass.
387, 388 (1812) (reciting common law doctrine in dismissing charge of attempted abortion against Isaiah
Bangs on grounds quickening not proved).
247. For an argument for considering part of the common-law doctrine a “constructive health
exception,” see supra Part I.D.4.a. (summarizing doctrine and suggesting for retrospective purposes it be
considered a constructive health exception); for a summary of some of the implications of applying this
doctrine in the United States, see LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD, supra note 22 at
13–14 (describing how, in “American legal and moral practice at the beginning of the nineteenth
century . . . early abortions were legally ignored”).
248. See, e.g., Means, The Phoenix of Abortional Freedom, supra note 19; Means, Cessation of
Constitutionality, supra note 19.
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even rarer.249 However, a wave of statutory innovation set to break on American
shores threatened this state of tolerance.
B. THE FIRST WAVE: REGULATION ENTERS STATUTE
1. Statute in the U.K.: Ratifying Science, Criminalizing Abortion, Encoding
Health Exception
A health “exception” requires an abortion prohibition, and in 1803 U.K. law
lords provided just that. At the same time that practice in the U.S. perpetuated
pre-existing theories and treatments of humoral health, in Europe investigations
in biological science began to challenge prevailing understandings among
knowledge elites and thence to influence law. In the seventeenth century, William
Harvey, an English physician conducting training lectures with dissections,
reconceived the theory of circulation of the blood.250 Harvey’s findings
challenged basic premises of Galenic physiology, over time gradually eroding
belief in the mechanics upon which Galenic theories of humors and health rest.251
Harvey’s method of investigation, meanwhile, was part of a wider trend of
empiricism that shifted medical thought from humoral doctrine towards a new
theory of health.252 This revolution in health theory turned treatment doctrines
away from keeping humors in holistic balance, and towards “localized treat-
ments” targeting newly conceived “systems” (like Harvey’s “circulatory sys-
tem”253 or the “reproductive system”) or discrete organs as loci of disorders or
infection.
Abandoning humoral theory did not happen all at once with a moment of
discovery or declaration of a new day. Rather, we can trace this slow and often
unconscious process by its footprints. Take, for example, the organization of
instruction at the medical college of Glasgow, Scotland. In 1704, when humoral
theory still prevailed, the college opened a “physic garden” for medicinal plants
and appointed John Marshall, a Glasgow surgeon, keeper of the garden and
instructor of botany to the medical students.254 In 1790, when James Jeffray
assumed the professorship, it was still a chair of anatomy and botany,255 a
combination that makes sense under humoral theories of health. Jeffray
249. Dayton, Taking the Trade, supra note 144, at 12 (finding record of only one, for a death from
abortion by instrument, in colonial American court archives, and describing the case in the death of Sarah
Grosvenor from after-effects of an intrusive procedure by male doctor after his potion failed to procure
abortion). Dayton also ascribes covert abortion in colonial America, when, before quickening, it was
legal, to shame of the discovered sin of sex outside of marriage. Dayton, id., at 14.
250. WILLIAM HARVEY, THE CIRCULATION OF THE BLOOD AND OTHER WRITINGS (Kenneth J. Franklin
trans., London: Orion Publishing Group ed. 1993) (1628) [hereinafter HARVEY, CIRCULATION OF THE
BLOOD]; see generally G. WHITTERIDGE, WILLIAM HARVEY AND THE CIRCULATION OF THE BLOOD (1971).
251. Henry and Forrester, Introduction to the Physiologia of Jean Fernel, supra note 62, at 5.
252. Id. at 2; see also infra Part III.C.
253. See generally HARVEY, CIRCULATION OF THE BLOOD, supra note 250.
254. COMRIE, HISTORY OF SCOTTISH MEDICINE, supra note 68, at 519.
255. Id. at 520.
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continued to conduct lectures for several years in the garden,256 but by 1800 he
had dropped botany, left the garden, and switched to the dissecting room to teach
anatomy.257 When Allen Thomson succeeded Jeffray, the chair was only
anatomy, not anatomy and botany; Thomson’s teaching load was anatomy and
physiology with research interests in embryology.258 By 1810 the medical
college’s “physic garden” had fallen into disuse; the university later replaced it
with a garden for botanical research outside the city, removed from the medical
college,259 and in 1831, the university built a chemistry lab.260 From medical
college garden to dissecting room; from plants, anatomy, and botany to cadavers,
organs, and chemistry: these are signs of the abandonment of humoral doctrine.
As thinking in health shifted from humoral to locational theories, empiricism
also drove science to divorce the Aristotelian premise of continuous in utero
development from its theories of animation and the soul. While embryology
yielded more fine-grained data about fetal development,261 science’s impulse
towards bright-line distinctions and generalization favored pointing to concep-
tion as the starting point of human “life.” Such a move erased the earlier
distinction between conceptus to fetus, and the idea of individual development
along a continuum eventually to include animation and ensoulment.262 Samuel
Farr, in his Elements of Medical Jurisprudence (1788), summarized the resulting
reconception of “life” and argued for legal change in response. “Life,” Farr
wrote, “begins . . . immediately after conception. Hence those seem to err 1st
who would persuade us, that the foetus acquires life when it is so particularly
active, that the mother becomes sensible of its motions.”263 In a statement
reflecting prior thinking about animation and its relation to vitality, together with
new thinking about conception and life, Farr then encompassingly reasoned:
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 522.
259. Id. at 520.
260. COMRIE, HISTORY OF SCOTTISH MEDICINE, supra note 68, at 522–23.
261. See, e.g., CASPAR FRIEDRICH WOLFF, DE FORMATIONE INTESTINORUM (J.C. Dupont & J.L. Perrin
eds., Brepols 2003) (1768-1769) (furthering epigenetics’ argument against preformationism by demon-
strating that the chick intestine forms by the folding of tissue that detaches from the embryo’s surface);
SAMUEL THOMAS SOEMERRING, ICONES EMBRYONUM HUMANORUM (Varrentrapp und Wenner, Frankfurt am
Main ed., 1799) (illustrating an early connected series of human development by drawings of human
embryos from his collection of mostly aborted material); KARL ERNST VON BAER, ¨UBER ENTWICKELUNGS-
GESCHICHTE DER THIERE [ON THE DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF ANIMALS] 4–7 (1828) (in contrast to the
Aristotelian idea of individual variation regarding the pace of in utero development, proposing a scheme
of “normal development,“ the “most usual” under favorable conditions). On Soemmering, see Lorraine
Daston and Peter Galison, The Image of Objectivity, 40 REPRESENTATIONS 81–128 (proposing that
Soemerring, typical of scientific illustrators of his time, sought to see beyond mere individuals to
represent types). On Baer, see Nick Hopwood, A History of Normal Plates, Tables, and Stages in
Vertebrate Embryology, 51 INT’L J. DEV. BIO. 1 (2007). On the history of embryology, see generally
JOSEPH NEEDHAM, A HISTORY OF EMBRYOLOGY (1934).
262. See supra Part I.B.
263. SAMUEL FARR, ELEMENTS OF MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE 26 (Smith and Davy 3rd ed. 1815) (1788)
[hereinafter FARR, ELEMENTS OF MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE].
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. . . as such beings might live, and become of use to mankind, and as
they may be supposed from the time indeed of conception, to be living
animated beings, there is no doubt but the destruction of them ought to
be considered as a capital crime.264
British legislators soon ratified this sense in Lord Ellenborough’s Act, the first
Anglophone statute to regulate abortion.265 Surprisingly, given its eventual fame
for criminalizing abortion, abortion did not figure prominently in its first draft,266
occurring merely as a narrow provision in a poison-control section. Homicide by
poison had long raised concern as an attack difficult to detect and its victims, to
treat.267 This measure prohibiting poison to induce miscarriage after quicken-
ing268 followed the spirit of earlier patient-protection doctrines.269
During the process of revising the draft bill, however, life science exerted its
influence, and Lord Ellenborough (also Chief Justice of the King’s Bench at the
time),270 his merciless rigor.271 In response to objections272 that the bill failed to
264. Id. at 74. But see id. at 28–9 (admitting “a foetus can not live out of the womb of its mother,”
proposing criteria for determining “what kind of children, when born” should be “deemed endued with
life,” and concluding upon seven months after conception should they enjoy a presumption of life).
265. Lord Ellenborough’s Act, 43 Geo. 3 ch. 58, reprinted at https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Lord_
Ellenborough’s_Act_1803. For further discussion of the relationship between embryology and Lord
Ellenborough’s Act, see KEOWN, ABORTION, DOCTORS, AND THE LAW, supra note 38, at 15.
266. Abortion does not appear in the title or the preamble. The Act’s long title was “An Act for the
further prevention of malicious shooting, stabbing, cutting, wounding, and poisoning, and also for the
malicious setting fire to buildings, and also for repealing a certain Act, made in the first year of the late
King James the first, intituled ‘An Act to prevent the destroying and murdering of bastard children,’ and
for substituting other provisions in lieu of the same.” Lord Ellenborough’s Act long title and Preamble,
reprinted at https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Lord_Ellenborough’s_Act_1803.
267. See, e.g., COKE, LAWS OF ENGLAND FOURTH, supra note 59, at 252 (singling out poisoning water
for special sanction).
268. For progress of the Bill in the House of Lords, see 44 H.L. JOUR. 111, 151, 156, 170, 172, 187,
256 (1802-1804), cited in KEOWN, ABORTION, DOCTORS, AND THE LAW, supra note 38, at 175 n.77; for
progress in the House of Commons, see 58 H.C. JOUR. 424, 514, 516, 513, 543 (1802-1803) cited in
KEOWN supra at 175 n.78.
269. See, e.g., supra Part I.D.2. (discussing Bracton’s poison prohibition); see also supra Part I.D.2.
(discussing the duty to save); supra Part I.D.4. (characterizing common-law treatments as a “constructive
health” doctrine and a “life-health defense”). One part of the bill even restores the presumption of
innocence for a woman reporting stillbirth of an illegitimate child: an earlier law that is referenced in the
long-form title of Lord Ellenborough’s Act [i.e., “a certain Act, made in the first year of the late King
James the first, intituled ‘An Act to prevent the destroying and murdering of bastard children’”] had
reversed the common-law presumption of innocence of a mother at stillbirth, if the child would have been
illegitimate. The 1803 Act restored it. Lord Ellenborough’s Act, 43 Geo. 3 ch. 58, text reprinted at
https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Lord_Ellenborough’s_Act_1803.
270. KEOWN, ABORTION, DOCTORS, AND THE LAW, supra note 38, at 19.
271. For an example of Lord Ellenborough’s project of systematizing criminal law and of facilitating
criminal prosecutions, see 36 Parl. Hist. Eng. 1245 (1803)) (Ellenborough stating the bill aims “to
generalize the law with regard to certain penal offenses, and to adapt it equally to every part of the United
Kingdom”); see also, generally, KEOWN, ABORTION, DOCTORS, AND THE LAW, supra note 38, at 13–17
(explaining Ellenborough’s revisions to eliminate disparities in criminal law between Ireland and the rest
of the U.K and modify doctrine to facilitate prosecutions). On Ellenborough and his reputation for
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incorporate new scientific thinking related to conception and human life,273 the
Lords added a new category, “pre-quickening abortion,” at first as a misde-
meanor,274 raised in revision to a felony.275 They made post-quickening abortion
a capital crime,276 and Ellenborough added attempt offenses, relieving prosecu-
tors of the burden of proving pregnancy.277 An offender needed only to have
acted with the intent of causing miscarriage, regardless of whether the woman
was actually pregnant, to incur criminal liability.278 This assault on the
“quickening” distinction, anticipating a similar move in the United States sixty
years later,279 nonetheless fell short of blanket criminalization. The key was
intent doctrine.
As finally passed, the statute criminalized “wilfully and maliciously”280
administering a substance with intent to procure miscarriage before quickening
or “wilfully, maliciously, and unlawfully” doing so after quickening.281 Historian
John Keown proposes that those terms, encoding the statute’s intent element,
survived subsequent revisions of the criminal statute to become U.K. courts’
vehicle for preserving prior common-law doctrine on therapeutic intent.282 (The
use of these terms, and the statute’s intent doctrine, foreshadowed and influenced
irascibility and mercilessness, see Entry for Law, Edward, first Baron Ellenborough, in OXFORD
DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/16142.
272. For discussion of this point, see KEOWN, ABORTION, DOCTORS, AND THE LAW, supra note 38, at
22–24.
273. See, e.g., FARR, ELEMENTS OF MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 263.
274. For progress of the Bill in the House of Lords, see 44 H.L. JOUR. 111, 151, 156, 170, 172, 187,
256 (1802-1804), cited in KEOWN, ABORTION, DOCTORS, AND THE LAW, supra note 38, at 175 n.77; for
progress in the House of Commons, see 58 H.C. JOUR. 424, 514, 516, 513, 543 (1802-1803) cited in
KEOWN supra at 175 n.78.
275. Lord Ellenborough’s Act, 43 Geo. 3 ch. 58, § 2, Act reprinted at https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/
Lord_Ellenborough’s_Act_1803.
276. Lord Ellenboroughs Act, § 1.
277. KEOWN, ABORTION, DOCTORS, AND THE LAW, supra note 38, at 15.
278. Id.
279. See Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and
Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 287 [hereinafter Siegel, Reasoning from the Body];
see also infra Part III.A.
280. Lord Ellenborough’s Act, § 2 (regarding pre-quickening abortion).
281. Lord Ellenborough’s Act, 43 Geo. 3 ch. 58, § 1 (regarding post-quickening abortion), reprinted at
https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Lord_Ellenborough’s_Act_1803.
282. The core of the intent provisions survived revision and, in that survival, bolstered the therapeutic
intent defense. KEOWN, ABORTION, DOCTORS, AND THE LAW, supra note 38, at 27 n.2. (citing the 1837
successor act, Offenses Against the Person Act § 6, that abolished the death penalty for abortion and
preserved the requirement that to be punishable, an act be done “unlawfully”); id. (citing the 1846 draft
revision of criminal law, including on abortion and the intent provision, Parl. Pap. 24 (Commissioners for
Revising and Consolidating the Criminal Law ed., 1846)) that proposed in relevant part, “. . . no
Act . . . shall be punishable when such act is done in good faith with the intention of saving the life of the
mother whose miscarriage is intended to be procured”)); id. at 167 (Appendix I) (reprinting relevant
sections of the revised criminal law as finally adopted, The Offenses Against the Person Act of 1861, that
stipulate to be punishable, an abortion must be done “unlawfully”). For discussion of the 1846 draft
revision, exempting from punishment an act done with the intent of saving the life of the mother, see also
Davies, Necessity, supra note 170, at 126.
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U.S. law.283) “Unlawfulness” was already familiar in homicide doctrine.284 Hale
had distinguished abortion with intent to cure or prevent disease in a woman from
abortion with intent to destroy the child within her, only characterizing the latter
as “unlawful.”285 Courts interpreting Lord Ellenborough’s Act and its successors
distinguished “lawful” abortion286 in a way that preserved the common-law
life-health defense and protected practitioners who acted with therapeutic
intent.287 Juries were instructed accordingly.288 “Malice,” another element from
the statute, was also already a familiar (if confusing) term.289 “Malice afore-
thought,” premeditated ill-intent, in criminal doctrine was the element distinguish-
ing murder from manslaughter.290 Prosecutors subsequently assured physicians
in official correspondence that the law did not forbid abortion necessary to save a
pregnant woman’s life,291 and legal experts distinguished non-criminal abortion
283. See infra Part III.
284. COKE, LAWS OF ENGLAND FOURTH, supra note 59, at 251. Blackstone, elaborating on Coke’s
doctrine, had defined “unlawfulness” in regard to homicide as “killing without warrant or excuse.”
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: BOOK THE FOURTH, ch. 14, 196
(1765–1769), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/blackstone_bk4ch14.asp [hereinafter BLACK-
STONE, COMMENTARIES].
285. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN, supra note 60, at 429; see also supra Part I.D.3.
286. See, e.g., R. v. Wilhelm, 17 MED. TIM. GAZ. 658 (1858)) (judge admits the possibility of a “lawful
cause” for attempted abortion), cited in KEOWN, ABORTION, DOCTORS, AND THE LAW, supra note 38, at 53,
182 n.29; R v. Bell [1929], 1 BRIT. MED. J. 1061) (judge states certain operations to terminate pregnancy
in its last stages to save patient’s are legal and necessary), cited in KEOWN, supra, at 53, 182 n.27; see
also, e.g., R. v. Bourne, 1 K.B. 687, 3 All E.R. 615, L.R. 471 (Central Criminal Court [U.K.])) (judge
upholds defense submission to amend indictment to include the word “unlawfully,” adding to elements
Crown prosecutors have to prove), cited in KEOWN supra at 51, 182 n.11.
287. See generally KEOWN, ABORTION, DOCTORS, AND THE LAW, supra note 38 (arguing courts
interpreted statutes’ intent language to permit therapeutic abortions).
288. See, e.g., R. v. Wilhelm, 17 Med. Tim. Gaz. 658 (1858)) (judge instructs jury that to convict it
must be satisfied that defendant used “an unlawful instrument for an unlawful purpose”), cited in KEOWN,
ABORTION, DOCTORS, AND THE LAW, supra note 38, at 52; R. v. Collins, 2 BRIT. MED. J. 59, 122, 129
(1898)) (in murder trial of medical practitioner charged with using an instrument to procure abortion,
judge instructs jury that in some cases “forcible miscarriage” is necessary to save the patient’s life and “a
properly qualified doctor had to say when that time had arrived. That was not unlawful.”), cited in
KEOWN, supra at 52; Death after operation to terminate pregnancy, 2 BRIT. MED. J. 549, 550 (1933) (at
inquest into possibility of wrongful death, coroner instructs jury that where surgical abortion was
medically indicated in view of attending physicians, felonious intent could “of course” be ruled out),
cited in KEOWN, supra at 53.
289. See, e.g., The People v. William Enoch, 13 Wend. 159, 167 (N.Y. Dec. 1834) (court trying to
make sense of common-law element of malice in context of altered terms in revised criminal code).
290. See COKE, LAWS OF ENGLAND FOURTH, supra note 59. Blackstone asserts that the law may imply
“malicious” intent even where none is expressed, iconoclastically giving unintended death of a woman
from violently efficacious abortion medicine as an example. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, supra note
284, at 201.
291. Sir Edward Clarke Q.C. & Horace Avory, Opinion of Q.C. on Abortion for Purpose of Saving Life
of Mother, Requested by Royal College of Physicians (1895), in TAYLOR’S PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF
MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE 154 (F.J. Smith ed., 5th ed. 1905)) (Queen’s Counsel, regarding a request for
opinion on abortion from Royal College of Physicians, responded, “the law does not forbid the
procurement of abortion during pregnancy, or the destruction of the child during labour, where such
procurement or destruction is necessary to save the mother’s life.”). For background on this opinion and
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for doctors.292 In short, even after statutory “criminalization,” British case law
followed the common-law rule that medically necessitated abortion was not
punishable. The courts found a life-health exception in statutory prohibitions that
criminalized only “malicious” or “unlawful” acts to procure miscarriage.
2. Statute in the United States: Protecting Patients
The abortion criminalization thrust of Lord Ellenborough’s Act initially found
no reception in the U.S.293 When eventually emulated, it was patient protection
that inspired state criminal code revisers. The first wave of U.S. abortion
regulation worked towards what we might somewhat anachronistically character-
ize as “consumer protection,” either in poison control (covering only a subset of
potional abortion)294 or malpractice protection.295 The health exception survived
in both; I propose that health preservation motivated both.
a. Poison and Consumer Protection
The first statutory regulation of abortion in the U.S. came in 1821 when
Connecticut Revisers, in a new section of the state criminal code against murder
by poisoning, included a clause making administering poison with intention to
cause post-quickening miscarriage punishable.296 Far from a blanket criminaliza-
tion of abortion, the Connecticut provision only covered “poison,” not all potions
that induce miscarriage (and, only targeting a second party, exempted the woman
herself from liability).297 It made no explicit health exception, but implicitly
encoded the logic of the common-law life-health defense in an intent element
requiring “poison” be administered “willfully and maliciously.”298 Although not
technically a “defense,” it embedded the logic of the antecedent defense in the
very definition of the elements of the offense, carving out an implicit therapeutic
exception. Timing was important. Inducing miscarriage of a “known” pregnancy—
on the intent provision interpreted for medical care providers, see KEOWN, ABORTION, DOCTORS, AND THE
LAW, supra note 38, at 54.
292. See e.g., The Ethical, Legal, and Medical Aspects of Abortion, 1 LANCET 230–231 (1927)) (in
joint meeting of Medico-Legal Society and obstetrics section of Royal Society of Medicine, Justice
Humphreys distinguished non-criminal abortion as “steps taken by a qualified medical man to get rid of a
condition in his patient which he considered, using the best of his skill and ability, and of course honestly,
on medical grounds and on medical grounds alone, to be dangerous to the safety of his patient.”),
discussed in KEOWN, ABORTION, DOCTORS, AND THE LAW, supra note 38, at 54–55, 183 n.32–36, 38–39.
293. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bangs, 9 Mass. 387, 388 (1812) (reciting common law doctrine in
dismissing charge of attempted abortion on grounds that even “if an abortion had been alleged and proved
to have ensued,” “averment that woman was quick with child is a necessary part of the indictment,” i.e.,
excluding any wider attempt doctrine).
294. See infra Part II.B.2.a.
295. See infra Part II.B.2.b.
296. CONN. GEN. STAT. tit. 22, §§ 14, 16, at 152, 153 (1821); see also MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA,
supra note 22, at 21–22 (describing the poison-control aspects of the Connecticut statute).
297. tit. 22, §§ 14, 16.
298. tit. 22, §§ 14, 16. For discussion of the Connecticut legislation, see also N.E.H. HULL & PETER
CHARLES HOFFER, ROE V. WADE: THE ABORTION RIGHTS CONTROVERSY IN AMERICAN HISTORY 21 (2001)
[hereinafter HULL & HOFFER, ABORTION RIGHTS IN AMERICAN HISTORY].
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i.e., post-quickening—required an essentially noxious substance (like arsenic) or
a more toxic quantity of an herbal purgative, administered during a period of
pregnancy of heightened risk of serious hemorrhage, all regarded as a threat to a
woman’s health and life.
Two states, Missouri in 1825 and Illinois in 1827, followed Connecticut’s lead,
amending criminal poisoning provisions to include attempting miscarriage
through poison.299 Their omission of reference to “quickening,” Mohr suggests,
evidences that in the United States, “the quickening distinction was taken
completely for granted rather than any effort to eliminate it.”300 Punishment was
aimed at those who peddled poisons with the promise of procuring miscar-
riage.301 By 1857, six jurisdictions had adopted their first abortion regulation
with reference to poison.302
b. Malpractice, Consumer Protection, and the Explicit Exception
In the same decade that revisers in Connecticut took up poison control, in New
York, formally trained physicians (referred to as “regulars”) began to advocate
legislated regulation of medicine. By the mid-1820s, they controlled, through the
speaker of the state assembly, appointments to the standing committee on
medical practice.303 To licensing procedures that had existed since the 1790s,304
in 1827 the New York legislature added a provision making unauthorized practice
of medicine a misdemeanor, the toughest medical-practice control regulation in
299. An Act Concerning Crimes and Punishments ch. 1, 1825 1 Mo. Rev. Laws ch. 1, § 78, 281, 283
(Act of Feb. 12, 1825) (including in Criminal Code section on administering poison “or other noxious,
poisonous, or destructive substance” with intention to murder, administering the same with intention to
cause or procure “miscarriage” of a woman with child); An Act Relative to Criminal Jurisprudence, div.
5, 1827 Ill. Rev. Laws, Criminal Code, div. 5, § 46, at 124, 131 (Act of Jan. 6, 1827) (including in
Criminal Code section on administering or causing to be taken poison “or other noxious or destructive
substance” with intention to “cause the death, doing the same with intention to “procure the miscarriage”
of a woman with child).
300. MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA, supra note 22, at 26.
301. HULL & HOFFER, ABORTION RIGHTS IN AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 298, at 20. (“Prosecutions
occurred only when a woman died or suffered grievous harm through the abortionist’s recklessness or
negligence.”).
302. In order of adoption, statutes regulating abortion in reference to poison before 1857 are: CONN.
GEN. STAT. tit. 22, §§ 14, 16, at 151, 152–53 (1821); 1825 1 Mo. Rev. Laws ch. 1, § 78; 1827 Ill. Rev.
Laws, Criminal Code, div. 5, § 46,; An Act Defining Crimes and Punishments §18, 1838–1839 Iowa
(Terr.) Acts §18, at 142, 145 (Act of Jan. 5, 1839). (N.B.: Revision of the Connecticut statute in 1830
extended the provision regarding poison to include abortion by instrument as well. 1830 Conn. Acts ch. 1,
§ 16.); see also An Act to Amend “an Act Relative to Crimes & Punishment approved Feb. 10, 1831” § 3,
IND. REV. STAT. ch. 26, § 3, at 224, 224 (1838) (Act of Feb. 8, 1835) (amending Indiana criminal code to
add a general provision on poisoning that included in one fell swoop a section on using a substance or an
instrument with intent to procure miscarriage); 1849–1850 Cal. Sess. Stats. ch. 99, § 45, at 229, 223
(abortion-regulating provision, though it includes using an “instrument” as well as a “medicine” or
“substance,” given in poisoning section of criminal code); HAW. (KINGDOM) PENAL CODE ch. 12, § 1
(1850) (prohibiting producing miscarriage by “instrument” as well as “poison” or “noxious thing”).
303. MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA, supra note 22, at 37–38.
304. It was declared unlawful to practice “physic [sic] and surgery” in New York if “not regularly
licensed” in 1796. In re Smith, 10 Wend. 449, 453 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1833).
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the U.S.305 The following year, revisers of the state criminal code, under the
advice of “old and experienced surgeons,”306 jumped on the patient-protection
bandwagon but took it further. Echoing Hale,307 they distinguished between two
kinds of practitioner intent: to “kill”308 (or “destroy”309) an unborn quick child
versus to “procure miscarriage.”310 This very distinction encodes two different
rationales behind interventions that terminate pregnancy that we have seen under
the humoral regime, with direct implications for an explicit therapeutic defense.
The most stringent of the three statutory provisions on abortion adopted in
New York (in title two, section eight)311 contemplates abortion by blows. It raised
“wilful [sic] killing” of an unborn quick child, by any injury to the mother which
would be considered murder if it had resulted in the death of the mother,312 from
misdemeanor to first-degree manslaughter.313 It thus penalized battery in a
particular way if against a pregnant woman post-quickening. Means clarifies that
this measure excluded practices typical of regulars314 and, we can add, of
humoral practitioners. Several states adopted a similar measure.315 Perhaps
305. ALEXANDER WILDER, HISTORY OF MEDICINE: A BRIEF OUTLINE OF MEDICAL HISTORY AND SECTS OF
PHYSICIANS, FROM THE EARLIEST HISTORICAL PERIOD; WITH AN EXTENDED ACCOUNT OF THE NEW SCHOOLS
OF THE HEALING ART IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY, AND ESPECIALLY A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN ECLECTIC
PRACTICE OF MEDICINE, NEVER BEFORE PUBLISHED 440–445 (1901)), cited in MOHR, ABORTION IN
AMERICA, supra note 22, at 38, 272 n.35.
306. MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA, supra note 22, at 38.
307. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN, supra note 60, at 429–34. For the argument that the push for
abortion regulation came from doctors, see generally Means, Cessation of Constitutionality, supra note
19, on New York’s 1828 statute; see also MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA, supra note 22, at 26–27.
308. An Act Concerning Crimes and Punishments; proceedings in criminal cases; and prison
discipline, pt. 4 (Act of Dec. 18, 1828) (codified as 2 N.Y. REV. STAT. pt. 4, ch. 1, tit. 2, art. 1, § 8, at 659,
661 (1828)).
309. pt. 4, ch. 1, tit. 2, art. 1, § 9, at 659, 661 (1828).
310. 2 N.Y. REV. STAT. pt. 4, ch. 1, tit. 6 § 21, at 689, 694 (1828).
311. 2 N.Y. REV. STAT. pt. 4, ch. 1, tit. 2, art. 1, § 8, at 659, 661 (1828).
312. tit. 2, art. 1, § 8.
313. 2 N.Y. REV. STAT. Appendix: Revisers’ Reports and Notes, pt. 4, ch. 1, tit. 2, art. 1, § 8, at 811, 812
(1828–1835) (explaining that the offense theretofore had only been classed a misdemeanor).
314. Means, Cessation of Constitutionality, supra note 19, at 446 (“No physician in 1828 would have
advised blows as an acceptable technique of therapeutic abortion.”).
315. Abortion by blows prohibitions adopted before 1857 (in order of adoption): An Act Concerning
Crimes and Punishments, pt. 4, tit. 2, § 8, codified as 2 N.Y. REV. STAT. pt. 4, ch. 1, tit. 2, art. 1, § 8, at 659,
661 (1828) (Act of Dec. 18, 1828); An Act concerning Crimes and their Punishments art. 2, § 9 (codified
as MO. REV. STAT. art. 2, § 9, at 168 (1835)) (Act of March 20, 1835); ARK. REV. STAT. ch. 44, div. 3, art. 2,
§ 5, at 240 (1838); An Act to amend the Acts of this State concerning Crimes and Punishments, and the
Penitentiary (An Act, to establish a Penitentiary in the State of Mississippi) ch. 14, § 70, 1839 Miss. Laws
app. ch. 14, § 70 at 858, 866 (Act of Feb. 15, 1839) (codified as MISS. STAT. ch. 50, act 1, tit. 3, art. 1, § 8)
(1839); An Act Defining Crimes and Punishments ch. 49, § 10, codified as IOWA (TERR.) REV. STAT. ch. 49,
§ 10, at 162, 167 (1843)) (Act of Feb. 16, 1843); An Act Regulating the Executive Power, the Judiciary,
and for Other Purposes art. 3, § 1, 1843-49 Or. (Terr.) Gen. Laws art. 3, § 1 (Act of June 27, 1844)
(adopting for Oregon territory the 1843 revised laws of Iowa, incorporating provision targeting abortion
by blows); Act of May 18, 1846, tit. 30, § 32, MICH. REV. STAT. tit. 30, ch. 153, § 32 (1846); MINN. (TERR.)
REV. STAT. ch. 100, § 10, at 491, 493 (1851); WIS. REV. STAT. pt. 4, tit. 30, ch. 133, §10, at 682, 683 (1849);
An Act concerning crimes and the punishment of offenses against the persons of individuals, ch. 48, § 9,
codified as KAN. (TERR.) STAT. ch. 48, § 9 (1855) (Act of July 22, 1855).
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reflecting condemnation of the practice itself, or those tempted to use it, this
section contained no health exception, implicit or explicit.
Not so for the statute’s other abortion provisions. Title two, section nine
criminalized intervention with the intent to “destroy” a quick fetus as second-
degree manslaughter. Title six, section 21 made willfully employing any means
with intent to procure miscarriage a misdemeanor.316 Though eliminating the
word “quickening” by specifying a “pregnant woman,” it imposed on the
prosecution the burden of proving pregnancy, which normally entailed proving
quickening.317
Under either section nine or section twenty-one, an act was not punishable if
undertaken to preserve the woman’s life or advised as such by two physicians.318
Thus, in sections nine and twenty-one, the New York Revisers introduced the first
explicit therapeutic exception to an abortion prohibition in Anglophone legisla-
tion. They seem to have been aware of its import. They referred to Lord
Ellenborough’s Act but consciously departed from it; the Notes accompanying
section twenty-one state, “The last section is founded upon an English
statute . . . but with a qualification which is deemed just and necessary,”319 i.e.,
the therapeutic exception. The idea of a two-physician consultation requirement
had already been gathering steam in New York. Regulars had imposed a
second-opinion requirement on themselves in their 1823 code of ethics, which
required that any physician consult a second regular physician in a difficult
case.320 New York Revisers had considered but ultimately did not enact a
proposal that would have made any surgery potentially endangering human life,
successful or not, a misdemeanor unless necessary to preserve the patient’s life or
recommended as such by two regular physicians.321 This precautionary principle
survived in their regulation of abortion. By 1857, a dozen jurisdictions followed
New York in affording an “irregular” who might wish to ensure herself a
life-health defense, proof as to medical necessity via consultation with a
“regular” physician.322
316. 2 N.Y. REV. STAT. pt. 4, ch. 1, tit. 6, § 21, at 689, 694 (1828).
317. tit. 6, § 21.
318. 2 N.Y. REV. STAT. pt. 4, ch. 1, tit. 2, art. 1, § 9, at 659, 661 (1828); 2 N.Y. REV. STAT. pt. 4, ch. 1, tit.
6, § 21, at 689, 694 (1828).
319. 3 N.Y. REV. STAT. Appendix: Revisers’ Reports and Notes, pt. 4, ch. 1, tit. 6, § 21, at 811, 829
(1828–1835) (quotation in text above omitting Revisers’ reference to Lord Ellenborough’s Act),
discussed in Means, Cessation of Constitutionality, supra note 19, at 449.
320. MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA, supra note 22, at 38, 272 n.36.
321. 3 N.Y. REV. STAT. Appendix: Revisers’ Reports and Notes, pt. 4, ch. 1, tit. 6, § 28, at 811, 829
(1828–1835), discussed in Means, Cessation of Constitutionality, supra note 20, at 451.
322. Seven, including New York, added a two-physician consultation. In order of adoption, they are:
An Act Concerning Crimes and Punishments; proceedings in criminal cases; and prison discipline, tit. 2,
§ 9, tit. 6, § 21 (Act of Dec. 18, 1828) (codified as 2 N.Y. REV. STAT. pt. 4, ch. 1, tit. 2, § 9, tit. 6, § 21
(1828)); An act to provide for the punishment of certain crimes therein named §§ 1, 2, 1833 Ohio Gen.
Acts 32nd Sess. at 20, 20-21 (Act of Feb. 27, 1834) (codified as OHIO GEN. STAT. ch. 35, §§ 111, 112
(1841)); An Act to amend the Acts of this State concerning Crimes and Punishments, and the Penitentiary
(An Act, to establish a Penitentiary in the State of Mississippi), 1839 Miss. Laws app. ch. 14, § 71 at 858,
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C. THE SECOND WAVE: MEDICAL EDUCATION, HEALTH PRACTICE, AND
SOCIETAL ANXIETY
1. Formalizing Medical Education
The New York legislation set a pattern privileging “regular physicians”323
while they were still a relative rarity in the United States, but this soon changed.
In 1800, only four medical schools operated in the United States324 and
“irregulars” vastly outnumbered institutionally trained “regulars.”325 Mohr
argues the regulars used legislation, including abortion regulation, to enhance
their competitive status vis-a-vis irregulars.326 Legislation did favor regulars and
formal medical education became more widespread. Between 1810 and 1840,
twenty-six new medical schools opened; between 1840 and 1876, forty-seven
more; and by 1910, 447 medical schools had opened in the previous century in
the U.S. and Canada (156 of which survived to 1910).327 Nearly all excluded
women students.328 A scathing report from the turn of the twentieth century notes
867 (codified as MISS. STAT. ch. 50, act 1, tit. 3, art. 1, § 9, at 693, 695 (1839)); MICH. REV. STAT. ch. 153,
§§ 33, 34 (1846) (Act of May 18, 1846); An Act to punish certain crimes therein named, ch. 743, §§ 1, 2,
1848 N.H. Laws Nov. Sess. ch. 743, §§ 1, 2, at 708, 708 (Act of Jan. 4, 1849); WIS. REV. STAT. pt, 4, tit. 30,
ch. 133, § 11 (1849); MINN. (TERR.) REV. STAT. ch. 100, § 11, at 493 (1851). But see infra Part II.C. (1845
scandals resulted in restrictring physician-advice defense). Four other states added a one-physician
provision, in order of adoption: An Act concerning crimes and their punishments art. 2, §§ 10, 36
(codified as MO. REV. STAT. art. 2, §§ 10, 36 (1835)) (Act of March 20, 1835) (amending Missouri’s earlier
poison-control statute to add, inter alia, a physician-consultation defense); ARK. REV. STAT. ch. 44, div. 3,
art. 2, §6 (1837); An Act Regulating Punishments under the Penitentiary System (Penal Code), ch. 6,
§2, 1840 Ala. Acts ch. 6, §2, at 143 (“respecable [sic] physician”); An Act concerning crimes and the
punishment of offenses against the persons of individuals, ch. 48, §§ 10, 39 (codified as KAN. (TERR.)
STAT., ch. 48, §§ 10, 39 (1855)) (Act of July 22, 1855). One, California, provided that only a physician
could enjoy the life-saving presumption. 1849–1850 Cal. Sess. Stats. ch. 99, § 45, at 223 (presumption of
legality only available to physician, not others, acting to save life of woman). Hawaii’s ambiguously
specified a “surgeon or other” eligible. HAW. (KINGDOM) PENAL CODE §2 (1850) (exception for surgeon
“or other” saving life of the mother).
323. See supra Part II.B.2.b; see also LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD, supra note
22, at 15–16 (describing the rise to prominence of elite “regular“ physicians).
324. They are: the medical departments of King’s College in New York (begun 1708, this medical
department does not benefit the nineteenth century long, as the college collapses during the British
occupation during the War of 1812); the College of Philadelphia (later, University of Pennsylvania)
(1765); Harvard College (1783); and Dartmouth College (1798). Another, that of Yale College, was
added at the end of the first decade of the century (1810). See Abraham Flexner, Medical Education in
America: Rethinking the Training of American Doctors, THE ATLANTIC (June 1910), http://www.theatlantic.
com/magazine/archive/1910/06/medical-education-in-america/306088/ [hereinafter Flexner, Medical Edu-
cation in America].
325. See, e.g., MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA, supra note 22, at 32 (in 1800 two-thirds of those making
a living as physicians in Philadelphia were neither members of the College of Medicine nor graduates of
any medical school). The very designation “regulars“ and “irregulars“ points to normalizing and
stigmatizing processes at work.
326. See generally id.
327. See Flexner, Medical Education in America, supra note 324.
328. In 1849, Elizabeth Blackwell became the first openly female graduate of a U.S. medical school
(Geneva College in New York). JACALYN DUFFIN, HISTORY OF MEDICINE: A SCANDALOUSLY SHORT
INTRODUCTION 301 (2010) [hereinafter DUFFIN, HISTORY OF MEDICINE]. Two sex-segregated medical
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that medical institutes, primarily commercial in nature, had supplanted prior
modes of apprenticeship training with lecture-hall education.329
The rise of formal medical education contributed to radical change in health
care.330 Care providers now included a new figure, the formally-educated but
practically-inexperienced solo practitioner. In early decades of the century, the
new men struggled to compete with highly valued local healers and midwives,331
but they gained ground at women’s expense, with legislative restrictions playing
a significant role in determining who could practice.332 One of the results was a
basic regendering of medical care.333
In addition to these demographic shifts, I argue that medical schools had a
profound impact on pedagogy that became significant for abortion and its
regulation. Formal medical schools promulgated different kinds of knowledge,
teaching about anatomy—organs and “systems”—and expounding theories that
located disease in specific sites on the body. They also taught these new subjects
in a different way. A few medical institutes were attached to a teaching hospital,
but in most, anatomical lectures depended on description in words, illustrative
charts, or, when available, cadavers.334 The lecture-hall pedagogy replacing the
older mode of training by apprenticeship335 isolated and objectified both disease
schools for women opened in Philadelphia (1850) and New York (1863). Id. at 303. When Johns Hopkins
University founded its medical department in 1893, a stipulation of donor Mary Garrett obliged it to offer
10% of its seats to women students. Id.
329. Flexner, Medical Education in America, supra note 324.
330. Siegel, Reasoning from the Body, supra note 279, at 319–20; see also Cohen, A Jurisprudence of
Doubt, supra note 13, at 204–15 (placing the regulation of abortion in the U.S. in longer historical context
and characterizing the nineteenth-century campaign by regular physicians to legislate abortion
prohibition as patriarchy’s resurgent self-defense).
331. See generally MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA, supra note 22.
332. For a comparison of midwives’ higher rates of success than physicians’ in regard to maternal and
infant mortality, see generally Ulrich, Midwifery and Mortality, supra note 245, at 29; see also, e.g.,
Edward Atwater, The Medical Profession of a New Society, Rochester, New York, (1811-1860), BULL.
HIST. MED. XLVII, NO. 3 221–35 (May–June 1973), cited in MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA, supra note 22,
at 34, n.26, 271–72.
333. See MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA, supra note 22; Siegel, Reasoning from the Body, supra note
279; LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD, supra note 22; CARROLL SMITH-ROSENBERG,
DISORDERLY CONDUCT: VISIONS OF GENDER IN VICTORIAN AMERICA 217–44 (1985); PAUL STARR, THE
SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE (1982); RICHARD SHYROCK, THE DEVELOPMENT OF
MODERN MEDICINE: AN INTERPRETATION OF THE SOCIAL AND SCIENTIFIC FACTORS INVOLVED (1947).
334. Demand for specimens exceeds supply and in some states, statutes prohibiting exhumation of
cadavers began to appear during this period. See, e.g., CONN. STAT. LAWS tit. 22, § 72 (1821)
(criminalizing removing a body from a grave “for the purposes of dissection, or any surgical, or
anatomical, experiments”); See also, e.g., An Act Relative to Crimes and Punishments, ch. 26 (codified as
IND. REV. STAT. ch. 26, § 36 207, 213 (1838)) (Act of Feb. 10, 1831); An Act defining Crimes and
Punishments, § 88, 1838-1839 Iowa (Terr.) Acts § 88 142, 165–66 (Act of Jan. 5, 1839); An Act
Concerning Crimes and Punishments, ch. 1 (codified as 1 MO. REV. LAWS ch. 1, § 78, 281, 306–07 (1825))
(Act of Feb. 12, 1825); An Act Concerning Crimes and Punishments § 94, 1844 R.I. Pub. Laws Jan. Sess.
§ 94.
335. The exception is the first U.S. medical school in Philadelphia, which in its early decades required
students have a year of apprenticeship with a practitioner before matriculating and had integrated bedside
hospital rounds with classroom education. See Flexner, Medical Education in America, supra note 324.
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and patient. Instead of demonstrating techniques with an ill person in her home as
earlier practitioners had, it relied on teaching aids like anatomical diagrams that
abstract the imagined “patient” from social context;336 instead of working with
live patients, it used drawings, or cadavers that did not cry out, talk back, or
protest when cut upon. Medical school pedagogy oriented students to a target set
of symptoms rather than to the holistic humoral balance of a person in distress
and introduced students to a range of new or formerly rare intrusive procedures.337
By mid-century different approaches to medicine proliferated. While some
with formal medical education criticized the therapeutic practices of humoral
health as too interventionist,338 other “regulars” responded to the new styles of
training by becoming even more prone to intervene, in more intrusive ways. In
this, I propose, lecture-based pedagogy that flattens and depersonalizes may have
contributed to a widely observed social phenomenon, namely that formally
trained physicians were increasingly prone to try previously rare surgical
interventions.339
The introduction of new conceptions of health that existed in parallel with
humoral theories, accelerated by the changes in knowledge transmission, brought
radically different techniques to gynecological practice. The intrusive measures
that regular physicians attempted more frequently in gynecology include dilating
the cervix, rupturing the amniotic sac to induce contractions, pulverizing the
fetus in utero and then extracting it, or, most dangerously, attempting Caesarian
section to save a pregnant woman’s life.340
336. Practitioners of humoral health cultivated knowledge of their patients’ social context. “A
physician who knew a family’s constitutional idiosyncracies was necessarily a better practitioner than
one who enjoyed no such insight—or even one who hailed from a different climate, for it was assumed
that both the action of drugs and the reaction of patients varied with season and geography.” Rosenberg,
Therapeutic Revolution, supra note 222, at 44.
337. Martin S. Pernick spots similar shifts. Although he inverts the historical sequence between belief
and practice that I propose, he nonetheless reports changes that support my overarching contention: “The
relatively high level of surgical specialization reflected another important difference between nineteenth-
century medicine and surgery—the surgeon’s necessarily more specific and localized conceptions of
disease. While nineteenth-century physicians favored general remedies . . . operative surgery assumed
that correcting local lesions in specific organs could cure specific diseases.” MARTIN S. PERNICK, A
CALCULUS OF SUFFERING: PAIN, PROFESSIONALISM, AND ANESTHESIA IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 29
(1985) [hereinafter PERNICK, CALCULUS OF SUFFERING].
338. Rosenberg, Therapeutic Revolution, supra note 222, at 46 (describing a school of thought known
as the “therapeutic nihilists” to its detractors).
339. The first technical book on surgery published in the United States, published in 1813, marked the
new movement in medicine. JOHN SYNG DORSEY, ELEMENTS OF SURGERY (1813). On Dorsey, surgery, and
surgical texts in the United States, see Susan Garfinkel, ‘This Trial was Sent in Love and Mercy for My
Refinement’: A Quaker Woman’s Experience of Breast Cancer Surgery in 1814, in Leavitt, WOMEN AND
HEALTH, supra note 236, at 68, 74 [hereinafter Garfinkel, Quaker Woman’s Breast Cancer Surgery]
(describing the work of Dorsey, a University of Pennsylvania medical school graduate-turned-professor).
See generally DUFFIN, HISTORY OF MEDICINE, supra note 328, at 245–75 (ch. 10, “Work of the Hand:
History of Surgery”).
340. MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA, supra note 22, at 14.
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As early as 1828, revisers of the New York criminal code reported their
skepticism towards a new willingness to perform surgery and acknowledged it
inspired increased regulation of medical practice itself:
The rashness of many young practitioners in performing the most
important surgical operations for the mere purpose of distinguishing
themselves, has been a subject of much complaint, and we are advised
by old and experienced surgeons, that the loss of life occasioned by
such practice, is alarming.341
Concern over “rashness” became a recurrent theme of this time.342 Public
alarm at “rashness” informed a wider backlash343 and even arrested new
measures that might be seen as ameliorative in patient care, for example,
extending the use of anesthesia.344 As “brash young men” took up obstetrics and
edged out midwives,345 later historians have found, childbirth became more
dangerous over the course of the nineteenth century.346
Consumer protection and malpractice regulation, the concern reflected in
first-wave statutes, was but one response to changes in the health regime. Other
symptoms of anxiety arose. The 1840s storm over “abortion” described in the
next Section focused on practitioners at the margins of respectability. However,
though targeting “abortionists,” it did not target abortion in general, nor potional
abortion, nor even abortion by blows. It focused on intrusive abortion. In this respect,
341. 3 N.Y. REV. STAT. Appendix: Revisers’ Reports and Notes, pt. 4, ch. 1, tit. 6, § 28, 811, 829–30
(1828–1835), discussed in Means, Cessation of Constitutionality, supra note 19, at 451. Contrast this
eagerness with the reluctant trepidation of surgeons called to remove a nearly one-pound breast tumor in
1814: “I was willing the business should proceed,” writes the patient, “but the young men hesitating to
perform it, it was judged best to delay the matter” until an older, more experienced doctor could perform
it. Garfinkel, Quaker Woman’s Breast Cancer Surgery, supra note 339, at 68, 72.
342. See, e.g., Rice v. State, 8 Mo. 403, 405 (1844) (“If a person assume to act as a physician, however
ignorant of medical science, and prescribe with an honest intention of curing the patient, but . . . the
patient die in consequence of the treatment, contrary to the expectation of the person prescribing, he is not
guilty of murder or manslaughter. But if the party prescribing have so much knowledge of the fatal
tendency of the prescription, that it may reasonably be presumed that he administered the medicine from
an obstinate, willful rashness” he is guilty of manslaughter at least, even if he did not intended any bodily
harm to the patient) (also cited in MO. REV. STAT. art. 2, ch. 47, § 22, n. c, 348 (1844–45) (case in footnote
to manslaughter provision of state criminal statute, which read together implies this jurisdiction
continuing the doctrine of excluding a medical practitioner acting with curative intent from criminal
culpability but changing it to make culpable a practitioner acting out of “obstinate, willful rashness”)).
343. See Rosenberg, Therapeutic Revolution, supra note 222, at 49 (describing the “therapeutic
nihilism” movement of the second third of the century).
344. In 1842, Georgia surgeon Crawford Long, who had attended “ether parties” as a medical student
in Philadelphia, experimented with using ether with surgical patients in eight minor operations but
negative public outcry induced him to stop. DUFFIN, HISTORY OF MEDICINE, supra note 328, at 261; See
also PERNICK, CALCULUS OF SUFFERING, supra note 337, at 35 (arguing in mid-nineteenth century
America, “humane, conscientious, highly reputable practitioners and ordinary lay people” held what they
believed to be rationally-based misgivings about surgical anesthesia).
345. Ulrich, Midwifery and Mortality, supra note 245, at 61.
346. Id. at 59.
2016] 713HEALTH EXCEPTION
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3390926
debate implicated not only practitioners at the margins of respectability—a certain
group of commercially organized, and apparently more urban-based, irregulars—
but practices at the margins of respectability, namely intrusive measures.
Although public criticism centered on a handful of irregular practitioners, what
aroused public concern was the general category of risky practices adopted with
less caution by regulars in all branches of medicine, i.e., intrusive measures and
surgeries. Abortion thus became a locus for societal debate over broader changes
in health theories and treatment. The following Section describes some of the
mechanisms of this debate and their particular impact on abortion and the health
exception.
2. The Penny Press: Sensation, Surgery, and Stigma
In the mid-1800s, the “penny press,” cheap, widely distributed urban
newssheets, boomed in popularity. Their revenue stream depended on advertising
and on mass sales; for the latter, the genre of the sensational story evolved to
arouse a mixture of titillation and condemnation, voyeurism, and outrage.
Historian Clifford Browder suggests “abortion” came to feed both.347 To
understand the second wave of U.S. abortion statutes, it is useful to know
something about the scandal that inspired them.
In New York in March 1839 an irregular practitioner, “Madame Restell” (the
alias of English immigrant Ann Lohman), came to public attention.348 She
advertised “simple, easy, healthy, and certain remedy” for parents whose families
had “increased” despite their wishes or means to support new offspring.349 If the
pills she advertised350 failed, she offered a short operation (usually inserting a
sharp instrument intravaginally to pierce the amniotic sac and thus stimulate
contraction and miscarriage) and boardinghouse room for patient post-operative
recuperation.351
347. See generally CLIFFORD BROWDER, THE WICKEDEST WOMAN IN NEW YORK: MADAME RESTELL,
THE ABORTIONIST (1988) [hereinafter BROWDER, ABORTIONIST].
348. For contemporary recital of the facts of Madame Restell’s case once she was brought to trial, see,
e.g., Trial of the Notorious Madame Restell alias Ann Lohman for Abortion and Causing the Death of
Mrs. Purdy; Being a Full account of all the Proceedings on the Trial, Together with the Suppressed
Evidence and Editorial Remarks (1841), http://resource.nlm.nih.gov/101521473, also available at GALE
CENGAGE LEARNING, The Making of Modern Law Trials, 1600-1926 online database.
349. Advertisement, N.Y. SUN, Mar. 27, 1839 (with an indication that the ad began Mar. 18, 1839),
reprinted in BROWDER, ABORTIONIST, supra note 347, at 9. Cf ROBERT DALE OWEN, MORAL PHYSIOLOGY;
OR, A BRIEF AND PLAIN TREATISE ON THE POPULATION QUESTION 32–33 (8th ed. 1835 (1831)) (presenting
arguments in favor of birth control and regulating population growth), quoted in Advertisement, id.
Browder recognizes that “Restell’s” advertisement borrowed text from Owen’s work, BROWDER, supra,
at 10.
350. Advertisement, N.Y. SUN, May 9, 1839, reprinted in BROWDER, ABORTIONIST, supra note 347, at
11.
351. BROWDER, ABORTIONIST, supra note 347, at 16–17. Lohman was not alone. Less famous irregulars
advertised similar services. For description of the business of urban abortion and affiliated boarding
house services, see e.g., id. at 12, 14-15.
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Competing newspapers condemned the propriety of advertising services like
Restell’s on the grounds that they inevitably endangered patients’ lives.352 Citing
the danger to patients, editorials warned Madame Restell to “beware ere it is too
late”353 and called upon the public to denounce her.354 Such writing led to mob
marches on clinics and calls for police action355 under first-wave statutes
theretofore not vigorously enforced.356 All of this activity created a public aware
of intrusive abortion and a following for scandalous trials when operative mishap
or post-operative infection claimed a patient.
A similar pattern—advertisement and sensational story, patient death, outrage—
repeated in Boston and elsewhere in roughly the same period.357 I suggest that in
creating the infamous public figure of “the abortionist,” over the course of the
1840s, the popular press increasingly associated intrusive measures with
“abortion” in the public mind and stimulated outrage as the public affect towards
them. A certain form of publicity, salacious news, gave rise to a public morality
and created publics demanding satisfaction for outrages on that morality. Neither
common law doctrine nor statutory provisions (in states that had passed them)
provided a fail-proof basis for prosecuting practitioners for the deaths of women
from sepsis or shock following intrusive abortions.
352. See, e.g., Samuel Jenks Smith, N.Y. SUNDAY MORNING NEWS, July 7, 1839 (condemning the New
York Sun for running Restell’s ads, writing that physicians opposed her because her practices endangered
patients’ lives), discussed in BROWDER, ABORTIONIST, supra note 347, at 17-18.
353. Id. Smith, the New York Sunday Morning News editor, also denounced Restell’s advertisement as
“monstrous and destructive” for publicizing a practice that “strikes at the root of all social order,”
objecting to the danger to patients and to fidelity and married life (but, not, notably, to fetal existence).
Smith, supra, quoted in BROWDER at 17–18.
354. Samuel Jenks Smith, N.Y. SUNDAY MORNING NEWS, July 14, 1839, cited in BROWDER,
ABORTIONIST, supra note 347, at 18 (“If laws cannot reach her, the voice of the people will; yes it will call
upon her in tones of thunder to abandon the nefarious trade in which she is engaged, and which she dares
to say has never resulted in a single failure.”).
355. Report of Restell’s arrest on August 17, 1839 for misdemeanor abortion ran in the Morning
Courier and New-York Enquirer. MORNING COURIER, Aug. 19, 1839 and NEW-YORK ENQUIRER Aug. 21,
1839, discussed in BROWDER, ABORTIONIST, supra note 347, at 19–20. But see Madame Restell, open
letter to Smith, N.Y. HERALD, July 15, 1839, at 3 (rejoinder from Restell to Smith’s July 1839 editorials);
BROWDER, ABORTIONIST, supra note 347, at 18 (explaining that The Herald’s publication of Restell’s open
letter to Smith reflected support for Restell by Smith’s rival, Herald editor James Gordon Bennett); see
also Madame Restell Under Arrest–Seduction in High Life, N. Y. DAILY TIMES, Feb. 13, 1854, at 8 (report
of Restell’s 1854 arrest for abortion of a consenting woman, by then made a felony); Madame Restell
Arrested on Felony Charges of Criminal Abortion, N. Y. DAILY TIMES, Feb. 14, 1854, reprinted in ROSE,
ABORTION DOCUMENTARY GUIDE, supra note 25, at 17–19. My argument here is about the socially
formative power of discourse. The editorials, denunciations, and responses around cases like Restell’s
sold newspapers; spoke into being emergent moralities and norms; and created reading publics following
scandal and salacious story focused around changing conceptions of health and attendant practices.
356. New York’s 1828 and 1830 provisions until this time largely “lay buried in the code,
unenforced.” Quay, Justifiable Abortion, supra note 223, at 500; see also Means, supra note 19, at
460-463.
357. See HULL & HOFFER, ABORTION RIGHTS IN AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 298, at 32–33.
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When Massachusetts courts dismissed two 1845 patient-death cases,358
outrage at the failed prosecutions inspired a second wave of abortion legislation.
Massachusetts adopted its first state law regulating abortion,359 even making
attempt—acting with intent to cause abortion at any time in pregnancy—a
misdemeanor, and, if a patient died as a consequence, a felony. It preserved the
implicit life-health exception by requiring that the act be done “maliciously or
without lawful justification.”360 Likewise, in New York, after one infamous
Restell incident, the legislature revised its abortion statute, restricting the prior
life-health exception only to an act undertaken with “intent to destroy a child,”361
eliminating the exception in the case of an act with “intent to procure
miscarriage,”362 and doing away with the protection provided by acting on the
advice of two physicians.363 The New York revision broke new ground in the
United States by penalizing a woman herself for soliciting abortion.364
The sensationalized cases and legislative responses they generated in the
Northeast ignited legislation in other states. Between 1845 and 1857, some
jurisdictions, like New York, although keeping their pre-existing exception for an
act necessary to preserve a woman’s life, revised statutes to make them more
stringent.365 A number of jurisdictions that had not previously regulated abortion
358. Commonwealth v. Parker, 50 Mass. (9 Met.) 263, 265–66 (1845) (dismissing charges against
practitioner Luceba Parker in patient death allegedly from abortion, on the grounds that the prosecution
failed to provide evidence of quickening, without which it failed to prove pregnancy and thus failed to
prove intent to commit abortion); see also HULL & HOFFER, ABORTION RIGHTS IN AMERICAN HISTORY,
supra note 298, at 32 (describing case dismissing charges in the death of patient Maria Aldrich after
abortion attempted at a stage of advanced pregnancy); MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA, supra note 22, at
120–21 (linking the failed prosecutions of Parker and of Aldrich’s care provider to movements for stricter
statutory regulation of abortion).
359. An Act to Punish Unlawful Attempts to Cause Abortion, ch. 27, 1845 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 27, at
322 (Act of Jan. 31, 1845) (published as MASS. REV. STAT. Supp. (1836-1849)).
360. Id.
361. An Act to Punish procurement of Abortion, and for other purposes, ch. 260, 1845 N.Y. Laws 68th
Sess. ch. 260, § 1, at 285, 285 (Act of May 13, 1845) (excepting from liability action “necessary to
preserve the life of the mother”). In 1846, the legislature amended the section punishing an act intended
to “destroy a child,” to require actual death of a woman or child to support a manslaughter prosecution
against a practitioner, in effect getting rid of the short-lived 1845 provision that would have criminalized
“attempt.” Act of March 4, 1846, ch. 22, §1, 1846 N.Y. Laws 69th Sess. 19 (amending the section of the
1845 statute concerning an act intended to “destroy” a child, to permit an act necessary to “preserve” the
woman’s life and to require the death of woman or child to support a manslaughter charge).
362. § 2, at 286.
363. § 1, at 285.
364. An Act to Punish procurement of Abortion, and for other purposes, ch. 260, 1845 N.Y. Laws 68th
Sess. ch. 260, §§ 3, 5, at 285, 286 (Act of May 13, 1845) (providing three months to one year in jail for a
woman soliciting abortion and, for repeat offenders, two to five years in prison).
365. See, e.g., 1845 N.Y. Laws 68th Sess. ch. 260, §§ 1, 2, 3, 5, at 285, 285–6 (amending existing New
York Law to eliminate prior life-health exception for an act intended to procure miscarriage, to remove
physician-consultation provision, and to make a patient herself criminally liable for seeking abortion);
Act of June 14, 1852, ch. 6, codified as 2 IND. REV. STAT. ch. 6, § 36, at 424, 437 (1852) (amending
existing 1835 Indiana law, IND. REV. STAT. ch. 26, § 3 (1838), to include not only an act intended to
procure miscarriage in a pregnant woman but also in “any woman he supposes to be pregnant” ); Act of
Apr. 17, 1857, ch. 124, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, ch. 124, § 8, at 664, 685 (1857) (amending existing
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through legislation added new statutory restrictions, some with an explicit
therapeutic exception366 and others with an implicit therapeutic intent exception
encoded in intent provisions.367 Some courts also took a harder line368 and in
particular cases that extended to their treatment of therapeutic intent.369
D. DOCTRINE: RAPID CHANGE AND FRACTURED UNIFORMITY
Over the short nineteenth century, new developments in the production and
circulation of discourse—from high-culture developments like the production of
biological science and the ascendance of formal medical education,370 to the
low-brow, like the rise of sensational news371—effected cultural and social
formations around abortion with consequences for legal doctrine. Knowledge
derived from empiricism promoted localized theories of health and disease.372
The new science of embryology used organ development, rather than humors and
Maine law, ME. REV. STAT. tit. 12, ch. 160, § 14 (1841) to raise punishment for procuring miscarriage from
one year imprisonment or $1000 fine, to the imprisonment and the fine).
366. New provisions, with an explicit therapeutic exception, passed between 1845 and 1857 in
already-existing jurisdictions are (in order of adoption): MICH. REV. STAT. ch. 153, §§ 32, 33, 34 (1846);
1848 N.H. Laws 708; 1848 Va. Acts tit. 2, ch. 3, § 9, at 96; WIS. REV. STAT. ch. 133, § 11 (1849)
(permitting an act necessary to preserve woman’s life). Some new jurisdictions also passed statutes with
an explicit life-health exception, including: 1853–1854 Or. Laws 187; An Act Relative to Crimes and
Punishments, and Procedures in Criminal Cases, 1854 Wash. (Terr.) Laws 1st Sess. ch. 2, §§ 37, 38, at 75,
81; 1855 Kan. Sess. Laws 238, 243–44 (permitting an act to “preserve” woman’s life); see also
1849–1850 Cal. Stat. 233; 1850 Haw. Sess. Laws 22 (permitting an act to “save” woman’s life) (N.B.
Hawaii was not a U.S. territory at the time, but some of its statutes reflect contemporaneous cultural and
social uses of law on the mainland. See SALLY ENGLE MERRY, COLONIZING HAWAII: THE CULTURAL POWER
OF LAW (2000) [hereinafter MERRY, COLONIZING HAWAII].)
367. New statutes passed between 1845 and 1857 with an implicit therapeutic exception are: An Act to
Punish Unlawful Attempts to Cause Abortion, ch. 27, 1845 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 27, at 322 (Act of Jan.
31, 1845) (published as MASS. REV. STAT. Supp. (1836-1849)) (requiring an act intending to cause
miscarriage of a pregnant woman be done “maliciously or without lawful justification” to be punishable
(as felony, if the woman perished, and as misdemeanor, if she did not)); 1846 Vt. Acts & Resolves No. 33,
34–35 (codified as VT. COMP. STAT. tit. 28, ch. 108, § 8 (1851)) (requiring a substance be administered
“maliciously, or without lawful justification,” or an instrument be employed “maliciously and without
lawful justification,” to be punishable); 1849 N.J. Laws 266–267 (requiring an act be done “unlawfully”
or “willfully” to be punishable); see also An Act Relative to Crimes and Offenses, Act of March 14, 1855,
1855 La. Acts No. 120, 129, 132–33 (codified as LA. REV. STAT., CRIMES & OFFENSES § 24, 134, 138
(1856) (no explicit life-health exception, but implicit exception in requirement that a drug or potion be
“feloniously administered”).
368. See, e.g., Mills v. Commonwealth, 13 Pa. 631, 633 (1850) (by abandoning quickening
distinction, expanding act punishable as “abortion” to any time during pregnancy); State v. Murphy, 27
N.J.L. 112, 114, 116 (Sup. Ct. 1858) (adding attempt offenses). Even Murphy specifies an act must have
been done “without lawful justification,” excluding acts done with therapeutic intent. See 27 N.J.L. at
113.
369. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 33 Me. 48, 54–55 (1851) (citing Commonwealth v. Parker, 50 Mass. (9
Metc.) 263 for the proposition that if medicine is given to procure abortion and the woman dies, the act
was done “without lawful purpose and dangerous to life,” and thus malice is imputed).
370. See supra Part II.B. and Part II.C.1.
371. See supra Part II.C.2.
372. See supra Part II.B.1.
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elements, to mark stages in human fetal development.373 A conceptualization of
bodily systems—the circulatory system, the reproductive system—divided the
body rather than conceiving it holistically.374 The social organization of medicine
also began to shift radically, regendering care, engaging different techniques and
ethics,375 and operationalizing new bodies of knowledge.376 Formalization of
medical training propelled these changes and imparted a greater degree of
standardization in practice,377 a different sense of boundaries around what good
practice or malpractice entails, and emergent structures for policing the
boundaries.378
This concentrated change in medicine unsettled the law. Abortion regulation
was initially introduced in state code revisions that, Siegel points out, were the
product of experts, not legislative or public debate.379 As anxieties over
sociological and epistemic changes in medicine surfaced more broadly and
abortion became a locus of debate over patient care, institutions of populism and
popular sovereignty—the penny press, elected representatives—got involved.380
The tempo of change increased. At the start of the short nineteenth century, no
state regulated abortion by statute; by 1857, nearly two-thirds do.381 Legislatures
became locomotives of change, dissolving common-law uniformity across
jurisdictions. Every state had its own law.382
373. On the history of embryology, see generally JOSEPH NEEDHAM, A HISTORY OF EMBRYOLOGY
(1934).
374. See supra Part II.C.1.
375. See Siegel, Reasoning from the Body, supra note 279.
376. See also infra Part III.C. (further describing such changes).
377. Regarding “one-size-fits-all” claims of the new laboratory-based medical sciences and skepti-
cism towards them—even among regulars—see generally Rosenberg, Therapeutic Revolution, supra
note 222.
378. Id.
379. Siegel, Reasoning from the Body, supra note 279, at 282 n. 74.
380. See supra Part II.C.2.
381. Twenty of thirty-one states and four of seven territories regulated abortion by statute by 1857. For
a compendium of statutes including those in force at the time, see Quay, Justifiable Abortion, supra note
223, at 447–520. Hawaii also enacted an abortion regulation in 1850, although it did not become a U.S.
territory until 1900. HAW. PEN. CODE, ch. 12, §§ 1, 2 (1850). (For the role of law in negotiating a
relationship for pre-statehood Hawaiia with an expansive United States, see generally MERRY,
COLONIZING HAWAII, supra note 366.)
382. Until a jurisdiction makes abortion the subject of statute, common-law presumptions of legality
continue. See generally supra Part I.D.; see also, e.g., Boies v. McAllister, 3 Me. 308, 308 (1835) (finding
evidentiary rule admitting rumor of plaintiff as criminal suspect not applicable to testimony regarding
woman’s rumored measures to procure abortion, implying court does not consider abortion a crime in
Maine, five years before passage of statute). In those jurisdictions with an abortion statute, interpretation
of therapeutic intent doctrine is increasingly informed by conceptions of risk and malpractice. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth ex rel. Chauncey & Nixon v. Keeper of the Prison, 2 Ashmead 1st Jud. D. Pa. 227, 231
(1841) (Philadelphia County, 1838), (finding that responsibility for death of abortion patient lies with the
men who administered the abortifacient, even where they did not intend to kill patient, but they were
“deliberate and malicious” and their acts were “attended with great danger.”).
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Thus, by 1857, the life-health defense, too, had become a local creature. New
statutory provisions and emerging nuances in therapeutic doctrine present some
puzzles that knowledge of humoral health helps us to understand. First, practices
disfavored under humoral health, having no humoral benefit and posing patient
risk,383 were singled out for blanket statutory prohibition. That explains the
somewhat puzzling provision making punishable “the wilful killing of any
unborn quick child, by any injury to the mother of such child, which would be
murder if it resulted in the death of such mother.”384 All states enacting such a
provision permitted abortion under other circumstances.385 Bearing in mind
contemporaneous abortion practice, these provisions can be understood as
targeting abortion by blows. They make sense in the same way that provisions
prohibiting using “poison”386 to induce miscarriage (the terminology distinguish-
ing this from routine potional abortion)387 do. Neither of these practices is
supported by humoral health rationale388 and neither such provision, in any
jurisdiction that adopts them, makes exception for therapeutic intent.
Second, common-law doctrine reflecting the nuances of humoral care is
perpetuated in certain otherwise puzzling legal formulations in the new statutes.
Under humoral theory, threat to a woman’s life from gynecological disorder goes
beyond the emergency states of abnormal pregnancy or life-threatening compli-
cations in labor389 and humoral health developed many compounds to restore
balance by inducing menstruation (many of which were also acknowledged to
terminate pregnancy).390 Uterine purgatives in either case—pregnancy emer-
gency or humoral imbalance—preserved a patient’s life. In ascertaining liability
for unintended patient death resulting from these practices, the common law
exercised flexibility by relying on categories of intent rather than categories of
controlled substances, exemplified in Hale’s differential treatment of practitioner
liability from a potion given to “cure or prevent a disease”391 versus from a
potion given to a woman not “to cure her of a disease” but “to destroy the child
383. See supra Part I.C. (reviewing three categories of causing abortion and their status under humoral
health).
384. For pre-1857 state laws prohibiting abortion by blows, see supra note 315; see also supra text
accompanying notes 311–315. The language in these provisions, nearly identical, typically reads in full,
“The wilful killing of any unborn quick child, by any injury to the mother of such child, which would be
murder if it resulted in the death of such mother, shall be deemed manslaughter in the first degree.” MO.
REV. STAT. § 9 at 168 (1835).
385. Cf. supra note 315 (reporting statutes criminalizing abortion by blows) and infra note 397
(reporting statutes permitting abortion by other means for curative purposes).
386. For pre-1857 state laws prohibiting abortion by “poison” specifically, see supra note 302. Indiana
statute singled out “poison” in § 1 but adds “medicines” and “instruments” in § 3. IND. REV. STAT. ch. 26,
§§ 1, 3, at 224, 224 (1838) (Act of Feb. 7, 1835).
387. See supra Part II.B.2.a.
388. See supra Part II.B.2.a.
389. See supra Part I.A.
390. See supra Part I.C.
391. See HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN, supra note 60, discussed supra in text accompanying note 191.
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within her.”392
This background clarifies some potentially puzzling new statutes and formula-
tions. New statutes differentiated an act “to destroy a child”393 from one “to
procure miscarriage,”394 penalizing the former more heavily.395 Unlike the
abortion by blows or poisoning provisions, jurisdictions provided explicit
392. See id., discussed in text accompanying supra note 192.
393. Pre-1857 statutes requiring, to be punishable, an act be undertaken with intent “to destroy child”
(in order of adoption): 1830 Conn. Laws ch. 1, § 16, at 255; An Act concerning crimes and their
punishments art. 2, (codified as MO. REV. STAT. art. 2, § 10, at 168, 169 (1835)) (Act of March 20, 1835);
An Act Concerning Crimes and Punishments pt. 4, codified as 2 N.Y. REV. STAT. pt. 4, ch. 1, tit. 2 § 9, at
659, 661 (Act of Dec. 18, 1828); An act to provide for the punishment of certain crimes therein named
§ 2, 1833 Ohio Gen. Acts 32nd Sess. § 2, at 20, 21 (Act of Feb. 27, 1834) (codified as OHIO GEN. STAT. ch.
35, § 112 (1841)); ARK. REV. STAT. ch. 44, div. 3, art. 2, § 6, at 240 (1838); An Act Defining Crimes and
Punishments, codified as IOWA (TERR.) REV. STAT. ch. 49, § 10, at 162, 167 (1843) (Act of Feb. 16, 1843)
(amending criminal statute to add “destroy child” provision) (repealed in IOWA CODE tit. 1, ch. 4, § 28,
leaving no statutory regulation of abortion in Iowa 1851–1858); An Act to amend the Acts of this State
concerning Crimes and Punishments, and the Penitentiary (An Act, to establish a Penitentiary in the State
of Mississippi), 1839 Miss. Laws app. ch. 14, § 71, at 858, 867 (Act of Feb. 15, 1839) (codified as MISS.
STAT. ch. 50, act 1, tit. 3, art. 1, § 9, at 693, 695 (1839)); Act of Oct. 22, 1840, ch. 160, ME. REV. STAT. tit.
12, ch. 160, § 13, at 684, 686 (1841) (retained, though succinctly combined in same section with “procure
miscarriage” provision, in ME. REV. STAT. tit. 11, ch. 124, § 9 (1857)); An Act Regulating the Executive
Power, the Judiciary, and for Other Purposes Art. 3, § 1, 1843-49 Or. (Terr.) Gen. Laws art. 3, § 1 (Act of
June 27, 1844) (importing, wholesale, the 1843 laws of Iowa, including the “destroy child” provision
encoded in IOWA (TERR.) REV. STAT. ch. 49, § 10 (1843)); 1845 N.Y. Laws 68th Sess. ch. 260, § 1, at 285,
285–86 (codified as 2 N.Y. REV. STAT. pt. 4, ch. 1, tit. 2, art. 1, § 9 (1828–1845)); Revised Statutes of the
State of Michigan, tit. 30, ch. 153, MICH. REV. STAT. tit. 30, ch. 153, § 33, at 657, 662 (1846) (Act of May
18, 1846); An Act to punish certain crimes therein named, ch. 743, 1848 N.H. Laws Nov. Sess. ch. 743,
§ 2, at 708, 709 (Act of Jan. 4, 1849); WIS. REV. STAT. pt. 4, tit. 30, ch. 133, § 11, at 682, 683 (1849);
Revised Statutes of the Territory of Minnesota, MINN. (TERR.) REV. STAT. ch. 100, § 11, at 491, 493
(1851); An Act Relative to Crimes and Punishments, and Procedures in Criminal Cases, 1854 Wash.
(Terr.) Laws 1st Sess. ch. 2, § 37, at 75, 81; An Act concerning crimes and the punishment of offenses
against the persons of individuals, ch. 48, codified as KAN. (TERR.) STAT., ch. 48, § 10, at 236, 238 (1855)
(Act of July 22, 1855).
394. Pre-1857 statutes requiring, to be punishable, an act be undertaken with intent to “procure
miscarriage,” distinct from one to “destroy child” (in order of adoption): An Act Relative to Criminal
Jurisprudence, div. 5, 1827 Ill. Rev. Laws, Criminal Code, div. 5, § 46, at 124, 131 (Act of Jan. 6, 1827);
MO. REV. STAT. art. 2, § 36, at 168, 172 (1835); 2 N.Y. REV. STAT. pt. 4, ch. 1, tit. 6, § 21, at 689, 694
(1828); An Act Defining Crimes and Punishments § 18, 1838–1839 Iowa (Terr.) Acts 1st Sess. div. 1,
§18, at 142, 145 (Act of Jan. 5, 1839) (repealed in IOWA CODE tit. 1, ch. 4, § 28, leaving no statutory
regulation of abortion in Iowa 1851–1858); OHIO GEN. STAT. ch. 35, § 111 (1841)); An Act Regulating
Punishments under the Penitentiary System (Penal Code), ch. 6, §2, 1840 Ala. Acts ch. 6, §2, at 143, 143;
Act of Oct. 22, 1840, ch. 160, ME. REV. STAT. tit. 12, ch. 160, § 14, at 684, 686 (1841) (retained, though
with higher punishment and combined in one section with “destroy child” provision, in ME. REV. STAT. tit.
11, ch. 124, § 9 (1857));1843-49 Or. (Terr.) Gen. Laws art. 3, § 1 (Act of June 27, 1844) (importing,
wholesale, the 1843 laws of Iowa, including the “procure miscarriage” provision); 1845 N.Y. Laws 68th
Sess. ch. 260, § 2, at 285, 286 (codified as 2 N.Y. REV. STAT. pt. 4, ch. 1, tit. 6, § 20 (1828–1845)); MICH.
REV. STAT. tit. 30, ch. 153, § 34, at 657, 662 (1846); 1848 N.H. Laws Nov. Sess. ch. 743, § 1, at 708, 709;
1849–1850 Cal. Sess. Stat. ch. 99, § 45, at 233; 1854 Wash. (Terr.) Laws 1st Sess. ch. 2, § 38, at 75, 81;
KAN. (TERR.) STAT., ch. 48, § 39, at 236, 243–44 (1855).
395. See, e.g., 2 N.Y. REV. STAT. pt. 4, ch. 1, tit. 2, art. 1, § 9 and tit. 6, § 20 (1828-1845); MO. REV. STAT.
art. 2, §§ 10, 36 (1835); OHIO GEN. STAT. ch. 35, §§ 111, 112 (1841); 1848 N.H. Laws ch. 743, §§ 1, 2;
MICH. REV. STAT. ch. 153, §§ 32, 33, 34, at 662 (1846); 1848 Va. Acts. tit. 2, ch. 3, § 9; 1854 Wash. (Terr.)
Laws 1st Sess. ch. 2, §§ 37, 38; KAN. (TERR.) STAT. ch. 48, §§ 10, 39 (1855); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 11, ch.
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therapeutic exception for an intervention (regardless of whether undertaken to
“destroy a child” or “procure a miscarriage”) deemed necessary to “preserve the
woman’s life,”396 which under humoral theory would encompass a broad range
of curative practice.397 Many statutes distinguished “lawful” from “unlawful”
abortion as the threshold element for prosecution,398 which, absent the back-
ground on humoral health and curative intent doctrine, could seem almost
tautological.399 Some statutes repeated other intent elements from Lord Ellenbor-
ough’s Act400 that would exclude the mental state of a healthcare provider acting
in good faith towards a person in need, i.e. requiring that an act be done
124, § 9 (1857) (penalizing an act with intent “to procure miscarriage” more lightly than one “to destroy a
child”). Compare, generally, provisions cited supra note 393 and supra note 394.
396. Nearly all pre-1857 statutes, whether criminalizing an act to “destroy child” or to “procure
miscarriage,” include an exception for any act undertaken to “preserve the life” of the woman. 1840 Ala.
Acts ch. 6, § 2; ARK. REV. STAT. ch. 44, div. 3, art. 2, § 6 (1838); 1849–1850 Cal. Sess. Stat. ch. 99, § 45
(limiting therapeutic exception to physician “in discharge of his professional duties”); Act of Feb. 7,
1835, codified as IND. REV. STAT. ch. 26, § 3, at 224, 224 (1838) (“preserve the life” exception retained in
amended abortion provision, Act of June 14, 1852 ch. 6, 2 IND. REV. STAT. pt. 3, ch. 6, § 36, at 424, 437
(1852)); IOWA (TERR.) REV. STAT. ch. 49, § 10 (1843) (amending criminal statute to replace prior “procure
miscarriage” provision with a “destroy child” provision and adding exception for preserving a patient’s
life) (repealed in IOWA CODE tit. 1, ch. 4, § 28, leaving no statutory regulation of abortion in Iowa
1851–1858); KAN. (TERR.) STAT., ch. 48, §§ 10, 39 (1855); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 12, ch. 160, §§ 13, 14 (1841)
(retained in a single section, in ME. REV. STAT. tit. 11, ch. 124, § 9 (1857)); MICH. REV. STAT. tit. 30, ch.
153, §§ 33, 34 (1846); MINN. (TERR.) REV. STAT. ch. 100, §§ 10, 11 (1851); MISS. STAT. ch. 50, act 1, tit. 3,
art. 1, § 9 (1839); MO. REV. STAT. art. 2, §§ 10, 36 (1835); 1848 N.H. Laws Nov. Sess. ch. 743, §§ 1, 2; 2
N.Y. REV. STAT. pt. 4, ch. 1, tit. 2, art. 1, § 9 (limiting “preserve life” exception to “destroy child” provision
but excluding it from “procure miscarriage” provision); OHIO GEN. STAT. ch. 35, §§ 111, 112 (1841);
1843-49 Or. (Terr.) Gen. Laws art. 3, § 1 (adopting 1843 Iowa provisions); 1848 Va. Acts. tit. 2, ch. 3, § 9;
1854 Wash. (Terr.) Laws 1st Sess. ch. 2, §§ 37, 38; WIS. REV. STAT. pt, 4, tit. 30, ch. 133, § 11 (1849); see
also HAW. PENAL CODE §§ 1, 2, 3 (1850) (exception for “surgeon or other” saving the life of a woman).
But see 1830 Conn. Laws ch. 1, § 16 (making no explicit exception, but encoding an implicit exception by
retaining “willfully and maliciously” elements of first Connecticut statute); see also 1845 Mass. Acts &
Resolves ch. 27; 1846 Vt. Acts & Resolves No. 33; N.J. Laws at 266 (1849); 1.LA. REV. STAT. § 24, at 138
(1856) (post-1845 scandal statutes making no explicit therapeutic exception but encoding an implicit
exception in mental state elements).
397. See supra Part I.A. and Part I.C.
398. In order of adoption, statutes invoking the “unlawful” distinction are: 1845 Mass. Gen. Laws ch.
27, at 322 (“maliciously or without lawful justification”); 1846 Vt. Acts & Resolves No. 33, § 1, at 34–35
(codified as Vt. Comp. Stat. tit. 28, ch. 108, § 8 (1851)) (“maliciously” or “without lawful justification”);
1849 N.J. Laws at 266–67 (“maliciously” or “without lawful justification”); HAW. PENAL CODE §1 (1850)
(“maliciously, without lawful justification”); LA. REV. STAT. § 24 (1856) (“feloniously administer”); see
also supra text accompanying notes 280–88 (relating the background of the “unlawful” distinction in
U.K. jurisprudence). Some state courts added to or reinforced statutory provisions in case law. See e.g.,
State v. Murphy, 27 N.J.L. 112, 113 (Sup. Ct. 1858) (specifying act must have been done “without lawful
justification”); Commonwealth v. Wheeler, 53 N.E. 2d 4 (Mass. 1944) (interpreting an act with
therapeutic intent as “lawful”).
399. See also supra Part II.B.1 (explaining that the interpretation of “lawful” versus “unlawful”
abortion in the U.K. hinges on curative intent).
400. Lord Ellenborough’s Act, 43 Geo. 3 ch. 58; see also supra Part II.B.1 (discussing these intent
elements in the first U.K. abortion statute).
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“maliciously”401 or “willfully”402 to be punishable. Courts typically understood
these intent elements as preserving the logic of the common-law “life-health”
defense.403
In short, out of the background of humoral health, the common-law life-health
defense survived across jurisdictions, but in a growing divergence of forms. In
different states’ laws, a variety of the features described in this Section404 appear
in combination or in isolation. Some statutes prohibited abortion by blows, and
all that did made no exception for therapeutic intent.405 Many statutes, by
distinguishing “poison,” preserved the presumption of a healthcare motivation
for potional abortion.406 Some statutes distinguished “unlawful” activity as a
threshold element for prosecution, presuming measures intended to preserve a
patient’s life “lawful,” thus encoding therapeutic intent.407 Intent elements
excluded the mental state of a healthcare provider acting in good faith towards a
patient.408 Nearly all statutes prohibiting intervention to “destroy a child” or
“procure miscarriage” contained an explicit therapeutic intent exception, exempt-
ing from punishment an act taken to “preserve a woman‘s life.”409 Some statutes
provided a physician-consultation option, affording “irregular” caregivers assur-
ance in asserting health necessity in the event of fatal mishap and a charge of
401. In order of adoption, statutes requiring, to be punishable, an act be undertaken “maliciously” are:
CONN. STAT. tit. 22, § 14 (1821) (“maliciously”), retained in amended provision in 1830 Conn. Laws. ch.
1, § 16, at 255; 1827 Ill. Rev. Laws, Criminal Code, div. 5, § 46, at 124, 131 (“wilfully and maliciously”);
IOWA (TERR.) STAT. 1st Legis., 1st Sess. § 18 (1838–1839) (“maliciously”); 1845 Mass. Acts & Resolves ch.
27 (“maliciously or without lawful justification”); 1846 Vt. Acts No. 33, § 1 (“maliciously” or “without
lawful justification”); 1849 N.J. Laws tit. 2, § 75, at 146–47 (“maliciously” or “without lawful
justification”); HAW. PENAL CODE ch. 12, §1 (1850) (“maliciously, without lawful justification”; §2 adds
explicit life exception). But see ILL. REV. CODE div. 5, § 46, at 174, 179 (1833) (revision in poison section
of statute removing “wilfully and maliciously” in regard to procuring abortion). See also IOWA (TERR.)
REV. STAT. ch. 49, § 10 (1843) (revising statute to add an explicit “preserve-life” exception and omitting
“maliciously”); 1843-49 Or. (Terr.) Gen. Laws art. 3, § 1 (adopting as the law of Oregon territory the
1843 Iowa laws).
402. See, e.g., CONN. STAT. tit. 22, § 14 at 152, 153 (1821); 1827 Ill. Rev. Laws, Criminal Code, div. 5,
§ 46 (“wilfully”).
403. See, e.g., State v. Murphy, 27 N.J.L. 112, 113 (Sup. Ct. 1858) (specifying to be considered an
offense, the intervention must have been done “without lawful justification”); Commonwealth v.
Wheeler, 53 N.E. 2d 4 (1944).
404. See supra text accompanying notes 383–403.
405. See supra note 315 (listing statutes prohibiting abortion by blows).
406. See supra Part II.B.2.a., especially text accompanying note 302 (regarding statutes regulating
abortion in reference to poison).
407. See supra text accompanying note 398 (discussing the distinction of “lawful” and “unlawful”
abortion in regard to therapeutic intent); supra text accompanying notes 280–88 (discussing same in
British jurisprudence).
408. See supra text accompanying note 401 (discussing “maliciously” encoding therapeutic intent);
supra text accompanying notes 289–90 (discussing same in British jurisprudence) See supra text
accompanying note 402 (discussing “willfully” encoding therapeutic intent).
409. See supra text accompanying note 396–97 (discussing provisions excepting an act to “preserve”
woman’s life).
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patient homicide.410 Most such provisions are survivors, some quite ancient, of
common law doctrine developed within a milieu of humoral healthcare. They
preserved the old respect for therapeutic intent in features of an emergent
life-health exception.411
Over the short nineteenth century, abortion had become a locus of societal
commentary on new intrusive practices and the epistemology producing them. In
the next period, it increasingly became a target of hostility as a site for policing
disciplinary boundaries, new conceptions of “health,” and new ethical commit-
ments. The next Part explains how the health exception fared.
III. THE LONG TWENTIETH CENTURY
The period between 1857-1957, the “long twentieth century” for the health
exception, saw a consolidation of the new ideas about health, with profound
implications for abortion doctrine and the health exception. The first Section of
this Part describes the epistemic landscape at the opening of the long twentieth
century and the political maneuvers, centered in health and grounded in discourse
about abortion, that wrought an earthquake in the practice of abortion and
medicine more generally. The second Section discusses the forms of law that both
promoted change and preserved older legal formulae appropriate to the waning
health regime. The third Section uses the shifted senses of “health” to read and
interpret the new statutes and the old language brought into new times.
A. HEALTH, LIFE, ABORTION IN THE LONG TWENTIETH CENTURY
1. Persistence of Humoral Ideas and Practice
The erosion of the humoral health regime took time. Even among formally
educated physicians, in practice and belief humoral medicine co-exised with
localized treatment,412 the legal and medical record show. Historian Charles
Rosenberg reports that through the second third of the nineteenth century, older
modes of therapeutics continued; practice was marked by a change in the
intensity of their deployment rather than a categorical abandonment.413 Even
410. See supra text accompanying notes 318–24. By 1857, a few states neither privilege the regular
physician directly, nor provide the procedural safeguard of physician consultation as to necessity to
evidence therapeutic intent. See, e.g., Indiana (IND. REV. STAT. §§ 1, 3, at 224 (1838) (Act of Feb. 7, 1835)
(retained, unchanged in this respect, in amended abortion provision of 2 IND. REV. STAT. pt. 3, ch. 6, § 36,
at 424, 437 (1852)); Maine (ME. REV. STAT., tit. 12, ch. 160, §§ 13, 14, 661, 686 (1841) (Act of Oct. 22,
1840)); Oregon (OR. STAT. ch. 3, § 13, at 187 (1853–1854)); Virginia (1848 Va. Acts tit. 2, ch. 3, § 9, at 96)
(no physician required, but neither does advice of physician convey protection from prosecution).
411. See supra Part I.D. (describing preexisting common law features deferential to therapeutic
intent).
412. Rosenberg, Therapeutic Revolution, supra note 222, at 47 (reporting that older therapeutic
practices were not abruptly abandoned but were merely used with less frequency); see also id.
(Physicians’ rhetoric disparaging humoral interventions notwithstanding, in the decades between 1850
and 1870, “[p]ractice changed a good deal less than the rhetoric surrounding it would suggest.”).
413. See id.
2016] 723HEALTH EXCEPTION
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3390926
well after the Civil War, physicians still administered purgatives in spring and fall
“to facilitate the body’s adjustment to the changing seasons.”414 As late as 1897,
uterine purgation remained such accepted practice that a U.K. court could not
preclude curative intent in the administration of an abortifacient emmenag-
ogue.415 In 1908, defenders of humoral medicine spoke out against its detractors
and alternatives.416 A 1906 state-commissioned study characterized the New
York midwife as “essentially medieval,” implying continued wide knowledge of
and reliance on herbal preparations to aid contractions and expel fetus or
afterbirth, and in 1910, about fifty percent of all U.S. births were still reported by
midwives.417 Across medical practice areas, dosage levels of humoral prepara-
tions decreased rather than ceased, and although bleeding sank into disuse,
purgatives like mercury still figured in the practice of most physicians.418
Medical schools’ anti-humoral rhetoric notwithstanding, in practice, clinicians
“insure[d] the greatest possible degree of continuity with older ideas.”419
As humoral medicine kept its tenacious hold on medical habits, first- and
second-wave abortion legislation focused on lethal malpractice or rashly
undertaken intrusive measures. In the hands of experienced caregivers, abortion
in the course of emmenagogic treatment continued, still protected at law by a
constructive health exception. Intentional termination of pregnancy continued
without interference from the law in states that followed common-law doctrine.
States that had passed abortion legislation incorporated a life-health exception in
statutory language excepting from prosecution a procedure deemed necessary to
preserve a woman’s life. Against this background, a revolution was to be waged
using abortion as its battleground.
2. The A.M.A. Campaign and Stifling Knowledge Transmission
In 1847, formally trained physicians (so-called “regulars”) founded the
American Medical Association (A.M.A.).420 Struggling to compete with mid-
wives and other expert practitioners for business and public esteem, Mohr argues,
they seized upon standardizing professional ethics to set themselves apart from
“irregulars.”421 A.M.A. members made the ancient Hippocratic Oath422 of a
414. Id.
415. Rex v. Collins, 2 BRIT. MED. J. 122 (1898).
416. Rosenberg, Therapeutic Revolution, supra note 222, at 49 (quoting Abraham Jacobs denouncing
one of the post-humoral approaches, so-called “expectant treatment,” as “too often a combination of
indolence and ignorance,” “the sin of omission, which not infrequently rises to the dignity of a crime.”).
417. Francis Kobrin, The American Midwife Controversy: A Crisis of Professionalization, in Leavitt
and Numbers, SICKNESS AND HEALTH supra note 222, at 197, citing J. Clifton Edgar, The Remedy for the
Midwife Problem, 63 AM. J. OBST. & GYNEC. 882 (1911).
418. Id.
419. Id.
420. American Medical Association, The Founding of the A.M.A., www.ama-assn.org/ama/hub/about-
ama/our-history/the-founding-of-ama.page? (last visited Sept. 10, 2016).
421. See MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA, supra note 22, at 35 (arguing the Hippocratic Oath holds a
special place in the history of ethics and identity formation among U.S. regular physicians).
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physician to avoid hurt or damage423 the cornerstone of their project. In the
original ancient Greek wording, the Oath includes swearing not to administer
poison to anyone424 nor, in gynecological practice, to resort to late-term
pessary.425 The A.M.A., however, seems to have relied on a mistranslation that
rendered “pessary” as “abortion.”426 This purported citation to classical ethics
and the project to create a distinct professional identity through standardized
ethical norms came to underwrite a full program hostile to abortion427 led by a
zealous A.M.A. subcommittee on “criminal abortion” formed in 1857.428
422. Siegel proposes that before the A.M.A. campaign, it was “not entirely clear” that physician’s
ethics prohibited abortion. See Siegel, Reasoning from the Body, supra note 279, at 282 n.77. The history
of medicine tells us that most people in the U.S. at that time were only coming to see pre-quickening
gestation as “pregnancy” and until this unsystematic shift in consciousness was complete, many would
not recognize early-term intervention as abortion. See supra Part I.A. and Part II.A. (describing received
doctrine, including quickening, and its continuation in the United States).
423. The Oath does not literally include the phrase, “First, do no harm“ [primum non nocere], which
probably comes from an adage in the Hippocratic text Epidemics, “Declare the past, diagnose the present,
foretell the future; practice these acts. As to diseases, make a habit of two things: to help, or at least to do
no harm.” Epidemics, Book 1, in HIPPOCRATIC WRITINGS 94 (Geoffrey Lloyd ed., 2nd ed. 1983). A
translation of the Oath circulated in England in the first quarter of the nineteenth century has a physician
swear, “With regard to healing the sick, I will devise and order for them the best diet, according to my
judgment and means; and I will take care that they suffer no hurt or damage.” See The Hippocratic Oath,
3 LONDON MED. REPOSITORY: MONTHLY J. & REV. pt. 5, at 258, (James Copland ed., Jan.–June 1825)
[hereinafter The London Hippocratic Oath] http://books.google.ie/books?id!Oe0EAAAAQAAJ&pg!
PA258#v!onepage&q&f!false.
424. See The London Hippocratic Oath, supra note 423 (“Nor shall any man’s entreaty prevail upon
me to administer poison to anyone; neither will I counsel any man to do so”).
425. 1 HIPPOCRATES 229 (W.H.S. Jones ed., 1934-88), cited in RIDDLE, ANCIENT ABORTION, ABORTION,
supra note 33, at 173 n.28. Classical historian John Riddle would translate the disputed phrase, “Neither
will I give a suppository to cause an abortion.” RIDDLE, ANCIENT ABORTION, supra note 33, at 9. We
understand “abortion” to be, in the time of Hippocrates, a late-term procedure, hence my rendering of the
Oath phrase as “late-term pessary.” See supra Part I.A.–I.C. Arabic-language custodians of the
Hippocratic texts are clearer about the correct translation: Ibn Ali Usaybia (d. 1269), for example, renders it, in
Arabic translation, “Nor will I contemplate administering any pessary which may cause abortion.” W.H.S. JONES,
THE DOCTOR‘S OATH: AN ESSAY IN THE HISTORY OF MEDICINE 31 (1924) (quoting Ibn Ali Usaybia)).
426. Mohr argues that allegiance to the Oath in (mis)translation moved regulars to oppose abortion.
MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA, supra note 22, at 65. To be clear, accounts about the A.M.A. physicians’
campaign against abortion tell us that A.M.A. members swore not to perform abortions as part of the
nineteenth-century Hippocratic Oath; however, contemporaneous sources confirming the actual words
physicians repeated when taking the Oath at that time are thin indeed. See Siegel, Reasoning from the
Body, supra note 279, at 349 n.77 (calling for more research into the versions of the Oath employed by
U.S. physicians during the antebellum period).
427. See Siegel, Reasoning from the Body, supra note 279, at 280–314 (describing the A.M.A.
campaign); see also LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD, supra note 22, at 15–16
(describing the A.M.A. campaign as a “direct social struggle” led by elite “regular” physicians “as part of
an effort to achieve other political and social goals”).
428. See MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA, supra note 22, at 147–170 (describing the physicians’ crusade
against abortion). The campaign concentrates on changing public consciousness as well as legislation. “It
may be asked,” poses one “informational” volume ostensibly written for women on sex and birth control,
“if there is no latitude to be allowed [in regard to abortion] for extreme cases . . . We are compelled to
answer, ‘None.’” HORATIO STORER, WHY NOT? A BOOK FOR EVERY WOMAN: A PROPER BOSTONIAN ON SEX
AND BIRTH CONTROL (1864), excerpted in ROSE, ABORTION DOCUMENTARY GUIDE, supra note 25, at 11, 16.
2016] 725HEALTH EXCEPTION
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3390926
The A.M.A. campaign successfully marshaled its arguments429 to score
legislative and public relations victories.430 It consolidated regular physicians’
hold on practice of abortion and their influence over its regulation,431 with both
direct and indirect effects on the health exception. The circumstances under
which caregivers other than formally trained physicians could avail themselves
of legal defenses shrank. Hinging assurance of a life-health defense on
consultation with a regular physician432 expanded to other jurisdictions,433 some
requiring that the provider himself434 actually be a regular physician.435
429. American Medical Association, Report on Criminal Abortion (1859), reprinted in ROSE, ABORTION
DOCUMENTARY GUIDE, supra note 25, at 8, 10; see also Siegel, Reasoning from the Body, supra note 279, at
280–314 (describing arguments for defense of patriarchal institutions the A.M.A. campaign raises).
430. See, e.g., MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA, supra note 22, at 200–226 (detailing anti-abortion
legislation resulting from the A.M.A. campaign).
431. See id. at 88–118 (describing the widespread practice of abortion outside the hands of “regular”
physicians before the campaign); id. at 200–245 (documenting their success in having outlawed the
competition’s practice after the campaign). The rare irregular who practiced commercial-scale abortion,
if known, became famous as an exception. See, e.g., generally, RICKIE SOLINGER, THE ABORTIONIST
(1994) (on the famously successful irregular practitioner Ruth Hanna of Portland, Oregon, who practiced
from 1918-1968); see also, e.g., CATHERINE CUSSET, THE STORY OF JANE (2001) (on laywomen who
learned to perform abortion for each other before re-legalization in Roe v. Wade as a form of altruism and
empowerment).
432. See supra note 322 (listing pre-1857 physician-consultation statutes).
433. In order of adoption, additional physician-consultation statutes are, for example: WIS. REV. STAT.
ch. 164, § 11 (1858); 1868 Fla. Acts 1st Sess., ch. 1637, 3, § 11; 1869 Wyo. (Terr.) Laws 1st Sess., ch. 3,
§ 25, at 104; Act of March 1, 1873, ch. 58, 1873 Neb. Gen. Stat. ch. 58, pt. 1, ch. 2, § 6, ch. 6, §39, at 720,
727–28 (two physicians); Act of Mar. 18, 1907 § 6, 1907 N.M. (Terr.) Acts 37th Sess. ch. 36, § 6, at 41,
42; An Act to Prevent and Punish Foeticide or Criminal Abortion in the State of Georgia, Act of Feb. 25,
1876, 1876 Ga. Laws. No. 130 §§ 2, 3; MISS. CODE § 2223 (1942); MO. REV. STAT. § 559.100 (1949); see
also TEX. GEN. STAT. DIG. ch. 7, art. 536, at 524 (Oldham & White 1859) (excepting abortion procured or
attempted on “medical advice”); An Act to Amend the Criminal Code of this State in relation to the
Offense of Abortion, Act of Feb. 28, 1867 § 3 1867 Ill. Pub. Laws 25th Gen. Assembly 1st Sess. § 3, at 89
(excepting “any person” acting “for bona fide medical or surgical purposes”).
434. The use of the male pronoun here is deliberate, as almost all medical schools excluded female
students and almost all formally trained physicians were male. The regendering of medical care,
particularly gynecology, and the effects of reinforcing patriarchal institutions at the expense of women
and their expertise have been the subject of many erudite works on the history of abortion in the U.S. See
infra text accompanying notes 436–439.
435. Post-1857 statutes that limited the benefit of a life-health exception to physicians include (in
order of adoption): 1861 Nev. (Terr.) Laws ch. 28, § 42, at 63 ; 1863–1864 Idaho (Terr.) Laws § 42, at 435
(limiting exception to “physician” who, “in discharge of his professional duties,” “deems it necessary” to
“save her life”); see also 1864 Mont. (Terr.) Laws § 41, at 184; ARIZ. HOWELL CODE ch. 10, § 45 (1865);
Act of Nov. 8, 1875, § 21, 1875 Ark. Laws 4th Adj. Sess. § 21, at 5 (“any regular practicing physician”);
see also Act of Apr. 14, 1881 ch. 87, An Act concerning Public Offenses and their Punishment, 1881 Ind.
Laws Spec. Sess. ch. 37, § 23, at 177 (making liable the woman herself who solicits intervention to
procure miscarriage “except when by a physician for saving the life of mother or child”); see also MD.
LAWS ch. 179, § 2, at 315 (1868) (requiring provider be physician who consults with one or more other
“respectable physicians”). But see IDAHO COMP. LAWS ch. 5, § 42, at 328 (1874-1875) (changing the
category covered by the provision to “physician practitioner”); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 454, at 138 (1887)
(expanding the defense to include any person of the opinion that inducing miscarriage was “necessary to
preserve the woman’s life”).
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Tying legal practice of abortion to formally trained physicians drove “irregu-
lars” from practice;436 doing so at a time when most medical schools excluded
female students437 put women out of the running for providing women’s
healthcare,438 reinforcing patriarchal gender inequities in new ways.439 In
addition to these important sociological effects, there is an untold story of
epistemic consequences. First, together with restrictions on who might lawfully
perform abortion runs the subtext of delegitimizing “abortion” in order to
delegitimize humoral health. Certain categories of practitioners had not been
trained in humoral health, not educated about blocked menses nor about the
potional purgatives that might restore menstruation.440 Restricting the category
of lawfully performed abortion to such formally trained practitioners ruled out
those who restored menstruation with emmenagogues or abortifacients under
humoral diagnoses and cures. Second, the damage to humoural practice extended
beyond that generation of practitioners. The A.M.A. anti-abortion campaign and
the “third wave” of legislation it produced blocked the transmission of
knowledge about humoral health theory and practice insofar as it related to
abortion.441 Written information was suppressed under federal legislation
resulting from the A.M.A. campaign (so-called “Comstock Laws”)442 and its
state-law imitators prohibiting advertising or distributing information about
abortifacient herbs, instruments, or practitioners.443 Oral traditions of knowledge
436. See generally MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA, supra note 22.
437. See supra note 328.
438. See Siegel, Reasoning from the Body, supra note 279, at 287; LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS
OF MOTHERHOOD, supra note 22, at 30–31
439. See Cohen, A Jurisprudence of Doubt, supra note 13, at 204–217.
440. See supra note 328.
441. After the A.M.A. abortion committee report came out in 1859 but still before the 1873 federal
obscenity legislation, a few jurisdictions restricted advertising information about inducing miscarriage.
See, e.g. (in order of adoption): KAN. GEN. LAWS ch. 28, § 10 (1859) (excepting publication of “standard
medical works”); 1860 Conn. Pub. Acts ch. 71, § 4; 1867 Vt. Acts No. 57, § 3; Act of Mar. 14, 1867, ch.
216, 1867 R.I. Pub. Laws Jan. Sess. (codified as amended at R.I. GEN. STAT. tit. 30, ch. 232, § 23)
(amending criminal “decency” law to prohibit inter alia advertising any person with “information or
knowledge” about causing miscarriage); 1868 Fla. Acts 1st Sess., ch. 1637, III, § 10; 1868 Md. Laws ch.
179, § 2, at 315; 1869 Mich. Laws ch. 106, § 2, at 175 (advertising any compound medicine of an
“immoral” nature or publishing any recipe); 1870 Pa. Laws No. 19, § 2; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 4, at 369
(1871-1872) (additionally restricting pharmacists). Massachusetts was the only state that anticipated the
A.M.A. campaign, criminalizing in its “second wave” post-scandal legislation distributing or advertising
any drug or instrument for use in abortion. 1847 Mass. Stat. ch. 83, § 10.
442. Act for the Suppression of Trade in, and Circulation of, Obscene Literature and Articles of
Immoral Use [Comstock Act], 18 U.S.C. §§ 1461, 1463, 1735 (1873), reprinted in ROSE, ABORTION
DOCUMENTARY GUIDE, supra note 25, at 19–21. The legislation takes its name from New York policeman
Anthony Comstock, who gained prominence wrangling with Madame Restell and, subsequently elected
to Congress, sponsored federal obscenity legislation. ROSE, supra.
443. After federal legislation passed, other states and territories passed “Comstock statutes” that
prohibited the advertising of means of potional or instrumental abortion. See, e .g. (in order of adoption),
2 MINN. STAT. ch. 54, Sec. 29, § 4, at 987 (1873); Act of Nov. 8, 1875, § 2, 1875 Ark. Laws 4th Adj. Sess.;
1881 Ind. Laws ch. 37 § 93; 1883 Del. Laws ch. 226, § 1, at 522; IDAHO REV. STAT. (PENAL CODE)
§ 18-603 (1887); D.C. CODE ch. 19, § 872 (1901); ARIZ. REV. PENAL CODE § 288 (1901); 2 NEV. REV.
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transmission about humoral health444 were similarly disrupted.445 In states with
such statutes, much of the work of those with knowledge of potional emmenag-
ogues and abortifacients was exposed to criminal liability. Even if it continued
underground for those in current need, the lack of open practice made this
knowledge less available for new practitioners to learn. Third-wave legislation
restricting abortion practice succeeded both in prohibiting abortion practice and
blocking the transmission of knowledge that otherwise could have been available
to future generations.
It took decades to eradicate knowledge. The waning of humoral health theory
and the abortion practices it supported resulted in part from a conscious switch to
new theories of health or concerted attempts to moralize and stigmatize.
However, change can happen as collateral damage as well. Knowledge eradica-
tion accelerated with the suppression of humoral knowledge and the transmission
of information about effective potional abortion.
Against this background of suppressing information about abortion and
undercutting a regime of health that had promoted it, states also enacted statutes
that preserved common-law therapeutic intent doctrine. The next Section reports
on old legal formulations deployed in new abortion-restricting statutes.
B. LAW
1. The Imprint of Humoral Health
In regard to the therapeutic exception, statutes enacted between 1857 and 1959
in the “third wave” of legislative activity on abortion446 continued trajectories
LAWS pt. 4, ch. 14, § 187 (1912); 1920 La. Acts No. 95, § 1; N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2A:170-76 (1953); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 134, § 11 (1954) (prohibiting publishing abortifacient recipe); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 2289 (1956) (including giving information orally); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-63 (Supp. 1960).
444. See supra Part I.A.1 and Part I.C.
445. See, e.g. (in order of adoption), 1847 Mass. Stat. ch. 83, § 10. (prohibiting selling or giving away
a drug or instrument, as well as advertising it, for “unlawful” abortion); 1869 N.Y. Laws ch. 631, § 2, at
1502 (prohibiting supplying any substance to be “unlawfully“ used); N.Y. GEN. STAT. ch. 181, § 3, at 71
(1872) (making manufacturing, selling, or giving away any drug for producing miscarriage a felony); ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 4, at 369 (1871–1872) (restricting pharmacists); 1911 Nev. Laws, Crimes and
Punishments, § 183 (codified at 2 NEV. REV. LAWS pt. 4, ch. 14, § 6448 (1912)) (prohibiting making,
selling, or giving away any substance known to cause abortion); IOWA CODE § 205.1 (1946) (prohibiting
sale, delivery, or giving away named products—cotton root, ergot, oil of tansy, oil of savin, or derivatives
of any of them—all known emmenagogue and/or abortifacients , unless to a physician, veterinarian, or
dentist and prohibiting pharmacist from filling prescription for an abortifacient unless prescribing doctor
is personally known to the pharmacist (and even then, prohibiting refills); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 617.25
(1953) (adding a prohibition on selling an abortifacient drug to statutory prohibition on advertising).
These efforts carried on well beyond the nineteenth century. See N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:170-76
(1953) (criminalizing “uttering” or “exposing to view” any instrument or medicine for abortion, or even
recommending against it); see also VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-63 (Supp. 1960) (prohibiting publication, sale
or circulation of a publication, or even lecture that might “encourage or prompt procuring abortion or
miscarriage”).
446. For a catalogue of such state statutes, see Quay, Justifiable Abortion, supra note 223, at 447–520
(cataloguing in Appendix I state statutes on abortion 1821–1960 with excerpts of relevant statutory text).
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incipient in the first447 and second waves.448 This Section describes some of their
general features, with a few illustrative examples.
Even as a background belief in humoral health waned during this period,
humoral theory continued to shape features of the epistemic landscape in regard
to regulation of abortion at law. First, its knowledge and practices continue to
appear in legal provisions449 long after humoral theory dropped from medical
school curricula and faded in regulars’ consciousness.450 As late as 1954, for
example, well into an era in which commercial drugs had replaced local
herbalists’ preparations, Maine statute prohibited publishing, or distributing any
publication of, any “recipe” tending to cause abortion.451 Procedures that had no
health-care justification under humoral health, such as abortion by blows,
continued to be singled out for criminalization without therapeutic exception.452
Second, humoral health shaped legal doctrine in distinctions and formulations
that survived much longer than the health theory that informed them. For
example, the humoral distinction between a uterine purgative intended to cure
(knowing that purgatives could also induce miscarriage) versus a procedure
intended to “destroy a child” in the womb453 survived. In medical practice, this
For a detailed history of abortion practice and legislative, court, and policy battles over it between
1917–1972, see GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY, supra note 22.
447. See supra Part II.B.2.
448. See supra Part II.C.
449. See, e.g., 1871-1872 Ill. Laws ch. 38 § 4, at 369 (prohibiting sale of substance “known or
presumed to be ecbolic or abortifacient” except upon written recommendation of “well known and
respectable practicing physician”).
450. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 205.1 (1946) (prohibiting selling or giving away substances known as
abortifacients under humoral health care—cotton root, ergot, oil of tansy, oil of savin—except to
physicians, veterinarians, or dentists).
451. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 134, § 11 (1954).
452. See for example the first provision of Georgia’s abortion regulation statute. An Act to Prevent and
Punish Foeticide [sic] or Criminal Abortion in the State of Georgia, 1876 Ga. Laws No. 130, § 1, at 133
(Act of Feb. 25, 1876) (making the willful killing of an unborn quick child by injury to the mother a
felony punishable by death or imprisonment, without the therapeutic exception that covered the law’s
provisions in regard to abortion by potion or by instrument). Some later statutes modified slightly the
previously highly standardized language of the abortion-by-blows provision, but the distinction made for
abortion by blows survives, as does the presumption made under humoral health that, inherently
dangerous to the patient, it could not be justified by therapeutic intent. Compare, for example, two
separate provisions of the homicide section of 1910 Oklahoma criminal law. The statute includes one
provision, headed “Killing an unborn quick child,” criminalizing “the wilful killing of an unborn quick
child by any injury committed upon the mother of such child.” 1 OK. REV. LAWS ch. 23, art. 18, § 2322
(1910). The next section, termed “Procuring destruction of an unborn child,” criminalizes as a distinct
offense procuring miscarriage by potion or by instrument if the death of the “child or of the mother”
results. This section includes a “life exception” for an act meant to “preserve the life of such mother,”
where the abortion by blows section does not. 1 OK. REV. LAWS ch. 23, art. 18, § 2323 (1910). For the
persistence of abortion-by-blows prohibitions in other twentieth-century statutes, see, e.g., 4 ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 41-2229 (1964); 22 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782-09 (1965); 2 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-409 (1964); 25
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.554 (1954); 2A MISS. CODE ANN. § 2222 (1942); 2 N.D. CENTURY CODE
§ 12-25-03 (1960); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 713 (1958).
453. See supra Part I.A (describing humoral theory); HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN, supra note 60 (in
legal doctrine that reflects humoral theory, distinguishing between a medical intervention “to cause
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distinction became less stark the more that embryology changed ideas about
conception, gestation, and life and the further that health ideology departed from
humoral health. Nonetheless, the distinction appeared in the statutes of sixteen
states before 1857454 and in thirteen more between 1857 and 1959.455 Only a few
of the states that made this distinction abolished it before 1959, and they did so
surprisingly late.456 Another example of the preservation of legal formulations
suited to humoral health is the special treatment later law gave to “poison,”457
reflecting prior medical and legal distinction of “poisoning” from potional
abortion at a time of widespread knowledge of powerful plant preparations.
We identified two legal doctrines under the humoral regime associated with
health under which abortion took place, the constructive health exception and the
life-health exception.458 With the waning of humoral theory, the emmenagogue
as a logic of practice practically disappeared, and with it, much of the basis for
miscarriage” versus “to destroy the child within her”); supra Part I.D.3 (discussing Hale’s formulation of
curative intent defense).
454. See supra note 393.
455. Compare, for example, two sections of one 1881 North Carolina statute. The first section made it
a felony to administer a substance or employ an instrument on a pregnant woman “with intent thereby to
destroy said child.” Act of March 12, 1881 ch. 35, An Act to Punish the Crime of Producing Abortion,
1881 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 351, § 1, at 584. The second section made it a misdemeanor to do the same
“with intent thereby to procure the miscarriage of any such woman.” Act of March 12, 1881 ch. 35, An
Act to Punish the Crime of Producing Abortion, 1881 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 351, § 2, at 584. (Alarmingly,
the second section of the North Carolina statute relegates to the misdemeanor passage acting with intent
“to injure or destroy such woman.” Act of March 12, 1881 ch. 35, An Act to Punish the Crime of
Producing Abortion, 1881 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 351, § 2, at 584–85.) Just thirty years later, Kentucky
legislators used language much more consistent with our contemporary thinking, while providing a
specificity that implies some users of the law might be less clear, and while allowing that technologies of
verification have still not caught up with the certainty of legal categories. Section one of the law,
criminalizing attempt, encompassed an act intended to procure miscarriage towards “any pregnant
woman, or to any woman he has reason to believe pregnant, at any time during the period of gestation”
(emphasis added). Section two made an act resulting in a successfully procured miscarriage, “causing the
death of the unborn child,” a felony; section three makes a resulting death of the woman herself murder or
manslaughter, “as the facts may justify.” Act of March 22, 1910, An Act Defining the Crime of Abortion
and Prescribing a Penalty Therefore, 1910 Ky. Acts ch. 58, §§ 2, 3, at 189–90. For a convenient reprinting
of other statutes making the distinction between intent to destroy a child versus procuring miscarriage,
see Quay, Justifiable Abortion, supra note 223 (listing abortion-regulating statutes passed between 1821
and 1961).
456. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 9.02.010 (1951) (revising statutory provision to equate
“miscarriage” with “abortion”).
457. See supra Part II.B.2.a. (describing the first U.S. statute restricting the practice of abortion as
strictly a “poison” control measure); see also, e.g., 1868 Fla. Acts 1st Sess. ch. 1637 (lumping
abortifacient drugs and medicine with “poison and any noxious thing”); An Act Concerning Crimes and
Punishments, 1864 Mont. (Terr.) Laws 1st Legislative Assembly ch. 3, § 41, at 184 (placing provision on
abortion by potion or instrument within poison-control section of statute); Act of March 1, 1873, ch. 58,
1873 Neb. Gen. Stat. ch. 58, pt. 1, ch. 6, § 39, at 727–28 (adding provision on attempt to procure
miscarriage to the chapter of the criminal code on attempted poisoning, lumping abortion by instrument
together with administering “medicine, drug, substance, or thing whatsoever”); An Act Concerning
Crimes and Punishments, Nov. 26, 1861, 1861 Nev. (Terr.) Laws ch. 28, § 42, at 63 (codified as NEV.
COMP. LAWS ch. 55, pt. 4, § 2348 (1873); R.I. GEN. LAWS ch. 277, § 22, at 977 (1896) (prohibiting using
“poison or other noxious thing,” or an instrument, on a woman pregnant or supposed pregnant).
458. See supra Part I.D.4.
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the “constructive health exception.”459 The logic of the life-health defense,460
however, survived and thrived. At the beginning of the “long twentieth century,”
when there was still little practical difference between a measure to preserve a
woman’s life and to preserve her health, the “life exception” continued in practice
as a “life-health exception.”461 In fact, as embryology redefined “pregnancy”
back to conception, more procedures could be classified as “abortion”462 at the
same time that legal restrictions on information about, and access to, abortion
increased.463 With these developments, therapeutic intent doctrine became more
important in women’s healthcare.
2. The Implicit Health Exception
Some state legislatures preserved common-law intent doctrine by encoding an
implicit exception464 in the language of a statutory prohibition itself in intent
elements requiring an act be done “maliciously,”465 “unlawfully” (or “without
lawful justification”),466 or “wilfully.”467 In other states, courts construed an
459. See supra Part I.D.4.a.
460. See supra Part I.D.4.b.
461. See Part I.D.4.b. (arguing that the legal doctrine of a defense of acting to save a patient’s life, in a
time of no practical distinction between preserving “life” and “health,” be understood in actuality as a
“life-health defense”).
462. See infra text accompanying notes 476–478 (describing the changing understandings of the
relationship between conception and life with the development of embryology and that the entrenchment
of embryology redefines “pregnancy” and thus “abortion” back to conception).
463. See supra Part III.A.2 (describing abortion restrictions that in effect stifle knowledge
transmission).
464. Some jurisdictions had incorporated an implicit exception in the first wave of abortion
legislation. See supra Part II. D; see also supra notes 398, 401–02 (listing them).
465. For post-1857 adoption of the implicit exception in the requirement of “malicious” intent in a
practitioner, see, for example (in order of adoption), HAW. PENAL CODE ch. 12, § 1 (1869) (“maliciously,
without lawful justification”); 1869 Wyo. (Terr.) Sess. Laws 1st Sess. ch. 3, § 25, at 104, (“willfully and
maliciously”); N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:87-1 (1953) (“maliciously and without lawful justification”).
466. For post-1857 adoption of the implicit exception in the requirement of “unlawful purpose” or that
an act took place “without lawful justification,” see, for example (in order of adoption), 1860 Pa. Laws
NO. 374, §§ 87, 88 (“unlawfully”); 1868 Fla. Acts 1st Sess. ch. 1637 (“unlawfully”); HAW. PENAL CODE
ch. 12, § 1 (1869) (“maliciously, without lawful justification”); 1869 N.Y. Laws ch. 631, §§ 1, 2, at 1502
(“unlawfully”); N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:87-1 (1953) (“maliciously and without lawful justification”).
Some states used “unlawful” or “criminal” abortion, not justified by the life-health exception, as a
measure of “unprofessionalism,” making performing unlawful abortion grounds for stripping a regular
physician of his license. See, e.g., H. B. 120, 1938 Miss. Extraordinary Session, reported in MISS. CODE
ch. 148, § 2011, at 1321 (1930) (Supp. 1938) (amending 1930 Code section 5863 (a) (5), to list procuring,
attempting, or pretending to procure any abortion not necessary to preserve the life of a pregnant woman
among causes authorizing State Board of Health to revoke a physician’s license); see also, for example,
similar statutes linking abortion to physician licensing: Act of Apr. 5, 1911, § 2 (codified as 1 ALA. CODE
ch. 52, art. 1, § 2847(5), at 1279, 1283 (1923) (amending existing state medical-practice certification
provision to add, as a cause for revocation, inducing “criminal” abortion, miscarriage, or premature
delivery unless, when done to save her life, attending physician “use due diligence to obtain the advice
and help of one or more consulting physicians”); 1914 La. Acts No. 54, § 10.1 (codified as LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 14:8, at 889 (West 1950)); 1917 Alaska Sess. Laws §§ 7, 8; MD. ANN. CODE § 3 (West 1924); OR.
COMP. LAWS ANN. ch. 9, art. 1, § 54-931 (1940); IOWA CODE § 147.56 (1946); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 559.100
(1949); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 458.12 (1952); 1955 HAW. REV. LAWS § 60-9 (“criminal” abortion).
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implicit life-health exception.468
The implicit exception enjoyed less consistent interpretation across jurisdic-
tions in the United States than in the United Kingdom.469 A Kentucky court, for
example, turned the “lawful” justification against an abortion practitioner, finding
that although the common law had not made pre-quickening abortion a felony,
the death of a woman from a pre-quickening procedure was “murder” because it
was done “without lawful purpose and dangerous to life.”470 Even statutes within
a single jurisdiction can seem at odds. In Louisiana, for example, criminal law
and physician licensing statutes contradict each other or, perhaps, evidence an
attempt to deal with an economy of abortion practice driven underground. The
criminal statute expansively defined abortion as administering any potion or
using any instrument on a pregnant female for the purpose of procuring
premature delivery of an embryo or fetus, subjecting anyone convicted of the
“crime of abortion” to imprisonment at hard labor for one to ten years without
exception.471 However, the state’s physician licensing statute, listing abortion as
grounds to revoke a medical license, excepted from sanction abortion “done for
the relief of a woman whose life appears in peril after due consultation with
another licensed physician.”472
3. The Explicit Health Exception
Most states, following the early New York example,473 straightforwardly
included an explicit “life exception” in their abortion-regulating statutes.474
467. For post-1857 adoption of the implicit exception in the requirement that an act be done
“wilfully,” see, for example (in order of adoption), 1867 R.I. Acts & Resolves Jan. Sess. ch. 689, § 1
(“wilfully administering”); 1869 Wyo. (Terr.) Sess. Laws 1st Sess. ch. 3, § 25, at 104, (“willfully and
maliciously”); Act of March 1, 1873, ch. 58, 1873 Neb. Gen. Stat. ch. 58, pt. 1, ch. 2, § 6, ch. 6, §39, at
720, 727–28 (“wilfully”); 1881 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 351, § 1, at 584 (“wilfully administer”); see also
1868 Md. Laws 315 (not specifying other intent elements but adding “knowingly”).
468. See, e.g., Passley v. State, 21 S.E.2d 230, 232 (Ga. 1942) (statutory provisions criminalizing
causing death to a woman (§ 26-1103) or a quick fetus (§ 26-1101) as a consequence of abortion
procedure require “malice” towards, respectively, the deceased woman or the fetus); Commonwealth v.
Wheeler, 53 N.E. 2d 4 (Mass. 1944) (requiring act to have been “unlawful,” “malicious,” “without lawful
justification”).
469. See supra text accompanying note 403. See generally KEOWN, ABORTION, DOCTORS, AND THE
LAW, supra note 38.
470. Peoples v. Commonwealth, 9 S.W. 509, 511 (Ky. 1888).
471. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 807 (1870).
472. 1914 La. Acts No. 56 §16 .
473. See supra note 396 (listing jurisdictions that had adopted an explicit exception permitting
procedure necessary to “preserve” woman’s life).
474. Joining the earlier adopting jurisdictions, id., after 1857 those with an explicit exception are (in
chronological order): MISS. REV. CODE ch. 64, § 34, art. 173, at 601 (1857); TEX. DIGEST OF GEN. STAT.
LAWS, PENAL CODE, pt. 2, tit. 17, ch. 7, art. 536, at 524 (1859); 1860 Conn. Pub. Acts ch. 71, §§ 1, 3, at 65
(codified as CONN. GEN. STAT. tit. 12, ch. 2, §§ 22, 24 (1866)); An Act Concerning Crimes and
Punishments, 1861 Nev. (Terr.) Laws ch. 28, § 42, at 63 (Act of Nov. 26, 1861) (codified as NEV. COMP.
LAWS ch. 55, pt. 4, § 2348 (1873); An Act Concerning Crimes and Punishments, 1864 Mont. (Terr.) Laws
1st Legislative Assembly ch. 3, § 41, at 184; Act of Mar. 14, 1867 ch. 689, 1867 R.I. Acts & Resolves Jan.
Sess. ch. 689, § 1, at 148; Act of Nov. 21, 1867 § 1, 1867 Vt. Acts & Resolves No. 57, § 1, at 64; MINN.
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Differences in the details, though, show a lack of consensus in basic understand-
ings of pregnancy and its threat to women’s health. For example, across different
jurisdictions legislatures and courts differed as to the burden of proof in the
life-health exception. There are two threshold matters of proof. First is proving
that abortion had happened in the first place, i.e., that a woman was pregnant
before the procedure. Some courts required “quickening” as prima facie evidence
of pregnancy.475 Some legal authorities dropped “quickening”476 as science
GEN. STAT. ch. 94, § 11 (1866) (repealed by, but life exception replicated in, Act of March 10, 1873, ch. 9,
An Act to Punish Abortionists and Attempts to Procure Abortion, and Improper Advertising in that
Direction, 1873 Minn. Gen. Laws 15th Sess. ch. 9, § 1 (codified as 2 MINN. STAT. AT LARGE ch. 54, Sec.
29, §§ 1, 3, at 987 (1873)); Act of March 1, 1873, ch. 58, 1873 Neb. Gen. Stat. ch. 58, pt. 1, ch. 2, § 6, ch.
6, §39, at 720, 727–28; The Penal Code of Utah § 142, 1876 Utah (Terr.) Laws 22nd Sess. § 142 (Act of
Feb. 18, 1876) (codified as UTAH (TERR.) COMP. STAT. tit. 21 Penal Code, tit. 9, ch. 3, § 142 (1876)); An
Act to Punish Procurement of Abortion, Feb. 13, 1883 ch. 226, 1883 7 Del. Laws pt. 1, tit. 20, ch. 226,
§ 2, at 523; DAK. (TERR.) REV. CODES, PENAL CODE ch. 29, §§ 337, 338, at 776 (1877) (“necessary to
preserve her life”), adopted as N. DAK. REV. CODES, PENAL CODE ch. 30, §§ 7177, 7178, at 1271-72
(1895) and S. DAK. REV. CODES, PENAL CODE ch. 29, §§ 342, 343, at 1134 (1903); An Act concerning
Public Offenses and their Punishment ch. 87, 1881 Ind. Laws Spec. Sess. ch. 37, §§ 22, 23, at 177 (Act of
Apr. 14, 1881); An Act to Punish the Crime of Producing Abortion, 1881 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 351, § 1, at
584 (Act of Mar. 12, 1881); An Act to Amend the Criminal Law by Providing for the Punishment of
Abortion, 1883 S.C. Acts No. 354, 99 §§ 1, 3, at 547–48 (Act of Dec. 24, 1883); An Act to Punish
Criminal Abortion, 1883 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 140, §§ 1, 2, at 188–89 (Act of March 23, 1883); 1890 Okla.
(Terr.) Gen. Stat. 1st Regular Sess. ch. 25, art. 29, §§ 1, 2, at 459 (codified as OKLA. GEN. STAT. ch. 25, art.
29, §§ 1, 2 (1890)); An Act to Define and Punish Crimes in the District of Alaska and to Provide a Code of
Criminal Procedure for Said District (enacted by Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States in Congress assembled) 30 Stat. L., 1253 Alaska Criminal Code (Act of Mar. 3, 1899), published
as ALASKA (TERR.) LAWS pt. 1 (Penal Code), ch. 2, § 8, at 3 (1900); Act of Mar. 18, 1907 § 6, 1907 N.M.
(Terr.) Acts 37th Sess. ch. 36, § 6, at 41, 42; An Act Defining the Crime of Abortion and Prescribing a
Penalty Therefore, 1910 Ky. Acts ch. 58, § 1, at 189 (Act of March 22, 1910); The Code of Alabama,
Crimes and Offenses, Act of July 2, 1940, tit. 14, ch. 2, § 9, 4 ALA. CODE tit. 14, ch. 2, § 9, at 7 (1940); see
also An Act to Amend the Criminal Code of this State in relation to the Offense of Abortion, §§ 2, 3 1867
Ill. Pub. Laws 25th Gen. Assembly 1st Sess. §§ 2, 3, at 89 (Act of Feb. 28, 1867) (abortion criminalization
provisions shall not apply to “any person” attempting or procuring miscarriage “for bona fide medical or
surgical purposes”); see also LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD, supra note 22, at
30–35 (discussing the meaning of “saving the life” of a woman in the last quarter of the nineteenth
century and Horatio Storer’s and other A.M.A. anti-abortion crusaders’ own arguments for performing
abortion to save a woman’s life).
475. See, e.g., Weightnovel v. State, 35 So. 856, 859 (Fla. 1903) (state must prove pregnancy via
quickening, as well as acts undertaken with intent to destroy the fetus) (citing State v. Emerich, 87 Mo.
110 (1885); People v. Olmstead, 30 Mich. 431 (1874)); Armstrong v. State, 145 So. 212, 212 (Fla. 1933);
Johnson v. State, 91 So. 2d 185, 186-91 (Fla. 1956) (state must prove quickening and effort to cause
abortion); Taylor v. State, 33 S.E. 190 (Ga. 1899) (holding the state must prove quickening to allege
abortion); Summerlin v. State, 103 S.E. 461, 462–63 (Ga. 1920) (language implying fetus not quick
means statutory abortion prohibition does not apply); Hunter v. State, 115 S.E. 277, 277 (Ga. Ct.
App.1923) (state must prove quickening beyond a reasonable doubt); Passley v. State, 21 S.E.2d 230, 232
(Ga. 1942) (lesser penalty under statute applies when child was not quick)).
476. The Tennessee act criminalizing abortion exemplifies some of the flux in the notion of pregnancy
and helps us to envision the evidentiary conundra that could arise from changes in scientific notions
without concomitant technologies of proof. The statute seems to reflect an encompassing view of
pregnancy from the moment of conception in the language of section one, that prohibits intervention in
regard to “any woman pregnant with child, whether such child be quick or not.” An Act to Punish
Criminal Abortion, 1883 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 140, § 1, at 188 (Act of March 23, 1883). However, matters
2016] 733HEALTH EXCEPTION
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3390926
invented other means of testing for pregnancy477 or as embryology changed the
meanings attached to “conception” and redefined in utero processes.478 Other
jurisdictions did not require the prosecution prove a woman was pregnant,479
only that those involved thought she was480 (in other words, criminalizing
attempt regardless of actual pregnancy).481
If an abortion had taken place or been attempted, the second threshold matter
of proof regarding whether the exception applies is whether the procedure was
medically necessary. Some states required a defendant to prove medical
necessity482 and erected presumptions that had to be overcome in that proof.483
Others laid on the state the burden of proving that an abortion was not medically
of proof are complicated when that section requires that the act be conducted “with intent to destroy such
child and shall thereby destroy such child. ” Id. (emphasis added). It is difficult to imagine, in the decades
before a pregnancy test, that much short of a recognizably formed fetus could have sufficed as proof for
such a charge. The next section of the statute employs yet different language to refer to pregnancy (as it
provides lesser punishment for attempt), referring to intervening “with the intent to procure the
miscarryage [sic] of a woman then being with child.” An Act to Punish Criminal Abortion, 1883 Tenn.
Pub. Acts ch. 140, § 2, at 188 (Act of March 23, 1883).
477. See supra text accompanying note 28 (describing pregnancy test development).
478. See, e.g., Mills v. Commonwealth, 13 Pa. 631, 633 (1850) (holding quickening is immaterial,
pregnancy at any time after “[t]he moment the womb is instinct with embryo life” and intentional
miscarriage are sufficient). A Hawaii court re-cites the Millls rule nearly a century later, attesting to the
durability of the new sensibility it reflects. Territory of Haw. v. Young, 37 Haw. 150, 159–60 (1945).
479. See, e.g., 1935 Cal. Stat. 51st Sess., Amendment to Penal Code ch. 528 (codified as 1 CAL. PENAL
CODE pt. 1, tit. 9, ch. 3, § 274 (1935) (amending California Penal Code, pt. 1, tit. 9, ch. 3, § 274 (1872), to
remove stipulation that woman be “pregnant” from prior abortion restriction); see also Rinker v. State Bd.
of Medical Examiners, 138 P.2d 403 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1943) (state need not prove actual pregnancy).
480. See, e.g., Barrow v. State, 48 S.E. 950, 951 (Ga. 1904) (sufficient to prove intent to destroy fetus
without proving quickening); see also People v. Kellner, 52 N.Y.S. 2d 355, 356 (NY Sup. Ct. 1945) (state
need not prove pregnancy but must prove defendant’s intent to cause miscarriage); see also
Commonwealth v. Trombetta, 200 A. 487, 489 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1938); Commonwealth v. Sierakowski, 35
A.2d 790, 792 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1944) (prosecution need only establish use of a means to procure
miscarriage and intention to do so).
481. For some courts, even proof at trial that a woman had not, indeed, been pregnant, did not defeat a
criminal charge stemming from attempted abortion if the accused had thought her pregnant. See, e.g.,
Wilson v. Commissioner, 60 S.W. 400, 401–03 (Ky. Ct. App. 1901) (though no actual abortion and
woman’s death due to other causes, finding defendant who had killed woman in attempt to produce
abortion—because his acts had “endangered her life” and, even if false, he believed her pregnant by
him—sufficient to support manslaughter charge).
482. See, e.g., Adams v. State, 88 A.2d 556 (Md. 1951) (defendant must show necessity); People v.
Hammer, 186 N.Y. Supp. 132 (1921); People v. McGonegal, 17 N.Y. Supp. 147 (Sup. Ct. 1891) (cited in
State v. Wells, 100 P. 681, 683–84 (Utah 1909)); People v. Meyers, 5 N.Y. Crim. 120 (Sup. Ct.), aff’d 107
N.Y. 671, 14 N.E. 608 (1887) (cited in N.Y. ABORTION LAW § 1142 (McKinney 1916); Weed v. People, 3
Th. & C. 50 (Sup. Ct.), aff’d 56 N.Y. 628 (1874); Bradford v. People, 20 Hun. 309 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1880)
(cited in People v. Hammer, 186 N.Y. Supp. 132, 134 (1932)); see also George, Current Abortion Laws,
supra note 170, at 377–78 (discussing “necessity” in state abortion statutes circa 1965).
483. See, e.g., Holloway v. State, 82 S.E. 2d 235, 236 (Ga. Ct. App. 1954); Guiffrida v. State, 7 S.E. 2d
34, 34 (Ga. Ct. App. 1940) (evidence that woman was healthy, co-present with plausible motivations such
as to avoid disgrace, sufficient to defeat asserted life exception); see also Grecu v. State, 12 N.E.2d 179,
181 (Ind. 1954) (testimony of woman that she was “perfectly well” or felt “perfectly healthy” up to
procedure defeats life defense). But see State v. Stillman, 301 S.W.2d 830, 831 (Mo. 1957) (good health
of woman prior to abortion means only that she was capable of carrying child to term).
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necessary.484 The robustness of the exception (or defensibility of having
conducted an abortion) often turned on technical matters of proof, and that was
inconsistent across jurisdictions.
Third-wave statutes, by repeating existing formulations from prior legal
authorities, preserved the common-law therapeutic exception at the same time
that the meaning of “health” itself was undergoing wholesale redefinition. The
next Section discusses the implications of this changed milieu.
C. HEALTH, REDEFINED
1. The Century of Surgery
Several largely unrelated new developments—the rise of surgery, the implica-
tions of embryology—worked in conjunction to reconfigure thinking about
health, life, and abortion in fundamental ways. Prior to the last third of the
nineteenth century, surgery had been a fearful prospect for patient (and
practitioner); for example, the absence of anesthesia necessitated rigorous
physical restraint of the patient and cutting into a live, unsedated patient was not
for the weak of will.485 Even so, by mid-nineteenth century, intrusive measures
disfavored in humoral gynecology486 had become more common.487 In gynecol-
ogy, surgeons and obstetricians increasingly employed the “curette,” a surgical
instrument shaped like a small scoop (previously used primarily for removing
484. See generally, People v. Long, 103 P.2d 969, cert. denied 311 U.S. 698 (Cal. 1940) (state bears
burden of proving abortion was not necessary to save woman’s life); State v. Rowley, 248 N.W. 340
(Iowa 1933) and State v. Snyder, 59 N.W. 2d 223 (1953) (state bears burden of proving abortion not
necessary to save woman’s life); State v. Hawkins, 210 S.W. 4, 7 (Mo. 1919); State v. Wells, 100 P. 681
(1909) (prosecution must prove abortion not necessary). Courts of the Commonwealth interpreting the
British statute likewise put the burden of proof on the prosecution. See, e.g., In re McCready, 4 C.C.C.
481, 485 (1909)) (Canadian judge refuses extradition to face criminal abortion charge on the grounds that
state fails to meet burden of proof that the operation was not necessary to preserve the woman’s life),
cited in KEOWN, ABORTION, DOCTORS, AND THE LAW, supra note 38, at 52, 182 n.22. But see MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 14 (West 1935) (statutory provision excusing prosecution from proving medical necessity
had not existed).
485. SAMUEL COOPER, DICTIONARY OF PRACTICAL SURGERY 196 (2d. ed., 1816)) (describing physical
restraints advisable when performing mastectomy in the time before anesthesia), cited in Garfinkel,
Quaker Woman’s Breast Cancer Surgery, supra note 339, at 74.
486. See supra Part I.C.
487. See supra Part II.C. To be clear, though disfavored, intrusive techniques are attested in Western
gynecology back to antiquity. See generally J.H. YOUNG, CAESARIAN SECTION: THE HISTORY AND
DEVELOPMENT OF THE OPERATION FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES (1944) (reporting the history of the use of
Caeasarian section and the belief systems informing its techniques from antiquity through mid-twentieth
century, with later materials concentrating on England); see also, generally, RENATE BLUMENFELD-
KOSINSKI, NOT OF WOMAN BORN: REPRESENTATIONS OF CAESAREAN BIRTH IN MEDIEVAL AND RENAISSANCE
CULTURE (1990) (documenting illustrations of Caesarian birth in medieval manuscripts). The name does
not itself extend back to Caesar’s time; rather ope´ration ce´sarienne comes only in the sixteenth century.
See Monica H. Green, Renate Blumenfeld-Kosinski, Not of Woman Born: Representations of Caesarean
Birth in Medieval and Renaissance Culture, 67 SPECULUM 380, 380 (1992) (book review).
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cataracts or earwax)488 to scrape the lining of the uterus489 as an abortion
procedure.490 They were also increasingly prone to undertake amniotic piercing,
to resort to the more painful and risky fetal extraction hook, or to attempt fetal
removal by Caesarian section.491 After the middle decades of the nineteenth
century, discoveries such as inhaled-gas anesthesia492 and sepsis-prevention
measures493 decreased mortality in all types of surgery. Magdalena Biernacka
suggests that invention became the mother of necessity: breakthroughs enabling
surgical solutions spurred a search for anatomical problems for surgery to
solve.494 Although in hindsight, writers like Jacalyn Duffin call 1870 to 1970 the
“Century of Surgery,” a time of “unbounded optimism” towards the treatment
potential offered by surgery,495 on its eve, we detect considerable wariness.496
Regarding those therapeutics for which humoral practice had distinguished
emmenagogues from abortifacients, it had done so by diagnosis and by treatment
intent, marked in part by timing. In locational medicine, quickening remained
helpful as a diagnostic for ascertaining pregnancy and alerting patient and
488. Curette, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989) [hereinafter “OED”]. The entry of the word
“curette” into English is first attested in 1739 in HENRI FRANCOIS LE DRAN, OBSERVATIONS IN SURGERY
lxxvii 271 (trans. John Sparrow, 1st ed. 1739), cited in OED.
489. For the earliest published description of such usage currently known, see OED (citing W.J.
Smyly, M.D., The Diagnosis and Treatment of Diseases of the Endometrium, 1 BRIT. MED. J. 288 (Feb.
11, 1888)).
490. See, e.g., Dr. Aleck Bourne’s response to a plea for help from the parents of a fourteen-year-old
impregnated by rape, “I shall be delighted to take her in at St. Mary’s and curette her.” KEOWN, ABORTION,
DOCTORS, AND THE LAW, supra note 38, at 49 (citing Charge of Procuring Abortion (in Rex v. Bourne)).
491. MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA, supra note 22, at 14.
492. Georgia surgeon Crawford Long experimented with, but abandoned after public outcry, use of
ether during surgery. BROWDER, ABORTIONIST, supra note 347. October 16, 1846, dentist W.T. Morton,
who had used ether on patients in tooth extraction, demonstrated the vapor of sulfuric or diethyl ether to
prevent pain of surgery. PERNICK, CALCULUS OF SUFFERING, supra note 337, at 3. Administered to Gilbert
Abbott, upon whom surgeon John Collins operated to remove a neck tumor, this well-publicized case was
used to promote use of inhaled gas anesthesia in surgery. DUFFIN, HISTORY OF MEDICINE, supra note 328,
at 262. In 1847, Scotsman James Young Simpson introduces chloroform into surgical practice; he
recommends it for obstetrics. Id.
493. The Listers developed antiseptics in 1867. See supra note 31. However, surgical wounds—
unlike, say, open fractures—were presumed “clean” and preventive asepsis to avoid wound contamina-
tion in surgery was not employed until Ernst von Bergmann introduces it in 1877. DUFFIN, HISTORY OF
MEDICINE, supra note 328, at 263.
494. Magdalena Biernacka, History of Visceroptosis, unpublished manuscript presented at Annual
Meeting of the Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons Canada (Sept. 26–29, 1996) (abstract
published in 19 CLINICAL INVESTIGATIVE MED. SUPP. 1 (Aug. 1996) (pointing to “visceroptosis,” or
“drooping abdomen,” as an example), cited in JACALYN DUFFIN, LOVERS AND LIVERS: DISEASE CONCEPTS
IN HISTORY (2005), at 135 n. 16.
495. DUFFIN, HISTORY OF MEDICINE, supra note 328, at 266. Kristin Luker refers to the period between
1890–1950, for the absence of public discussion of abortion, as “the Century of Silence.” See LUKER,
ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD, supra note 22, at 40–65.
496. See, e.g., supra Part II.C (describing a “second wave” of legislation regulating abortion inspired
by tabloid reporting of patient death from intrusive abortion).
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practitioner to a time of heightened danger for intervention.497 However, as
embryology became common knowledge, it challenged belief in quickening as a
beginning to human life.498 This extended conceptualization of an act as
“abortion” back to the earliest days of pregnancy: as a conceptual category,
“abortion” gained ground against “emmenagogue.” A humoral theory of health
that had provided the epistemological and ethical structures for emmenagogic
work also faded. The category of “emmenagogues” waned in consciousness and
the administration of emmenagogic substances became more susceptible to being
equated with birth control.
Together, over the long twentieth century, the collapsing category of “emmena-
gogues,” leaving all intervention conceptualized as “abortion,” and the rise of
intrusive measures in prominence and in practice, increasingly made intervention
under conditions of amenorrhea in a woman of menstruating age synonymous
with abortion; and abortion, with intrusive techniques.
2. Growing Gap Between “Life” and “Health”
In medieval and early modern gynecological practice, acts to protect a
woman’s “health” were inseparable from acts to preserve her “life.” In serious
matters, “health” was subsumed under the more encompassing category of “life,”
and at law, a “life exception” encompassed a “health exception.”499
However, by the long twentieth century, a gap began to appear between “life”
and “health.” Under humoral theory, a patient could not be characterized as
“healthy” if she did not have the four humors in balance, and neither could life be
sustained: humoral imbalance caused life-threatening disease. Under a locational
theory of health, however, diseased organs or parts can be considered discretely
from the whole. A patient with a “heart condition” can take medication for “heart
disease” but be considered “otherwise healthy.” Under holistic conceptions of
health, there is no “otherwise.” As a practical matter as well, treatments
developed under locational theories increasingly allowed for the possibility of
preserving life under conditions of “wrecked health.” As a conceptual matter, a
gap appeared between “life” and “health”; as a practical matter, empirical-
science breakthroughs amplified that gap.
The language of the therapeutic exception in state abortion statutes began to
reflect that gap. Modifications to standard provisions may have been subtle but
their inception quietly marks the bigger revolution going on in health epistemol-
497. The pregnancy test was not invented until the late 1920s. See Harry E. Kaplan, M.D., The
Aschheim-Zondek Hormone Test for Pregnancy, 31 CAL. & W. MED. 412, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
pmc/articles/PMC1657279/?page!1. See generally supra note 28.
498. Siegel, Reasoning from the Body, supra note 279, at 287–92 (discussing “quickening”).
499. See supra Part I.D.4.b. (arguing that the common-law “life exception” be understood in practical
terms as a “life-health exception”).
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ogy and practice. Illinois first altered the formula in 1867.500 Whereas the
previous standard formula of the explicit life-health exception permitted
practices necessary to “preserve the woman’s life,” the Illinois statute permitted
abortion for “bona fide medical and surgical purposes.”501 Maryland statute,
passed in 1868, allowed abortion when the fetus was dead or when no other
method of treatment “will secure the safety of the mother.”502 Colorado statute of
the same year worded its exception to permit intervention to “save the life” or to
“prevent bodily injury” to the patient.503 (New Mexico in 1953 repeated similar
language, permitting intervention to “preserve life” or “prevent permanent bodily
injury” to the patient.504) Finally, the District of Columbia introduced the term
“health” itself with a 1901 provision that permitted intervention to save the “life
and health” of the patient.505 Case law in various jurisdictions followed suit, for
example a Massachusetts court’s allowance that the law permits abortion to
“preserve maternal life and protect maternal health.”506 Alabama statute of 1951
explicitly added “health” to its life exception.507 A 1956 New Jersey case
permitted abortion to avoid death or “permanent, serious injury” to the mother.508
In 1959, the same year as the publication of the Model Penal Code, a California
court acknowledged changes in medical knowledge that allowed a practitioner to
separate saving life from preserving health and further, to recognize conditions
that might be lethally exacerbated by pregnancy without entailing the emergency,
say, of fatal complications during childbirth. Peril to life need not be “imminent”
to meet the statutory “life exception,” the court noted.509 Acknowledging a gap
between “health” and “life” did not come without ambivalence, nor did “health”
always survive its disentanglement from “life.” A 1948 New Jersey case, for
example, warned that a doctor can perform an abortion to save the life of a
woman but not “merely” her health.510
3. “Health” Narrowed and Expanded
The separation of “life” from “health” had the potential to narrow the grounds
for medically justifiable intervention. Abandoning humoral health theory, in
500. An Act to amend the criminal code of this state in relation to the offense of abortion, 1867 Ill.
Pub. Laws 1st Sess. 89 (Act of Feb. 28, 1867).
501. Id.
502. 1868 Md. Laws ch. 179, § 2, at 315.
503. COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-4-42 (1868).
504. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-5-2 (1963).
505. D.C. CODE 31 Stat. 1322 (1901).
506. Commonwealth v. Wheeler, 53 N.E.2d 4 (Mass. 1944).
507. ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 9 (1959), discussed in George, Current Abortion Laws, supra note 170, at
378 (discussing statutes that permits abortion to “protect the health of the mother ”).
508. State v. Siciliano, 121 A.2d 490 (N.J. 1956).
509. People v. Ballard, 335 P.2d 204 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959) (peril to woman’s life need not be
“imminent” to justify abortion under statutory standard of necessity).
510. State v. Brandeburg, 58 A.2d 709, 710–11 (N.J. 1948) (doctor can act to “save the life” of a
woman but not “merely to protect her health”).
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practice, removed the most common health-based justifications for administering
those uterine purgatives that had previously been so commonly prescribed and
reduced the number of disease conditions that might be treated with abortifa-
cients in the name of health rather than in the name of ending pregnancy.511
As reliance on medical professionals’ judgment of abortion necessity and
legality grew over the “long twentieth century,” however, an unexpected
development occured: instead of only narrowing “medical necessity” to more
restricted and technical grounds, medical experts in two respects expanded it.
First, using rationale akin to that of the new science of sociology, some experts
began to reinsert the patient into context, now conceptualized as “socioeco-
nomic” context.512 Informed by the emerging field of “public health,” medical
experts began to see poverty as a cause of disease and ill-health.513 They
scrutinized economic opportunity as part of campaigns to ameliorate the
conditions that cause ill health. A new idiom entered into discussion of
“therapeutic abortion” (that is, abortion the legality of which rests on the health
exception): “social indications” for abortion,514 one of which was poverty.515
Second, as an earlier belief in “temperament”—related to the balance of
humors in a person—waned, a new theory related to “the psyche” arose516 and a
new term, “mental health,” entered the practitioner lexicon. The formalization of
the discipline of psychiatry in the U.S. parallelled that of medicine, with its early
luminaries educated abroad517 and institutionalization accelerating in the short
nineteenth century. The founding of the American Psychiatric Association in
511. See supra note 19 (giving sources that discuss medical indication for abortion, at least from the
perspective of medicine in the first half of the twentieth century).
512. See REAGAN, WHEN ABORTION WAS A CRIME, supra note 22, at 139 (explaining Dr. A.J. Rongy’s
argument that most physicians already took “social necessity” into consideration when deciding whether
to perform an abortion); see also id. at 142–44 (on the expanding consideration physicians gave social
factors in the 1930s).
513. See, e.g., id. at 132–36 (describing growing willingness by doctors during the Great Depression
to admit that assessment of social conditions entered into medical judgment about the suitability of
therapeutic abortion).
514. See id. at 61–65 (reporting doctor raising question about “social indication” for abortion in query
to the Journal of the American Medical Association); see also id. at 181 (on physician advocates for
socially indicated therapeutic abortion in the 1950s).
515. See id. at 65 (reading between the lines of letters to the Journal of the American Medical
Association to find poverty as a reason physicians provided abortion); id. at 144–45 (on Dr. Frederick J.
Taussig’s late 1930s arguments that indications for therapeutic abortion include poverty, hunger,
pre-existing family size in relation to family income).
516. Previous psychiatric theory had attempted to fit observations of “insanity” into humoral schema
of theories of health and treatment. See, e.g., MASON COX, PRACTICAL OBSERVATIONS ON INSANITY (1804)
(proposing too much blood in the brain is the cause of all mental disease and purgation is the cure), cited
in GREGORY ZILBOORG (IN COLLABORATION WITH GEORGE W. HENRY), A HISTORY OF MEDICAL PSYCHOLOGY
411 (1941) [hereinafter ZILBOORG, HISTORY OF MEDICAL PSYCHOLOGY].
517. See, e.g., BENJAMIN RUSH, MEDICAL INQUIRIES AND OBSERVATIONS UPON DISEASES OF THE MIND (1812).
(Rush’s first American textbook on psychiatry); JOHN REVERE, DISPUTATIO MEDICA INAUGURALIS DE INSANIA
(1811) (son of Paul Revere, John Revere’s, doctoral thesis in medicine at the University of Edinburgh).
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1844518 and Dorothea Dix’s post-Civil War campaign for specialized treatment
hospitals519 helped to establish psychiatry as part of the emerging medical
mainstream. Some psychiatric diagnoses were given equal weight with other
medical conditions in the eyes of the law. One category of such analysis was
abortion. Protecting “mental health” was increasingly invoked as a justification
for abortion under the statutory health exception.520 By the end of the long
twentieth century, regulars’ journals debated “medical indications” for abor-
tion,521 including the psychotherapeutic.522
In this, U.K. law took a trajectory that U.S. law followed. U.K. statute
ostensibly prohibited abortion except where necessary to save a woman’s
“life.”523 In the watershed case identifying the place of mental health in
interpreting the life-health exception, Rex v. Bourne, a 1938 abortion prosecution,
the defense made no assertion that the patient, a fourteen-year-old impregnated
through rape, faced danger to her physical “life” if pregnancy continued. The
physician defendant testified that his decision to curette was based on the threat to
the patient of “mental and nervous injury.”524 Under cross-examination, he
denied a clear distinction between danger to life and to health.525 This was no
resurrection of the old life-health exception, however, but its reconceptualization
on new grounds: the defense argued here that because of “mental and nervous
518. ZILBOORG, HISTORY OF MEDICAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 516, at 410–11 (describing the
founding of the American Psychiatric Association, actually predating the A.M.A. by three years, in the
context of the development of the field of psychiatry internationally).
519. See generally FRANCIS TIFFANY, LIFE OF DOROTHEA LYNDE DIX (1891); see also ALBERT DEUTSCH,
THE MENTALLY ILL IN AMERICA, ch. 9 (1937) (reporting her achievements).
520. As evidence of the rising acceptance of “psychiatric indications” for therapeutic abortion in the
1940s and 1950s, studies show in 1947 one-fifth of all therapeutic abortions were granted on psychiatric
grounds, a proportion that grew to one-half of all therapeutic abortions by 1960. REAGAN, WHEN
ABORTION WAS A CRIME, supra note 22, at 201–03.
521. See, e.g., REAGAN, WHEN ABORTION WAS A CRIME, supra note 22, at 278 n.55, 279 n.57 (1997) (citing
E.C. McKee, Abortion, AM. J. OBSTETRICS 1333–34 (1891); W.C. Bowers, Justifiable Artificial Abortion and
Induced Premature Labor, J. AM. MED. ASSOC. 568–569 (1899); Frank A. Higgins, The Propriety, Indications
and Methods for the Termination of Pregnancy, 43 J. AM. MED. ASSOC. 1531–33 (1904); Paul Titus, A Statistical
Study of a Series of Abortions Occurring in the Obstetrical Department of the Johns Hopkins Hospital, 65 AM. J.
OBSTETRICS 960 (1912); Irving K. Perlmutter, Analysis of Therapeutic Abortions, Bellevue Hospital 1935–1945,
53 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1012 (1947)).
522. See, e.g., Is Abortion Justifiable in the Insane Pregnant?, 38 J. AM. MED. ASSOC. 69 (1902); R.
Finely Gayle, The Psychiatric Consideration of Abortion, 91 S. MED. AND SURG. 251 (1929), cited in
REAGAN, WHEN ABORTION WAS A CRIME, supra note 22, at 279 n.59 (1997); see also Harold Rosen,
Psychiatric Implications of Abortion: A Case Study in Social Hypocrisy, 17 W. RES. L. REV. 435 (1965);
Richard A. Schwartz, Abortion on Request: The Psychiatric Implications, 23 CASE W. L. REV. 840
(1971–72).
523. See supra text accompanying notes 265-292 (explaining Lord Ellenborough’s Act, the fate of its
abortion provisions in successor legislation, and its interpretation in U.K. courts); see also generally
KEOWN, ABORTION, DOCTORS, AND THE LAW, supra note 38.
524. Charge of Procuring Abortion, 2 BRIT. MED. J. 97 (1939), cited in KEOWN, ABORTION, DOCTORS,
AND THE LAW, supra note 38, at 50.
525. Id.
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injury,” health could become so compromised that it would shorten life.526 The
prosecution argued a bright-line distinction between saving life and preserving
health527 and queried the lawfulness of abortion in regard to the latter,528
especially to mitigate a possible threat to mental health.529 In jury instructions,
the judge clarified that a doctor need not wait until a patient was in immediate
danger but was duty-bound to operate if pregnancy threatened life.530 He further
told the jury that “life depends on health, and it may be that health is so gravely
impaired that death results.”531 Statutory provision permitting abortion for “the
preservation of life” was to be construed in a “reasonable sense”: if a doctor
thought “the probable consequence of continuation of the pregnancy will be to
make the woman a physical or mental wreck,” the jury was entitled to find that
the doctor operated for the purpose of preserving the life of the mother.532
The approach in Rex v. Bourne illustrates a few matters intrinsic to the
development of the life-health exception. First, by 1938, life and health were
becoming disentangled. Second, some courts, as in Bourne, reasoned that the
threat to life and grounds for invoking the “life” defense need not be restricted to
birthing emergency and its immediate temporality.533 A threat to health over the
long term could make a person a “wreck” and ruin her life or tempt her to end it.
Third, as with the old life-health exception, the “life” exception included defense
of health, but here, “health” included mental health.
Over the long twentieth century, the emergence of “mental health” benefitted
the therapeutic exception at a time when life and health were increasingly
disentangled in abortion practice, which could have left the rationale of a health
exception particularly vulnerable to erosion. Intrusive measures had become less
deadly to women. Further, with the switch from humoral health, in other
situations there were ways to save life that might not necessarily preserve “full
health.” In other words, a gap had appeared between “saving life” and “saving
health” in twentieth-century gynecology. Into this doctrinal gap, at law the
meaning of “health” expanded along two dimensions. Between 1940 and 1959,
sociologically informed ideas of health and lifespan, as well as psychologically
526. Id.
527. Id.
528. Id. at 50–51 (in Rex v. Bourne, Attorney-General conceded that if necessary to save the life of the
mother, induced or forcible miscarriage is not “unlawful”).
529. THE TIMES, July 20, 1938, cited in KEOWN, ABORTION, DOCTORS, AND THE LAW, supra note 38, at
50, 182 n.8.
530. Rex v. Bourne, 1 K.B. 687, 693 (1939), cited in KEOWN, ABORTION, DOCTORS, AND THE LAW,
supra note 38, at 182 n.14.
531. Id. at 692.
532. Id. at 694.
533. See People v. Ballard, 167 Cal. App. 2d 803, 335 P.2d 204 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959) (peril to woman’s
life need not be “imminent” to justify abortion under statutory standard of necessity); see also, e.g., R v.
Bell [1929], 1 BRIT. MED. J. 1061 (in case of patient whose obesity made pregnancy increasingly risky,
judge states certain operations to terminate pregnancy in its last stages to save patient’s are legal and
necessary), cited in KEOWN, ABORTION, DOCTORS, AND THE LAW, supra note 38, at 182 n.27.
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informed ideas of mental health, entered into decisions about medical necessity.
With the medicalization of legal doctrine, control over abortion that was first
concentrated in physicians passed increasingly to hospitals. Hospitals set up
therapeutic abortion review boards to weigh the medical justification of abortion
in a particular case.534 A woman’s wish to terminate pregnancy became subject to
scrutiny by teams of strangers, mostly men.535 When the American Law Institute
(ALI) proposed a model penal code section on abortion in 1959, it repeated the
old New York formula of requiring that two physicians consult on the medical
necessity of the procedure.536 However, following a few state courts, the ALI
defined the life/health exception to include “substantial risk that continuance of
the pregnancy would gravely impair the physical or mental health of the
mother.”537 The M.P.C. ushered in a new wave of statutory reform and intensified
anxiety, action, and discourse until Roe v. Wade.
4. Health Lost
In parallel and overshadowed by overt developments, another great transforma-
tion took place over the course of the long twentieth century: the loss of two
millenia of practical knowledge of emmenagogic and abortifacient recipes and
procedures. The practice of early-term potional abortion in the name of “restoring
menses,” no longer justified by outmoded humoral theories, fell out of
practitioners’ repertoire. With the disappearance of humoral theory, practice—
even by many irregulars—shifted to new grounds. Changes in practice disrupted
established patterns for transmitting knowledge, through texts and oral tradition.
Knowledge of abortifacients was dropped from translation538 and suppressed.539
The period from 1857 to 1959 was marked by the near extinction of an enormous
body of knowledge and practice in abortion.
Abortion increasingly came to mean uterine intrusion or surgery, not only
because of a shift in medical practice from irregulars to regulars but also from the
evaporation of a humoral theory that explained disease in a way that justified, even
demanded, emmenagogic and abortive purgations. In other words, by our time of
534. For accounts of how the hospital review boards worked, see, e.g., HAROLD ROSEN, THERAPEUTIC
ABORTION: MEDICAL, PSYCHIATRIC, ANTHROPOLOGICAL, AND RELIGIOUS CONSIDERATIONS (1954); see also
Alan Guttmacher, The Genesis of Liberalized Abortion in New York: A Personal Insight, 23 CASE W. L.
REV. 756 (1971–72); REAGAN, WHEN ABORTION WAS A CRIME, supra note 22, at 173–79, 214 (describing
the work and institutionalization of hospital “therapeutic abortion” review committees).
535. For a description of this aspect of the work of hospital abortion committees, see Rickie Sollinger,
“A Complete Disaster”: Abortion and the Politics of Hospital Abortion Committees, 1950–1970, in
Leavitt, WOMEN AND HEALTH supra note 144, at 659, 664–68.
536. MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.3(3) (1959), in ROSE, ABORTION DOCUMENTARY GUIDE, supra note 25,
at 38.
537. § 230.3(2) (1959), in ROSE, ABORTION DOCUMENTARY GUIDE, supra note 25, at 38.
538. See RIDDLE, ANCIENT ABORTION, supra note 33, at 160–66 (describing, e.g., abortion knowledge
edited out of nineteenth- and twentieth-century English translations of humoral works).
539. See Tine M. Gammeltoft and Ayo Wahlberg, Selective Reproduction Technologies, 43 ANN. REV.
ANTHROPOLOGY 201 (2014) (including knowledge suppressed in translation from colonies to England).
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post-Roe thinking, “abortion” had become equated with intrusive measures and surgery
not only because doctors forced out midwives,540 but also because a conceptualization
of health that had supported alternative procedures disappeared.
CONCLUSION
Understanding practices and conceptions of health particular to past times
exposes a history of the “health exception” often otherwise obscured. For most of
its history, Anglo-American law regulated abortion differentially by practice.541
In its earliest iterations, the law permitted without comment potional abortion,
and disfavored practices most dangerous to the patient—“poison,” abortion by
blows, and internal intrusion—and interventions at times most dangerous to the
patient, i.e., after “quickening.”542
The antecedents of abortion regulation also encoded intent. Curative intent
could be construed in regard to treating either retained menses or responding to
perilous pregnancy. Liability attached under a very limited circumstance: in the
case of patient death, from a post-quickening procedure, if intent had been to
destroy a fetus rather than to cure or save a patient.543 If a practitioner
administered an emmenagogue, a “constructive health exception” excluded
liability for unintended patient death.544 If a practitioner undertook a treatment
understood to terminate pregnancy, a “life-health” defense provided a shield from
liability in most cases of unintended patient death.545 Statutory provisions
regarding “lawful” and “unlawful” abortion depended on curative intent to
distinguish legality.546
The contours of this doctrine survived, even as fundamental understandings of
health changed,547 preserved in legality distinctions and in life-health exceptions
to restrictions imposed by statute.548 However, aside from new ideas about
socioeconomic health effects and mental health impairments from unwanted
pregnancies and births, conceptions of “health” became steadily less holistic, and
the grounds for invoking medical necessity became ever narrower through the
twentieth century.549 The “health exception” doctrine of today represents
continuity with doctrines of the past, enjoying centuries-old antecedents. What is
540. See generally MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA, supra note 22.
541. See supra Part I.D.
542. See supra Part I.D.2.
543. See supra Part I.D.3.
544. See supra Part I.D.4.
545. See supra Part I.D.4.
546. See supra Part II.D.
547. See supra Part II.A–C.
548. See supra Part II.D.
549. See supra Part III.
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novel are the narrowed grounds on which patients, practitioners, and lawmakers
may now invoke it.
Debates over “life,” and changes to contraception and abortion practice,
receive more attention than health epistemologies nowadays. However, if the past
is anything to judge by, changes to our conception of health—though less
conscious and more difficult to detect—may prove the more dispositive part of
the equation for the future of the “health exception.”
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